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Foreword
This collection of ‘critical reflections’ on Australian public policy offers a valuable
contribution to public discussion of important political and policy issues facing
our nation and society. These essays are important not only because of the
reputation and position of the various contributors, but because they are
incredibly ‘content rich’ and brimming with new ideas.
Contributors to this volume include politicians, senior public servants, respected
academics and civil society leaders. Their views matter—whether or not one
agrees with the propositions put—because of who they are and their capacity
to influence and shape events. With few exceptions, the contributors are active
players, not dispassionate observers of the issues in which they are engaged.
Their observations and commentary on Australian public affairs reach back into
the recent past and, in some cases, the essays need to be viewed through the
lens of antecedent and subsequent events. For example, readers of Ian Gill’s
essay on creating a conservation economy in indigenous communities (Chapter
15), will compare and contrast his experience with Australia’s experience of the
Northern Territory intervention. Readers of Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston’s
essay on leadership in the Australian Defence Force (Chapter 12) will reflect on
his remarks in light of recent controversies concerning the relationship between
the Defence Minister and the civilian and military arms of the Defence portfolio.
Many of the essays in this collection are ‘primary sources’ insofar as they provide
an important record of the views, hopes and frustrations of key decision makers
working at the coalface of Australian political, social and economic affairs. It
must be borne in mind, when reading some of these contributions, that the views
expressed by the authors reflect a particular point in time: for example, John
Brumby has contributed two essays to this collection, one prepared on the back
of the National Reform Agenda (see Chapter 5) from a speech given while he was
still the Victorian Treasurer and John Howard was still Prime Minister, and the
other (Chapter 2) from a speech given after he became Premier and John Howard
had given way to Kevin Rudd. Taken together, the two essays chart the political
and policy trajectory of the development of his ideas as the federal reform agenda
progressed.
The essays in this collection were originally presented either as part of the
Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Public Lecture
Series in 2007 and 2008 or at the ANZSOG Annual Conference ‘Making Federalism
Work’ held on 11 and 12 September 2008, in Melbourne. The sole exception is
Peter Thompson’s essay reflecting on changes in the media landscape during
his lifetime, which was prepared for a special ANZSOG workshop on strategic
media management held in August 2006. The essays in this volume are grouped
into four broad themes.
ix
Part 1, Reflections on Australian federalism, contains essays by the Federal
Treasurer, Wayne Swan, Queensland Premier, Anna Bligh, Victorian Premier,
John Brumby, and ANU academic Mark Matthews, each of whom outlines cogent
arguments and prescriptions for a renewed and reinvigorated federalism.
In Part 2, Reflections on Australian politics and policy, Griffith University’s Pat
Weller paints a compelling—and at times amusing—portrait of cabinet
government and Solicitor-General, David Bennett, Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) Chairman, Graeme Samuel, and Productivity
Commission Chairman, Gary Banks, reflect on matters as diverse as constitutional
litigation, the operation of the Trade Practices Act and the many iterations of
evidenced-based policy.
In Part 3, Reflections on leadership and governance, the colourful former Telstra
executive Phil Burgess 1  reflects on the cultural divide between public and
private sector leadership; former Senator Andrew Murray speculates on the
inclusion of political governance, transparency and accountability as part of a
broader reform agenda alongside burning issues such as climate change, education
and infrastructure; and Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston reflects on the
principles on which successful leadership of the Australian Defence Force must
be based.
In Part 4, Reflections on adaptive change, The Australian National University’s
Vice-Chancellor—sometimes dubbed the most powerful vice-chancellor in
Australia—presents a compelling argument for ‘rethinking, renewal and
reinvigoration’ in Australian higher education; social entrepreneur Ian Gill,
President of Ecotrust Canada, outlines the Canadian experience in building a
‘conservation economy’ in indigenous communities and draws comparisons with
the Australian situation; and, finally, well-known journalist Peter Thompson
reflects on the technological revolutions shaping Australian media and popular
culture.
Whether the authors are actors in the events and issues under discussion (such
as Wayne Swan, John Brumby, Ian Gill or Graeme Samuel) or keen observers of
events (Patrick Weller, Peter Thompson or Mark Matthews), the critical
reflections contained within these pages offer much to those with an interest in
the main currents of contemporary Australian policy and politics. I commend
this volume to you.
John Wanna
Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration
Research School of Social Science
The Australian National University
March 2009
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ENDNOTES
1  Burgess, of course, was one of a trio of American executive imports (the others being Greg Winn and
Bill Stewart) dubbed the ‘three amigos’, who, under the direction of Chief Executive, Sol Trujillo, saw
a normally subservient Telstra muscle up to the Howard Government in the policy tussle over the






Gary Banks AO has been Chairman of the Productivity Commission since its
inception and was reappointed in April 2008. In addition to overseeing the
commission’s activities, he has personally headed national inquiries into such
topics as the National Competition Policy, the National Reform Agenda and the
economic implications of an ageing Australia. He also chaired the Australian
Government’s Regulation Taskforce in 2006 and is presiding over the
Productivity Commission’s gambling inquiry. Banks chairs the intergovernmental
Steering Committee for the Review of Government Services and was the initial
convenor for its report on Indigenous disadvantage. In 1998, he was a member
of the West Review of Higher Education. In 2007, he was made an Officer of the
Order of Australia for services to the development of public policy in
microeconomic reform and regulation.
David Bennett
David Bennett AC QC was the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of
Australia, appointed for a five-year term in August 1998 and for a second
five-year term in August 2003. In August 2008, Dr Bennett returned to private
practice at the legal firm 5 Wentworth, founded by Sir Garfield Barwick in 1932,
where he had been a member between 1982 and 1998. Dr Bennett was appointed
as a Queen’s Counsel in 1979 and practised in the areas of appellate law generally,
constitutional law, administrative law, revenue law, trade practices and
competition law, among others. Dr Bennett served as president of the NSW Bar
Association from November 1995 to November 1997 and President of the
Australian Bar Association from November 1995 to February 1997. Dr Bennett
was appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia on 12 June 2000 for service
to the law and the legal profession in the areas of administration, education and
practice. Dr Bennett was appointed a Companion in the Order of Australia in
the Queen’s Birthday Honours List 2008 for services to the law, particularly as
Commonwealth Solicitor-General, through the provision of advice on matters
of national interest and the international promotion of Australian legal services
and education. He was also the recipient of a Centenary Medal in 2003.
Anna Bligh
Anna Bligh MP was sworn in as Premier of Queensland on 13 September 2007,
after the resignation of Peter Beattie. She is the state’s first female premier and,
in the 2009 Queensland state election, earned the distinction of being the first
elected female State premier. Bligh was appointed Deputy Premier of Queensland
in July 2005—the same month she celebrated 10 years as Member for South
Brisbane. As Deputy Premier, she was also Treasurer and Minister for
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Infrastructure, running the $33 billion Queensland State Budget and leading
construction of the $9 billion South-East Queensland Water Grid. She was
formerly Minister for Finance, State Development, Trade and Innovation. Before
that, she was Queensland’s first female Education Minister, spending almost five
years overseeing significant reforms to the state’s education system, during
which time she also had responsibilities for the arts portfolio, overseeing
construction of the Millennium Arts Precinct. After the election of the Beattie
Labor Government in June 1998, her first ministerial responsibility was as
Minister for Families, Youth and Community Care and Disability Services. Before
her election, on 15 July 1995, Bligh worked in many community organisations
and in the Queensland Public Service, in employment, training and industrial
relations policy. Bligh graduated with an Arts Degree from the University of
Queensland in 1980.
John Brumby
John Brumby MP was sworn in as the forty-fifth Premier of Victoria on 30 July
2007. Before becoming Premier, Brumby served as Treasurer and Minister for
Regional and Rural Development. He was also appointed as Victoria’s first
Minister for Innovation in February 2002. Brumby was elected to the Victorian
Parliament in 1993. He was Leader of the Opposition for almost six years. Between
1983 and 1990, he was the Federal Member for Bendigo during the Hawke
Government and served as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on
Employment, Education and Training. Brumby completed a Bachelor of Commerce
from Melbourne University in 1974 and a Diploma of Education from the State
College of Victoria, Rusden, in 1975. He was the recipient of a Centenary Medal
in 2001, a National Leadership Award for Tourism and Infrastructure
Contribution in 2005 and a Research Australia Leadership and Innovation Award
in 2006.
Phil Burgess
Phil Burgess is a writer and commentator on economic, political and cultural
trends. He is also a Visiting Professor of Policy Studies at the University of
California at Los Angeles’ public policy school, where he teaches in the graduate
program on communications and culture, and a non-resident Senior Fellow for
Technology and Culture at the Center for the New West, where he was the
founding president from 1988–2000. He is the former Group Managing Director
for Public Policy and Communications at Telstra. He now lives in the United
States and is President of The Annapolis Institute, a private, non-partisan think
tank.
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Ian Chubb
Ian Chubb AC was appointed Vice-Chancellor of The Australian National
University in January 2001, having previously been Vice-Chancellor of Flinders
University from 1995 to 2000. He was the Senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor at
Monash University from 1993 to 1995, for part of that time simultaneously
holding the position of Foundation Dean of the Faculty of Business and
Economics. From 1986 to 1990, Professor Chubb was Deputy Vice-Chancellor of
the University of Wollongong. Between 1990 and 1993, Professor Chubb was
the full-time Chair of the Higher Education Council and concurrently Deputy
Chair of the National Board of Employment, Education and Training. He served
as a member and, subsequently, Chair of the Higher Education Council in a
part-time capacity from 1994 to 1997. He also served as Interim Chair, then
Deputy Chair, of the National Committee for Quality in Higher Education from
1993 to 1994. Professor Chubb was Chair of the Group of Eight universities in
2004 and 2005 and has served in various capacities on the National Health and
Medical Research Council and the Australian Research Committee. Professor
Chubb began his university career as a neuroscientist. The recipient of a number
of academic awards and named fellowships at the University of Ghent and Oxford
University, he returned to Australia to take up a position in human physiology
at Flinders University in 1977. In June 1999, Professor Chubb was made an
Officer of the Order of Australia for his services to ‘the development of higher
education policy and its implementation at state, national and international
levels, as an administrator in the tertiary education sector, and to research,
particularly in the field of neuroscience’. In April 2003, he was awarded the
Centenary Medal for service to Australian society through tertiary education
and university administration. In June 2006, Professor Chubb was appointed a
Companion of the Order of Australia for ‘service to higher education including
research and development policy in the pursuit of advancing the national interest
socially, economically, culturally and environmentally and to the facilitation of
a knowledge-based global economy’.
Ian Gill
Ian Gill is President of Ecotrust Canada, an enterprising non-profit organisation
whose purpose is to build the conservation economy in coastal British Columbia.
Ecotrust Canada works at the intersection of conservation and community
economic development by promoting innovation and enabling communities,
First Nations and enterprises to green and grow their local economies. Gill was
born in Australia and now holds dual Australian and Canadian citizenship. He
began his career as a journalist, covering federal politics from Canberra for The
Land. After moving to Canada in 1981, he furthered his journalistic career, first
with the Vancouver Sun and then with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation—as
its environmental reporter and as a host and producer of documentaries that
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won local, national and international awards. In 1994, Gill founded Ecotrust
Canada and today serves as President of Ecotrust Canada and its subsidiary,
Ecotrust Canada Capital.
Allan Grant (Angus) Houston
Allan Grant (Angus) Houston AO AFC joined the Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF) as a cadet pilot in 1970. Air Chief Marshal Houston has wide staff
experience, having served on the Joint Operations staff at Headquarters
Australian Defence during the Gulf crisis of 1990–91. He was the Director of Air
Force Policy during 1992–93 and also served at Headquarters Australian Theatre
from 1997 to 1999 as Chief of Staff, and Head of Strategic Command from 2000
to 2001. He was promoted to Air Chief Marshal and assumed his current
appointment as Chief of the Defence Force on 4 July 2005 after four years as
Chief of Air Force. In 2003, Air Chief Marshal Houston was advanced as an
Officer in the Order of Australia, having previously been appointed a Member
in 1990. In 1980, he was awarded the Air Force Cross. Air Chief Marshal Houston
is the third RAAF officer to be appointed to the most senior position in the
Australian Defence Force.
Mark Matthews
Mark Matthews is Director of Policy and Engagement at the new Centre for
Policy Innovation in the Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian
National University. Since April 2007, Matthews has also served as Executive
Director of the Forum for European-Australian Science and Technology
cooperation (FEAST), established by the Australian Government and the European
Union to highlight, promote and facilitate research collaboration between their
respective communities. The FEAST Secretariat is hosted by The Australian
National University on behalf of the research community. Matthews has extensive
private sector experience in public policy consulting in the United Kingdom
and Australia, with a particular emphasis on science and innovation policy. In
addition to his business experience, he has held academic positions in the
Universities of Sussex (Research Fellow, Science Policy Research Unit), Bath
(Research Fellow, School of Management) and Warwick (Senior Fellow, Warwick
Manufacturing Group, Department of Engineering). Matthews’ research focuses
on international political aspects of national differences in science and innovation
capability and on the potential for using insights from engineering management
and finance to inform how uncertainty and risk are managed in public policy
settings.
Terry Moran
Terry Moran AO was appointed to the position of Secretary, Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, in February 2008. Moran has had a varied career
as a public servant, working with successive Australian federal and state
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governments, with roles in public policy and public sector management. He was
Chief Executive of the Office of the State Training Board (OSTB) in Victoria from
late 1987 to May 1993. In May 1993, he was appointed as the first Chief Executive
Officer of the Australian National Training Authority and was subsequently
appointed Director-General of Education Queensland in August 1998. In July
2000, Moran was appointed Secretary of the Victorian Department of Premier
and Cabinet. As part of this role, Moran advised the Victorian Premier on the
development of major policy initiatives by the Victorian Government. He advised
the Victorian Government in relation to public sector reform initiatives that led
to the establishment of the Victorian State Services Authority in 2005 and also
took a leading role in the development of a new National Reform Agenda, a
broad reform program aimed at improving productivity and workforce
participation. Moran has a strong interest in public policy capacity and was
instrumental in establishing the Australia and New Zealand School of
Government—a joint initiative by six governments and 10 universities—in
2003.
Andrew Murray
Andrew Murray was born in England and has lived and worked in Rhodesia,
South Africa, England and Australia. Raised and schooled in Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), he went to university in South Africa and later to Oxford as a Rhodes
Scholar. Murray migrated to Australia in 1989 and was a senator for Western
Australia from July 1996 to June 2008. He has direct experience of complex and
difficult environments, including those affected by war, economic sanctions and
major political, social, environmental and economic problems. Pre-Senate, his
business career included positions as an executive and director in large public
and private corporations, and owning and managing his own businesses. He has
also been in the armed forces, a consultant, occasional media writer and occasional
academic, and is a published author. He is best known in politics for his work
on finance, economic, business, industrial relations and tax issues; on
accountability and electoral reform; and for his work on institutionalised children.
Graeme Samuel
Graeme Samuel AO is the Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC). He took up the position in July 2003. Until then he was
President of the National Competition Council, Chairman of the Melbourne and
Olympics Parks Trust, a commissioner of the Australian Football League, a
member of the board of the Docklands Authority and a director of Thakral
Holdings Limited. He relinquished all these offices to assume his position with
the ACCC. Samuel is also an Associate Member of the Australian Communications
and Media Authority. He is a past president of the Australian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and a past chairman of Playbox Theatre Company.
Samuel holds a Bachelor of Laws (Melbourne) and Master of Laws (Monash). In
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1998, Samuel was appointed an Officer in the General Division of the Order of
Australia.
Wayne Swan
Wayne Swan MP was sworn in as Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia
after Labor’s election victory on 24 November 2007. He was elected to Parliament
as the Member for the Brisbane seat of Lilley from 1993 to 1996, and from 1998
to the present. Swan is the author of Postcode: The splintering of a nation,
published by Pluto Press Australia in June 2005. Before his appointment to his
current role, he was Labor’s Shadow Treasurer from 2004. Before that, he was
Shadow Minister for Family and Community Services from 1998 to 2004. Before
entering Parliament, Swan was for 12 years a lecturer in public policy at the
Queensland Institute of Technology (now QUT), then State Secretary of the
Queensland Branch of the Australian Labor Party and campaign director for
Wayne Goss’s historic election victories in 1989 and 1992. He has also worked
as a policy analyst in the Office of Youth Affairs and as an adviser to the Hon
Bill Hayden MP, the Hon Mick Young MP and the Hon Kim Beazley MP. Swan
has a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) degree from the University of Queensland.
Peter Thompson
Peter Thompson is a leading educator, communications consultant, broadcaster
and author. For many years he has been an ABC radio and television broadcaster
and currently hosts the successful Talking Heads program on ABC TV. His
publications include Persuading Aristotle, The Secrets of the Great Communicators
and the audio publications Communication: A winning strategy and The Astute
Negotiator. Thompson is an ANZSOG Fellow and has taught senior public sector
managers in the school’s Executive Fellows Program about the complex
relationship between the media and government. Thompson has also taught
communication to MBA and executive programs at the Australian Graduate
School of Management, and advises governments and non-governmental
organisations on communication strategy. He is an alumnus of the Kennedy
School of Government and the Australian Graduate School of Management.
Patrick Weller
Patrick Weller AO holds an ANZSOG Chair at Griffith University, where he is
also Professor of Politics and Public Policy and Director of the Centre for
Governance and Public Policy. His principal interests are the operations of
executive government, in Australia and internationally, the impact of political
leadership and the role of international civil servants in international
organisations. Professor Weller is the author of many books, articles, book
chapters, reviews, conference papers and reports.
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Part 1. Reflections on federalism

1. Federalism and the engine room of
prosperity1
The Hon Wayne Swan MP, Treasurer of Australia
Australian legal scholar Professor Greg Craven once described federalism as the
topic most likely to clear an Australian barbecue. In the past 50 years, he wrote,
‘Australian federalism has received more bad press than morbid obesity’. Whether
you agree or disagree with Craven’s views on federalism itself, it is hard to argue
with his description of it as our own constitutional ‘F’ word.
To most Australians, federalism is probably about as popular as a politician
appearing onstage at a grand final. Yet while it might not so far have become
the lead topic of conversation in the nation’s lounge rooms and pubs, Australians
do care about making public services work better. And in a system such as ours,
it’s hard to get better outcomes in areas such as housing, health and Indigenous
affairs unless all governments work together.
I want to say something about the ambitious reforms we’re implementing through
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), to offer a sense of the new
architecture we propose and why it represents a fundamental improvement over
the way we’ve done things in the past. Reforming the architecture of
Commonwealth–state relations can sound a little airy, so I also want to provide
a practical example of how our new approach will affect the lives of Australians.
I want to describe what we’re doing with school reform and how it exemplifies
what we can achieve from modern federalism. There’s no better reason to get
federalism right than the opportunity it provides to improve our schools.
My whole political life I have believed education is the engine room of prosperity
and the key to overcoming social disadvantage. It’s why I devoted a big chunk
of 2005 to writing Postcode: The splintering of a nation, my book on social
disadvantage in Australia. Creating prosperity and spreading opportunity are
why I entered politics. Education is what brings these two objectives together.
I am relishing the opportunity we’ve been given to modernise the federation,
so we can build a platform from which to reform Australia’s education system.
As the government goes about lifting national productivity and creating a more
inclusive society, Commonwealth–state relations and education reform is the
place where Julia Gillard’s policy agendas and mine frequently meet. Education
reform—especially school reform—has been proposed in this country for a
decade. Half-hearted attempts have been made, but they have not been backed
up with the leadership and conviction needed to deliver structural change. Our
predecessors never succeeded in navigating Australia’s future—and there is no
3
better example of this than the former treasurer’s failure to invest in the education
of our children.
In a number of developed countries, imaginative public policies have
substantially improved the quality of school education and student outcomes.
Greater transparency, along with new investment and greater flexibility, has
been key to these improvements. By comparison, Australia’s reform effort has
been lacklustre. And one of the key reasons why is they have foundered on the
rock of unreformed federalism. It’s only now that we are creating a more flexible,
market-driven set of Commonwealth–state relations that substantial education
reforms can finally be realised. Ultimately, this is a major structural difference
between the Rudd Government’s school reforms and those that have been floated
before them—not only because we have the will to revolutionise Australia’s
education system, but because we are modernising the federal structures to
enable necessary education reforms and investments to be made.
Modern federalism
Every economy in the world today is facing tough economic conditions. The
global credit crunch and global oil price shock have buffeted confidence and
share markets and are slowing global growth. But as the National Accounts for
the September Quarter 2008 demonstrated, while Australia is not immune, we
are well placed in comparison with a number of other developed economies.
And the Rudd Government is determined to press home this advantage. This
means undertaking serious microeconomic reform—to boost our productivity,
lift our international competitiveness and invest in our human capital.
In many respects, the COAG reforms are the centrepiece of the government’s
microeconomic reform agenda. The reforms are focused on what economists call
‘enhancing public sector productivity’—or what just about everyone else simply
calls ‘better public services’. The changes in the financial relationship between
the Commonwealth and the states that we are putting in place represent a major
revamp of Australian federalism. The old ways of doing things have obviously
not worked.
For decades, the Commonwealth imposed input controls on Commonwealth
funding to the states—tough conditions to dictate the way funding was to be
used. These conditions constrained flexibility and innovation in service delivery.
This made it difficult for the states to set their own priorities. It also created
inefficiencies, as the Commonwealth devoted unnecessary time to administering
them. Most importantly, Commonwealth intervention in areas of state
responsibility blurred the lines of accountability. The conditions imposed on
Commonwealth funding confused the public because it was no longer clear
whether the states or the Commonwealth was accountable for poor service
delivery, or indeed good service delivery. If you doubt this, I suggest you go
4
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to a suburban shopping centre and ask the shoppers which level of government
is responsible for improving their child’s school.
This lack of public accountability is the reason COAG meetings became a routine
blame game, with both levels of government blaming the other for poor service
delivery and trying to shift expenditure responsibility. Voters were left unsure
who was ultimately at fault, but quite sure that they wouldn’t tolerate that kind
of squabbling from their children. Old-style federalism was conducive to
short-term fixes and political machinations—but it stood fundamentally at odds
with delivering high-quality services and the necessary reforms to underpin
future economic prosperity. We are committed to leaving it permanently in our
wake.
There’s been a lot written and a lot said about the future of federalism if the
Carpenter Government is not returned in Western Australia.2 This misses the
point. We’ve always said that we want to build a modern federalism that looks
beyond current governments. The reforms we envisage are too important to be
caught up in partisan politics. In education, for example, the future of our kids
is far more important than any party political differences we have. That is why
I am proud of the new financial framework that Australian treasurers have
hammered out this year.
New financial framework reforms
In modernising Commonwealth–state financial relations in Australia, we have
been guided by some commonsense principles. The states have a wealth of
experience in how best to deliver services in their jurisdictions. The
Commonwealth should leave them the scope to innovate and tailor solutions in
a way that best fits the needs of their populations. This is not to say that there
is no role for policy leadership by the Commonwealth. Many of the big challenges
facing the economy are issues that need to be addressed through the
Commonwealth working in partnership with the states.
So what do the new financial framework reforms mean in practice? The
Commonwealth will continue to assist the states in their endeavours, but the
states will be responsible and accountable. The new framework for federal
financial relations will help to make that clear. That clarity in accountability
will be achieved in several ways. First, the number of Specific Purpose Payments
will be reduced from more than 90 to just a handful—in the areas of health care,
early years education and schools, vocational education, disabilities and housing.
To see what a fundamental break this is with the past, you have to recall that
the number of Specific Purpose Payments has sat at about 100 for decades now.
In this sense, our approach is radically different from what has gone before.
This rationalisation will reduce wastage at a time when we can no longer sustain
the excesses of the past.
5
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Second, the Commonwealth will give the states the budget flexibility they need
to allocate resources where they will produce the best results. The Commonwealth
will move away from the prescription of the past and remove the input controls
that inhibit state service delivery and priority setting. Instead, the focus will be
on the achievement of outcomes.
Third, the Commonwealth will provide the states with more funding certainty.
States will be better off financially and will no longer be plagued with the
uncertainty of not knowing whether they will receive Commonwealth payments.
There will be no more five-year agreements with ‘take it or leave it’ offers when
they expire. Instead, the new National Specific Purpose Payments will be ongoing
agreements, reviewed periodically to ensure the maintenance of funding
adequacy.
Fourth, and central to the new framework, there will be simpler, standardised
and more transparent public performance reporting. The new reporting
framework will focus on the achievement of results, value for money and timely
provision of publicly available and comparable performance information. Roles
and responsibilities will be clarified and the performance of each jurisdiction
will be independently assessed by the COAG Reform Council.
Also central to the new financial framework reforms will be additional incentive
payments to drive key economic and social reforms. National Partnership
Payments will reward those states that best deliver the services and outcomes
to their citizens, and not reward those that don’t. In so doing, they will drive a
new microeconomic reform agenda in this country. Most importantly of all, they
will improve the quality of services available to the Australian people—including
schools.
Schools reform
Australia has not traditionally been a highly educated country. It is easy to
forget that in 1983, when the Hawke Government came to power, only four in
10 Australian children finished year 12. When Labor left office in 1996, that
number had risen to seven in 10. Since then, there has been relatively little
change in school completion rates. Higher educational attainment has a substantial
productivity pay-off. On average, each additional year of education raises
earnings by 10 per cent.
Education is particularly important at a time when developed-country labour
markets are in a state of flux. Manual low-skilled jobs are increasingly
disappearing, while employment growth has been concentrated in jobs requiring
abstract cognitive skills, complex communication and exercising judgment in
the face of uncertainty. Of course, manual jobs will not disappear, but there is
also a trend towards higher skill requirements within occupations.
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As a recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
working paper pointed out, ‘a bank teller today spends more time than in the
past selling financial services, and less time performing routine tasks such as
processing deposits and withdrawals. Similarly a mechanic can no longer function
without the ability to read and to work with computerised testing equipment.’3
What is driving these changes? One factor is the rapid advance of technology.
In a new book, Harvard economists Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz refer to the
‘race’ between education and technology.4  At times when technology outstrips
education, inequality rises. Conversely, when education increases faster than
technology, inequality falls. The other factor is globalisation. In the past few
decades, India has opened its economy to the world, China has shifted to market
capitalism and the former Soviet empire has collapsed. Another Harvard
economist, Richard Freeman, vividly refers to these events as equivalent to
another 1.5 billion unskilled workers joining the global economy.5
On balance, the expansion of the global economy has benefited Australians. But
as immigration, trade and offshoring have expanded, many Australian workers
suddenly find themselves in a global labour market. These findings have
profound implications for anyone who cares about the most disadvantaged in
our society. Although technological advances and globalisation are major
contributors to rising living standards in Australia, they do not lift all boats
equally. Public policy needs to recognise this and ensure that the gains from
technology, trade and immigration are shared across society. Central to this is
raising the quantity and quality of education.
It isn’t easy to predict the occupational mix of the Australian labour market in
the future. But it’s a fair bet that one of the best things we can give to a young
Australian today is a broad-based education—the foundation for lifelong learning.
This will benefit the individuals themselves, but it will also have positive
spill-overs. Better-educated adults pay more tax, are less reliant on income
support and are less likely to commit crimes.
A comprehensive discussion of the government’s schools reforms would take
much longer than I have available to me here. So let me simply focus on two
aspects of our reforms, which are symbolic of what we are working towards.
These are transparency in school reporting and improving schools in low
socioeconomic status communities.
Transparency in school reporting
In the private sector, it has long been recognised that information is central to
well-functioning markets. It turns out that the same is true in the public sector.
Giving people information about the performance of public services empowers
them to spur reform. It is also consistent with this government’s belief in
transparency. We are ultimately accountable to voters, whose taxes fund
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government services. Those voters have a right to know how well these services
are performing.
I’ve talked previously about the importance of reporting health outcomes at a
hospital level—an agenda that Health Minister, Nicola Roxon, has been
vigorously promoting. In this essay, I want to speak about a parallel agenda:
reporting test score results at a school level.
During the past month, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister have
made clear that we are committed to reporting test scores at a school level. This
has not been uncontroversial, with some critics referring to it as ‘unreliable and
misleading’, a ‘divisive sideshow’ and suggesting that we are engaging in
‘bullying tactics’.
It is important that we engage with our critics on this issue. For the most part,
they care about the same things that we do: ensuring that our education system
is as good as it can be and that it particularly serves the needs of the most needy
students. You cannot be serious about equality of opportunity unless you are
committed to improving the quality of schools in disadvantaged communities.
In achieving this goal, it is critical that we measure the performance of schools,
so we can learn from the best and identify problems early.
But measuring school performance is not as simple as comparing their raw scores.
In part, the differences between schools are due to their socioeconomic mix. We
should not blame a school because it enrols children from low-income households
or shower it with plaudits because it admits only the more affluent. That is why
this government is committed to ‘like school’ reporting.
Separating what students bring to the classroom on day one from the value
added by the school is not trivial—but it is not impossible either. Indeed, the
challenge is similar to the one we face in separating hospital performance from
case-load mix. We need to take account of whether one hospital treats sicker
patients than another in determining hospital effectiveness.
A student’s family background is an important influence on his or her success
at school. But it would be a mistake to think that is all that matters. There are
persistent and systematic differences between schools and we owe it to Australia’s
children to learn as much as we can about why one school does better than
another. It is also important to remember that we are requiring all schools to be
accountable—government and non-government.
For the first time in the nation’s history, parents will be able to compare the
performance of schools across Australia, taking into account the mix of students
at those schools. If one school is performing far better than its socioeconomic
mix would predict, why don’t we see what we can learn from it? Sometimes the
answer will be something that is hard to replicate—a charismatic principal,
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perhaps. But other times, we might find that schools can learn lessons from one
another that can raise the performance of all.
In theory, information should matter—and in practice, we have good evidence
that it does. Looking at accountability across all 50 states of the United States,
Stanford academics Martin Carnoy and Susanna Loeb found that the largest test
score gains were experienced in those states that published school-level results.
White, black and Hispanic students all did better when schools in their state
became more accountable. A strong and transparent accountability framework
is a non-negotiable part of the COAG schools reform agenda, which reaches
further and deeper than anything Australia has seen in the past decade and
more.
For too long, public policy in this area has been made with an eye to short-term
politics, not long-term improvements in policy outcomes. That’s not the way
this government does business. We believe that parents and the community
have a right to know how their schools are performing and to compare them
with other schools that serve similar populations.
Schools in low socioeconomic status communities
While greater transparency is necessary for improving underachieving schools,
it’s not sufficient. The government has therefore set out to provide new resources
to schools in low socioeconomic status communities in order to spur reform in
those schools. In my book Postcode, I described a quality education as ‘a one-way
ticket out of poverty’. But at the time of writing—2005—I also noted that
‘education policies seem to be designed with the purpose of making it harder
for students from poorer communities to compete with their wealthier peers’.
According to OECD research, students in the lowest socioeconomic quartile lag
behind those in the highest socioeconomic quartile by 2.5 years. It’s time to
change that.
Through the COAG process, we’re aiming to help improve schools in low
socioeconomic status communities. This involves targeting additional
resources—about $500 000 per annum for a typical sized school—to the schools
that serve the most disadvantaged children in Australia. Making these schools
work better will raise gross domestic product (GDP) in the long run, but it’s
about more than that. We want poor children in Australia to enjoy an education
as good—or better—than anyone else.
Our low socioeconomic status school reforms are about more than money. In
aggregate, there is very little evidence to show that spending more money alone
will result in better education performance.6  So we are committed to ensuring
that this new spending spurs fundamental changes in these schools.
Over time, we hope that many of these reforms will be adopted in other schools.
But we are starting at the place we believe is most important: the neediest
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neighbourhoods of Australia. Our reforms will provide more funding and greater
discretion to principals and local school communities. They will help schools
attract high-performing teachers and principals, and reward them for success.
Teaching in a disadvantaged area is one of the most important jobs in the nation.
We need to ensure that more talented young Australians choose teaching in the
future, and create incentives for them to work in the nation’s neediest schools.
Through our low socioeconomic status reforms, schools will also have the
flexibility to help students through after-school study support, new sporting
programs, strong networks with the local community and links with local
businesses. Private schools in leafy suburbs have long offered programs such
as these to their students. But in low socioeconomic status communities, they
have been the exception rather than the norm. With these extra resources, we
also expect greater accountability.
We do not apologise for insisting that high standards should apply in every
community. These proposed reforms have been criticised from some quarters
as anti-teacher and even anti-public education. The opposite, in fact, is true.
They are motivated by a passionate belief in the importance of good public
schools and good teachers—a belief founded in personal experience, shared with
the Prime Minister, during our years at Nambour High School.
Under these policies, school funding will follow need and be used to raise the
quality, standing and remuneration of the teaching profession. And given the
predominance of public schools in the ranks of disadvantage, this means the
policies represent a new future for public education and for the teaching
profession.
In many cases, there are excellent, dedicated principals and teachers doing a
great job in these communities. Our task is to recognise those professionals and
strengthen their efforts. Our policies are a lifeline for these teachers, should they
choose to grasp it. I suspect the overwhelming majority of parents are hoping
they will.
The reforms have also been dismissed as a copy of the previous government’s
policy. That too is wrong. The policies of the Howard Government set out to
create something completely different: a set of ‘dumb’ league tables that offered
no analysis of why some schools were underperforming and no strategy for
addressing their underperformance. In contrast, our ‘like schools’ approach
takes account of differences in family backgrounds across schools. And where
we identify underperformance, we’ll be in there doing our utmost to make sure
those schools fulfil their potential.
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Conclusion
I’ve aimed to give you a flavour of what we are doing to modernise
Commonwealth–state relations—and to give you two examples of the types of
reforms we will be able to deliver, building on this new federal platform. My
examples have focused on school reform because it brings together two of my
longstanding policy interests. Education is both economic policy and social
policy. It is now the key policy area where good economics and good moral
values combine to produce the best results. This is the reason why social
democratic parties around the world run for office promising their three top
priorities will be ‘education, education and education’. In a world of technological
change and globalisation, we owe it to the next generation of Australians to
provide the best possible education. This matters for all children—but it matters
especially for the most disadvantaged.
For Labor, better schools are the cornerstone of a decent society. Indeed, quality
schools might well be the best anti-poverty program available. Education
increases productivity and participation, it builds prosperity and it also offers
the hope of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Modern federalism will enable us to finally undertake bold reforms to Australia’s
school system—notwithstanding the fact that the responsibility for schools
policy in this country straddles Commonwealth–state boundaries. Our
modernisation of the federation is driven by the same practical spirit that inspired
Federation itself: a desire to create systems that stand the best chance of
delivering for the Australian people.
We want to encourage innovation and problem solving at the local
level—providing states with greater budgetary flexibility in return for greater
transparency and accountability. And we are committed to major reforms to
make public services work better, which we are backing with substantial new
funding. Underpinning what we are doing is what I have called ‘the Australian
way’. The Australian way is the idea that we are all richer when we are able to
participate in the economy, that inequality is bad economics and that better
education is vital to creating a better society.
For me, these are moral certainties and they inspire the reforms that we are
undertaking today.
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2. Does federalism work?1
The Hon John Brumby MP, Premier of Victoria
Does a system of government drawn up at the end of the nineteenth century
and activated at the dawn of the twentieth century still have currency in the
twenty-first century?
In a word: yes. Federalism does work. It is a robust and flexible system that has
stood the test of time and made us one of the world’s most stable democracies.
It is an efficient system that, according to analysis done for the Withers and
Twomey report Australia’s Federal Future, boosts our per capita GDP by 10.5
per cent—or $11 402 per household—through the greater efficiencies of political
and fiscal decentralisation.
But, it needs to be said, there is room for improvement. Given the size and scope
of challenges Australia faces—such as climate change, the rise of the BRIC
economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and our ageing and growing
population—we need to make federalism work better.
Federalism needs to change to adapt to our changing circumstances and benefit
the community. For instance, Withers and Twomey found that if Australia went
further with fiscal decentralisation—in line with the best federal practice of
Canada, Germany and Switzerland—average annual incomes would increase by
$4188.
However, in changing, we must resist the temptation to go back to the
future—and re-litigate the old arguments of state versus Commonwealth. For
instance, the question of who holds the financial levers is well and truly settled.
As our second Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, accurately predicted in 1902, ‘The
rights of self-government of the states have been fondly supposed to be
safeguarded by the Constitution. It has left them legally free, but financially
chained to the chariot wheels of the Commonwealth.’
Equally, it would be a mistake to confuse the Commonwealth’s fiscal power with
constitutional power. As Sir Henry Winneke, the former Governor and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria, said in 1965:
As a consequence of our federal way of life, based as it is upon a division
of powers between Commonwealth and state, there is no absolute
sovereignty in Australia. Citizens who value their individual liberties
may see in this an effective safeguard against the development of…a
new despotism.
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In other words, no Australian government operates in isolation. Every Australian
government—be they state or territory or Commonwealth—has an equal share
in our federation. And that egalitarian and quintessentially Australian approach
to federalism is the best way to deliver the policies and investments we need to
meet the challenges of our time, secure Australia’s productivity, sustainability
and liveability and deliver the Australian people the opportunities they deserve.
Victoria’s reform record
I have spoken many times about what needs to be done to make federalism work
better. For instance, in April 2005, I delivered a speech to the Melbourne Institute
that laid out the framework for what became the National Reform Agenda. I said
Australia needed:
• a new model of cooperative federalism
• a national effort to improve competition and regulation
• greater investment in world-class infrastructure
• a national target for boosting workforce participation
• a national approach to Australia’s growing population.
The last time I addressed ANZSOG—in February last year—I spoke about how
cooperative Commonwealth–state relations were crucial to meet the reform
challenges. The quote from me that features on today’s program is taken from
that speech: ‘New solutions, new reforms and a recommitment to co-operative
federalism are crucial to meeting the challenges facing our country.’
More importantly, those words have been backed with action. Victoria has not
just developed the National Reform Agenda, we’ve:
• quadrupled infrastructure spending
• led the nation in regulatory reform
• and led the nation in skills training and jobs creation.
In the past month, we’ve launched a major innovation statement to drive new
economic growth, and a major skills statement to boost jobs training. Securing
Jobs for Your Future is a $316 million reform package that will give 172 000
Victorians the opportunity to train, retrain or boost their qualifications, as well
as transforming the skills base of our workforce and boosting productivity and
labour-force participation.
We will shortly release a manufacturing statement to drive innovation and
investment across the sector. And, at the end of 2008, we will release a landmark
transport statement that sets out how we will expand Victoria’s transport
network.
We understand the importance of innovation and reform. That’s why—despite
a two-tiered economy and a global economic slowdown—Victoria is, according
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to The Age’s reading of the latest National Accounts figures, the ‘surprise engine
room of the Australian economy’, contributing almost half of the nation’s growth
in domestic demand.
However, the size and scope of the challenges we face are too great for any one
level of government to tackle on their own. That’s why we need cooperative
federalism.
Cooperative federalism
The past 10 months demonstrate what can be achieved if all the stakeholders
work together. Since the election of the Rudd Government, COAG has met three
times: in December 2007, then in March and July 2008.
The December 2007 COAG meeting saw the Prime Minister, premiers and chief
ministers commit to:
• a blitz on elective surgery waiting times
• a national partnership to close the gap in life expectancy that exists between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
The March 2008 COAG saw the Prime Minister, premiers and chief ministers:
• agree to draw up a new model for federal financial relations—with the
priority being modernising Special Purpose Payments and developing
National Partnership Payments
• agree for the first time on a common framework for the reform of
education—including early childhood development, schooling, skills and
workforce development
• sign a historic memorandum of understanding for the reform of the
Murray-Darling Basin to restore the environment and ensure sustainable
agriculture in the future.
The July 2008 COAG meeting agreed to a major overhaul of overlapping and
inconsistent regulations that will make life easier for business and consumers
and usher in a seamless national economy. And we have—in July and September
2008—seen the release of draft and supplementary draft reports by the landmark
Garnaut Climate Change Review, with the final report to be released on 30
September 2008.
The Garnaut Review was initiated by the states and territories through the
Council for the Australian Federation in February 2007. The Council for the
Australian Federation complements COAG by providing a forum for new policy
innovations such as committing to improve vehicle safety standards to ensure
new vehicles are safer and that the benefits of new technologies are realised.
Of these COAG reforms the one with the highest profile was the agreement on
the Murray-Darling Basin. This was a reform first discussed in 1901, and
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earmarked again for reform by Paul Keating in 1996 and John Howard in 2006.
It was only when the issue was approached as an exercise in cooperative
federalism that real progress was made—with an agreement reached in less than
six months.
There’s another point about the Murray-Darling that needs to be made. There
was a perception that the magic solution for the Murray-Darling was to give the
Commonwealth total control over the Murray-Darling Basin. Not only was this
scenario constitutionally impossible, it was environmentally nonsensical.
The fact is that federalism can’t make it rain—and only rain will make the
Murray-Darling Basin bloom. If the Commonwealth had been running the
Murray-Darling before the drought, the basin would still be in dire straits.
The new agreement is a good outcome for the Murray-Darling and demonstrates
what can be achieved when governments work together. And the year’s still
not over.
COAG will meet again in October and December 2008, with major discussions
on the agenda for the new Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme and a complete
rewriting of federal–state financial relations, with 90 former Special Purpose
Payment agreements collapsed down to five and a set of new National
Partnerships to deliver incentives for agreed reform outcomes.
The COAG working groups are also developing a substantial agenda for reform,
including 27 areas for rationalisation of regulation. I can honestly say that, in
25 years of public life as a federal and state parliamentarian, I have never seen
the Commonwealth, states and territories work together with such focus and
with such positive outcomes. Put it this way:
• with the Keating Government, COAG’s first five meetings were held over a
period of three-and-a-half years
• with the Howard Government, its first five COAGs were held over five
years—and its last five over two years
• with the Rudd Government, by December 2008, the past five meetings will
have been held over 12 months.
Since the last federal election, the COAG process has doubled in frequency—and
intensity. But we need to do more.
Making federalism work better
As I said earlier, Australia is facing enormous challenges. Our global economy
is changing rapidly, with the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Our
environment is changing rapidly, with the drought and climate change. And
our community is changing rapidly, with our rapidly growing and ageing
population.
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Not only that, the challenges we face are all interrelated. That’s one of the lessons
of climate change: the way we live and work has an impact on the world in
which we live. Everything is connected.
The great challenge we face as a nation is to change the way we live and work
for the better—to improve our sustainability and productivity and create a fairer
and more liveable community. And the best way we can do that is for
governments of all jurisdictions—no matter where they sit in the electoral cycle,
no matter what their political persuasion—to take decisive action and take that
decisive action in a coordinated manner.
We need to turn what’s been a year of action by COAG into a decade of action
and national reform. And, to do so, we need to elevate the status of and clarify
the agenda of COAG. COAG has always been a forum for national progress. Its
purpose—when first established in 1992 by the Keating Government—was to
coordinate and focus the authority of the heads of governments, improve
intergovernmental relations and drive microeconomic reform.
But COAG has no constitutional or legislative standing, and its secretariat is an
appendix of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. And the COAG
Reform Council operates based on an intergovernmental agreement that sets out
broad objectives and functions, but with no clear powers or independence. The
current status and structure of COAG is outmoded. Just as we are modernising
federal finances, we need to modernise what is, in effect, federation’s cabinet
of first ministers.
With that in mind, I am here calling for COAG to be underpinned by a new
intergovernmental agreement—with the role and governance of the COAG
Secretariat formalised. This agreement should require:
• regular meetings of COAG
• an effective and independent secretariat
• the right for states to place items on the agenda.
COAG is an increasingly important decision-making body that drives the reform
process, makes collective decisions and resolves deadlocks. The fact that COAG
has ceased the practice of always sitting in Canberra has changed the dynamic.
But Australia needs COAG to become an enduring institution that rises above
the ebb and flow of governments.
A new intergovernmental agreement would:
• reflect that COAG is an equal partnership between all levels of government
• set out COAG’s vision and objectives
• have a strong emphasis on joint accountability and direct all Australian
governments to meet high performance benchmarks
• provide flexibility for COAG to adapt and evolve
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• make COAG transparent to the community—using plain language that all
Australians can understand
• drive the cultural change required to support a mature federalism.
I am also calling for the drawing up of a comprehensive forward plan for action
by COAG—tackling key social and environmental challenges and the tighter
global economy with short, medium and long-term targets.
Australia faces serious challenges to its diverse economic
foundations—particularly in the area of manufacturing skills and self-reliance.
We need to find new opportunities for export markets, import replacements and
to expand into the growth markets of the future.
Over the next decade, it’s likely that Australian governments will spend more
than $10 billion buying new trains to provide for the significant shift back to
public transport as petrol prices rise. There is an opportunity for COAG to show
leadership in procurement and industry development by coordinating the
purchase and assembly of new rolling stock and maximising the benefits for
Australia from this massive investment.
Australian manufacturing already makes everything from family sedans to naval
frigates. There’s no reason why we shouldn’t be also involved in the
manufacturing and assembly of trains.
And when it comes to equipping the next generation of Australians with the
skills and education they need to make their way in the world, we need to look
to the value of a place-based approach to education.
In areas of disadvantage and underperformance, this will mean breaking down
the barriers between state and federal government funding arrangements, as
well as between government and non-government schools.
Such an approach could deliver stronger partnerships with clear goals, so that
all children in a targeted area—whether in a government or non-government
school—could experience an even better education.
This approach is being driven in Victoria through the Education Blueprint our
government released in September 2008, which is based on our solid belief that
every Victorian child deserves every opportunity in life.
Reform of ministerial councils
Another area for significant reform is the plethora of ministerial councils. We
need to look at ways to rationalise their number in order to foster interaction
between areas—such as natural resources and primary industries, early childhood
development and school education. And we also need to strengthen their
effectiveness so that they retain a clear focus on resolving issues within deadlines.
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Currently, there are 31 separate ministerial councils. Those councils are expensive
to run, often have overlapping responsibilities and consume too much time for
too little outcome. Different jurisdictions have different portfolio arrangements,
sometimes leading to confusion and large entourages at council meetings. Some
ministerial councils now have statutory functions or decision-making powers
that can create ambiguities.
Over the past year, the reform task has been given to a small group of COAG
working groups, chaired by federal ministers, and these have achieved a great
deal. However, the accountability of COAG working groups could be improved
and there is a mismatch, with the states represented at an officer level and the
Commonwealth at a ministerial level.
The review of the COAG working groups due at the end of 2008 is an opportunity
to simplify the system. That review should also extend to a consideration of the
relationship between the working groups and our 31 ministerial councils. In my
view, the review should focus on the merger of the working groups and
ministerial councils and a net reduction in the number of councils—perhaps to
less than a dozen covering major portfolio groups.
It should also consider the relationship of the ministerial councils to
COAG—including clarifying the role of COAG in being the final arbiter of
disputes, with power to cut through deadlocks that have repeatedly arisen to
slow the pace of reform.
The outcome of the review should be reflected in the intergovernmental
agreement. In short, we need to foster a federal culture that encourages
harmonisation and innovation without imposing uniformity.
Clarifying overlapping responsibilities
There have also been recent calls for the transferral of various state
responsibilities holus-bolus to the Commonwealth, with unsubstantiated claims
about potential savings. Those claims don’t stand up to scrutiny. As the Withers
and Twomey report found, the federal system of government is more efficient
and flexible than the unitary system, with more transparency and less corruption.
Unitary states in 21 OECD countries employ nearly 11 per cent more public
servants than federations. Public spending as a proportion of GDP is also 13 per
cent higher in those OECD countries with a unitary system of government.
That’s why, internationally, the trend is towards developing a more federal style
of government that is able to juggle the competing demands of globalisation and
local communities.
Yet, in Australia, federalism seems to be a scapegoat. The Withers Twomey
report found that many of the arguments against federalism were based on
misconceptions and false assumptions, such as that it was incompatible with
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globalisation, too costly, had one tier of government too many and promoted
buck-passing and conflict.
As the Withers Twomey report says: ‘There are many popular myths in Australia
concerning federalism that are not borne out by the evidence…Australian
attitudes towards federalism are out of step with those in the rest of the world.’
In this hyper-critical climate, it is easy to lose perspective. There is a double
standard when it comes to measuring the relative performance of state and federal
governments. Why is it that whenever a state government is perceived to have
failed it is, inevitably, seen as proof that the states should be abolished? That’s
like arguing that the Commonwealth should be abolished and Canberra turned
back into a sheep paddock because the Howard Government mishandled the $1
billion Seasprite helicopter project.
Historically, many reform initiatives were first proposed and trialled by state
governments. For example, new approaches to social and environmental policy
were trialled by the Dunstan and Hamer Governments and public sector reform
was introduced by the Cain Government and adopted Australia-wide.
The states also ensure the voices of regional communities are heard and their
interests represented in Canberra.
The point I am driving at is that we need to set aside our myths and
preconceptions of federalism and focus on the reality, such as sorting out
overlapping responsibilities. Clarifying responsibilities is one of the most practical
actions we can take to make federalism work better, but there are no easy
solutions. Recent discussions have highlighted how hard reform within a federal
system can be at the practical, day-to-day level.
Let me be clear: I am not an advocate of a grand exchange of responsibilities.
Instead, I want to see governments work together on areas where there are strong
overlaps in responsibilities so that we can present a seamless service to the public.
Four areas where we could start—as part of the new funding agreements
currently under negotiation—are:
• aged-care services and disability services
• universities, TAFE and apprenticeships
• early childhood development services and child care
• hospitals and Medicare-funded primary health services.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me leave you with a thought. Right now, most federations are
working towards subsidiarity—shifting the focus of government decision making
to a more local level. Globally, Australia is an exception to that rule: rather than
becoming more localised, we are becoming more centralised.
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The new Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Robert French, characterised
the trend somewhat fatalistically in a speech in August 2008 when he said:
Despite the benefits of co-operative federalism the wide range of its
application may have an overall tendency to define as national that which
was once local. A shrinking federation will continue to shrink. The logical
outcome is the singular state of a unitary federation. That is the federation
you have when you do not have a federation.
It is in our national interest to resist a slide into a ‘Clayton’s’ federation—because
cooperative federalism is the system best able to juggle the competing global
and local demands of the future.
The challenge ahead of us is not to make federalism work—but work better.
Over the past nine months we have seen what can be achieved through
cooperative federalism, with the states and the Commonwealth working together
to:
• target elective surgery waiting times
• create a seamless national economy
• secure a historic agreement on the Murray-Darling Basin
• close the gap in life expectancy between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians
• draw up a new model for federal financial relations
• agree to a common framework for education reform
• establish the building blocks of an emissions trading scheme.
The new actions I have suggested here propose an even broader vision for
cooperative federalism, with the prospect of further real and tangible gains for
the nation. At this time of economic, social and environmental challenges, we
need to take the next step and ensure that the performance of our federation is
up there with the very best in the world.
ENDNOTES





3. What has federalism ever done for
us?1
The Hon Anna Bligh MP, Premier of Queensland
In April 2008, our new Prime Minister gathered together 1000 of our country’s
best and brightest to imagine the Australia we could be in 2020. As I left Canberra
on that cold Sunday afternoon, I was both inspired and alarmed. Inspired by
the wealth of ideas and the many new voices that had been unearthed by the
process and alarmed that the most recurring theme and, without doubt, the most
popular idea was the abolition of the states.
Here were some of the country’s brightest, most educated, most experienced
and publicly engaged thinkers cheering rapturously at a throwaway line from
Tim Fischer about getting rid of the states. It gave me real pause for thought.
A century ago, as the fathers of the federation shaped the constitution, the
preservation and protection of the states were pivotal to their deliberations, and
yet today there seems to be a headlong, popular rush to abandon them. I was
struck by how comprehensively John Howard had demonised the states, but I
was also acutely aware that this alone could not explain the phenomenon.
At the very least, the summiteers’ reaction articulated a real sense of
disappointment and frustration with many key areas of social service provision.
States ignore this at their peril.
So, a century on from federation, against a backdrop of an emerging cooperative
federalism and fresh from a meeting of COAG, I thought it would be useful here
to reflect on federalism as a form of government and contemplate the future of
our own federation. In doing so, I intend to mount a spirited defence of the
federation.
I will, no doubt, be accused of self-interest in this respect; I note that the wheels
of constitutional change turn at a glacial pace in this country and any radical
change in the federation is unlikely to happen during my political career. So, I
speak as a citizen as much as a premier and I caution against the inevitable,
perhaps intoxicating, rush to simple solutions.
In essence, I believe that, in a country of 21 million people, spread across 7.6
million square kilometres, providing services to people in some of the great cities
of the world and some of the most remote places on Earth, a federation of states
is the most effective way to govern, to manage and to provide services.
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A century ago, Australia’s colonies were able to design the government they
wanted. They examined governments around the world and they chose a
federation. They were not alone in so choosing. The United States, Switzerland
and Canada were among the nations that had already decided on a federation.
Looking back over 107 years of federalism in Australia, we might well ask: what
has federalism ever done for us?
Well, how about this: federalism divides and limits power, providing checks
and balances that protect individuals, mitigate against an overly powerful central
government and assist accountability. Federalism allows for coordinated national
action on issues of national importance, such as responses to natural disasters
like cyclones. It also encourages healthy competition and creativity between the
states and territories, both of which lead to improvements in performance,
efficiency and outcomes.
For example, consider how uncompetitive our state tax arrangements would be
if there was not a healthy competition between states to lower the tax burden
in every budget. Federalism recognises the distinctive nature and identity of
the regions of Australia through the states and territories, thereby allowing for
policies and services to be tailored to the different needs of different people and
communities across vast and varied country.
Federalism offers a number of other advantages, as detailed in a report by Anne
Twomey and Glenn Withers for the Council for the Australian Federation in
2007. They point out that many Australians see our structure of government as
old-fashioned, cumbersome and inefficient. Yet, in other places, federalism is
viewed as modern, flexible and efficient in dealing with the increasing pressures
faced by communities. This report shows that, when compared with centralised,
unitary governments, federated structures such as Australia have:
• more efficient governments
• higher rates of economic growth
• higher per capita GDP.
Further, their research demonstrates that increasing centralisation threatens
these benefits.
The foundation of our current prosperity as a nation is built on significant
economic, social and environmental reforms, negotiated and put in place through
our federal structure. As the report demonstrates, of the G8 nations—the
countries with the greatest economies in the world—four are federations and
seven have at least three tiers of government. The success of federations—and
of countries with three tiers of government—is not transitory, as Twomey and
Withers state: ‘In the past 50 years, federations have consistently out-performed
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unitary systems in economic terms…the more centralised the federation, the
better the performance.’
What have the states ever done for us?
If some Australians question the value of federalism, I think many more might
ask: what have the states ever done for us? For most Australians, most of the
time, most of the government services they use are delivered by the states, such
as the schools their children attend, the public hospitals where they seek
emergency care and surgery, the roads they drive on, the buses and trains they
catch, the clean water provided to their homes.
Why is it that the states deliver most services, even though the Commonwealth
funds at least some of them? One reason is that our federation is built on the
principle of subsidiarity—the idea that matters should be dealt with, and services
provided by, competent government closest to the community.
Given the scale usually required to deliver universally available services, that
generally means the state and territory governments, and in some cases it means
local government. Under the subsidiarity principle, matters of national interest,
such as defence, and areas that require a nationally equitable approach across
state borders, such as income support, should sit with the national government.
Similarly, cross-jurisdictional matters or areas where harmonisation is required,
such as corporation laws, and where economies of scale can be derived, also sit
naturally with the national government. However, where services need to be
delivered in person or tailored to local circumstances, other levels of government
are best placed to manage service delivery.
And we should remember that these large, and sometimes challenging, service
delivery systems deliver some extraordinary results across our country. In
Australia today, 2.268 million children will be taught in a state school classroom
and about 120 000 people will be treated as non-admitted patients in public
hospitals. In Queensland today, some 478 000 children are being educated in
state schools and more than 28 800 people will be treated as non-admitted patients
in public hospitals.
The system isn’t perfect
However, neither the federation nor the states are perfect. The problems have
been well documented: creeping centralism in all areas of public policy and
service delivery; complexity and confusion about the roles and responsibilities
of the Commonwealth and the states; a system that can be bureaucratic,
cumbersome and slow to respond to cross-jurisdictional or emerging issues;
duplication of services, wastage of funds, cost-shifting and buck-passing; and
financial arrangements that have produced an extreme vertical fiscal imbalance.
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No wonder there is frustration and disappointment at service delivery failures.
Government doesn’t always deliver services well, on time, on budget or to
expectation. There have been some awful failures, as Queensland experienced
recently with the poor maintenance of nurses’ accommodation in the Torres
Strait, with the resultant threat to the safety and security of our staff in an
isolated part of the state, which, in turn, has led to problems in recruiting and
retaining qualified staff.
I understand, and share, people’s frustration and I have to say the states,
including my own, can do much better on service delivery. Accompanying this
is a belief that another level of government—in most cases, the federal
government—could do a better job, as we saw from the preliminary results of
a survey on constitutional values by Griffith University, which were published
in The Australian on 3 July 2008. The survey of 1200 voters showed that half
of them believed the Commonwealth was the level of government that was most
effective at doing its job; just under 20 per cent nominated local government;
and just over 18 per cent nominated the states. And just over 79 per cent thought
the Commonwealth should get involved in issues that were the responsibility
of state governments.
This rush to a seemingly simple solution is underpinned, in my view, by the
fact that most people have limited experience of the Commonwealth as a direct
service provider. They are just blindly hoping the Commonwealth will do a
better job. They are also apparently in the grip of collective amnesia about the
Commonwealth’s record when it does actually deliver services. So let’s stop for
a moment and remember:
• the kerosene baths for frail aged people in a nursing home under the purview
of a Commonwealth department
• the long-running and expensive saga of defence procurement, such as the
Collins-class submarines
• unjust and unlawful detentions by an immigration department that was
assessed as incompetent by the Commonwealth itself.
Contemplate the alternative. Imagine the lack of coherence if all of Australia’s
schools, more than 9500 in all, were run out of Canberra. Consider the challenge
for a mum in Broome seeking to influence a federal Education Minister from
Melbourne about the toilet block at the local public school, or worse still, imagine
if schools were the responsibility of some 700 local governments. I raise these
examples not as a partisan political attack or as a Canberra-bashing exercise but
to highlight that service delivery problems are not the exclusive preserve of any
one level of government, but rather that they are endemic to the business of
delivering services.
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Appetite for change
I am not alone in identifying the problems with our federation and the need for
reform. Debate about federalism, which cooled after the failure of the republic
referendum, has been rekindled in the past few years. We’ve had some significant
contributions from, among others, former premiers Peter Beattie and Steve
Bracks, the states and territories through the Council for the Australian
Federation, Kevin Rudd as Opposition Leader and as Prime Minister, the Business
Council of Australia and delegates to the Australia 2020 Summit and the
Queensland 2020 Summit. I think it’s fair to say there is widespread agreement
that we need reform.
But before we start tearing up our constitution, or abolishing our states, let’s
acknowledge that federations have much to offer. Let’s acknowledge that there
is a global move towards federalism rather than away from it. Countries such as
Spain, Belgium and South Africa, which had been unitary, have adopted federal
structures, thereby maintaining some central control while also permitting some
regional control. The United Kingdom is creating legislatures and devolving
responsibilities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. And of course there
is the European Union, a federation of sovereign nations that more often than
not also have very strong provincial governments. So, let’s keep our federation
but let’s make it work better.
Some proposals
I’d like to offer some proposals to reinforce and reinvigorate our system. My
proposals are built on three key beliefs:
• a belief in the principle of subsidiarity
• a belief in the need for clear roles and responsibilities—and in many major
services of importance, shared responsibilities, based on changing needs,
challenges and opportunities facing our citizens
• a belief that the Commonwealth and the states must be willing to both assume
and surrender responsibilities.
I can best articulate these beliefs by explaining how they would apply to three
key policy areas, and to Commonwealth–state financial relations. I will start
with the roles and responsibilities in two key human services that are in great
need of reform—that is, education and training, and health—and, finally, move
on to climate change, a new public policy challenge that will have an enormous
impact on each of us.
Education and training
As a former education minister and as a parent, I know that education is the key
that unlocks a child’s potential. Education, skills, innovation—these are the
keys to our individual and collective prosperity.
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Given their importance, education and training are the first policy areas in which
I propose reform of state and federal relations. Some of you might be aware that
in the lead-up to the Australia 2020 Summit, I proposed the introduction of a
full national curriculum progressively from the beginning of the 2010 school
year, supported by a new national curriculum authority incorporating the state,
Catholic and independent sectors.
Here, I want to go further. In a globalised economy, with an increasingly mobile
population, in the midst of a skills shortage, we need greater consistency in our
education and training system. Currently, we have a mishmash of inconsistent
responsibilities and accountability requirements.
In early childhood education and care, the states are largely responsible for
licensing and regulating childcare centres, which the Commonwealth funds and
accredits and with its own quality-assurance system attached. The end result is
massive duplication, with childcare centres having to report on policies and
practices to two levels of government. Notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s
recent commitment to universal access to preschool for all four year olds,
currently the states are the primary funders and regulators of preschool services
and accredit the programs that are used.
In primary and secondary education, the states provide public education, but
regulate private schools. However, we fund, register teachers and approve the
curriculum for both sectors. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth chips in some
funding for public schools, most of the funding for private schools and has its
own accountability requirements for both sectors, in addition to those of the
states.
In vocational education and training, states regulate the training system, purchase
training from public and private training providers and provide training through
TAFE and community colleges. The Commonwealth provides about one-quarter
of training funds and also subsidises employers to take on apprentices. And
universities are created under state legislation, get most of their funding from
the Commonwealth and face the accountability requirements of both. It’s time
for a radical rethinking of roles and responsibilities.
One option is for the states to take primary responsibility for service delivery
in early childhood and care as well as school education and for the Commonwealth
to assume primary responsibility for delivery of post-school qualifications in
the vocational education and training (VET) system and universities. I am not
proposing a complete takeover of early childhood and school education by the
states. The Commonwealth could usefully retain lead responsibility for setting
overall national goals and a national curriculum. But the delivery would be the
responsibility of the states, as provider in the public system and regulator in
the private system.
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I think it’s time for us to view early childhood and school education as one
seamless system, whether it is publicly or privately provided. And surely the
quality of care and education provided in all early childhood centres and schools
should be the responsibility of one level of government. Similarly, responsibilities
for post-secondary education and training should be reformed.
One of the key points of agreement at the Australia 2020 Summit was that we
should develop a seamless national economy. Given the importance of skilled
labour to our economy, surely this must mean streamlining our post-school
education system. As with early childhood and school education, we need to
see this system as a whole. Making the Commonwealth solely responsible for
VET and universities would be a major step in delivering the skilled workforce
we need as a nation. Importantly, it would also significantly improve the
efficiency of our university and VET providers and reduce red tape and major
duplication in financial and performance accountability requirements of the
state and federal governments. It will also increase the national and international
portability of the skills of our workforce.
Health
All states face significant challenges in delivering health services. Some of
Queensland’s challenges are unique. Each week, up to 1800 extra people arrive
in our state and contribute to surging demand. The majority of residents live
outside the capital, some in remote communities and some in regional centres
such as Cairns, which is further away from Brisbane than Melbourne.
We have boosted spending on our health system, investing more than $10 billion
over five years. But over the past 10 years under the Howard Government,
federal funding for our public health system fell from 50 to about 35 per cent.
Frankly, we are struggling to keep pace with growth and demand.
If Queensland’s current rates of population growth, economic growth and public
health spending continue unabated, by 2042 our public health spending will
consume the entire state budget. This is not in the public interest. That’s my
motivation for proposing some major changes in the way we manage health, as
a nation.
In our submission to the National Hospitals and Health Reform Commission, we
suggest key reforms. In my view, states should be responsible for health services
that are likely to require an integrated service delivery response. For example,
many of the problems we encounter in relation to Indigenous health in remote
communities cannot be addressed solely through the health system; there is
sometimes a housing issue, sometimes a need for upgraded water supplies or
better sewerage systems, which, of course, the state delivers.
This means the states should be responsible for Indigenous health. Queensland
agrees with the commission that the states should continue to be responsible for
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acute-care services—those that require hospital admissions. However, we need
the Commonwealth to take responsibility for things that are making the job of
running hospitals that much harder. At the moment, there are people waiting
in hospital emergency wards who really just need to see a GP, and a shortage of
nursing home beds—controlled by the Commonwealth—means that every day
an average of 468 Queenslanders who need a nursing home bed are in fact in
acute-care beds in public hospitals and Queensland bears the extra cost of almost
$400 000 a day.
The problem is that public hospitals are run by state governments and nursing
homes are overseen by the Commonwealth. There is no imperative, no incentive
for the two sectors to work together. Queensland’s submission proposes that the
Commonwealth should pay the states the full cost of providing such services in
a hospital. I’m confident that pressure on the Commonwealth’s hip-pocket nerve
would lead to a rapid appreciation of the need to fix these anomalies. The National
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission is a good example of the way in which
we can maturely and systemically renegotiate roles and responsibilities to achieve
better health care for all Australians.
Climate change
Professor Ross Garnaut’s report to the government—The Garnaut Climate Change
Review— examines, for the first time, the costs of climate change to Australia.
His findings will be challenging. The report doesn’t offer easy solutions. Climate
change is the most critical challenge facing Australia and the world. We must
get it right. And given the embryonic nature of policy making regarding climate
change, we have the chance to get it right from the very beginning rather than
reworking an existing system. We have the chance to ensure the different levels
of government do not end up tripping over each other. We must ensure our
federation is sufficiently responsive, agile and coordinated to deal with the
complex issues relating to challenges from climate change.
Opportunity for change
My argument for reform is not about the states, it’s about the health and
sustainability of our federation. It is, by no means, a perfect system. But, to
misquote Winston Churchill, just ‘a little federalism is the worst form of
governance, except for all the others’.
One hundred and eleven years ago, a proponent of federalism, Sir Isaac Isaacs,
spoke of the colonies being at a point of great tension as they considered whether
to form a federation. I think we are at another point in our history where there
is great tension around how we work together. Our nation has evolved and our
world has changed greatly since 1901 but our federal system and our constitution
have not. We are at a point of great opportunity, with governments of the same
political persuasion in power across Australia, a Prime Minister committed to a
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new federalism and state and territory leaders who want a real partnership. We
have an appetite for change. There is also an opportunity for change—a
once-in-a-generation opportunity. Let’s make the most of it.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 4 July 2008.
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4. Splicing the perspectives of the
Commonwealth and states into a
workable federation1
Terry Moran AO
In my view, we are on the verge of a revived federalism, which holds great
possibilities for Australia in the twenty-first century. By this I do not mean we
are about to eliminate or radically diminish the power of the states or any other
critical element of the institutions of the federal system. Rather, we are on the
threshold of entering into a new compact between governments, which contains
the potential to confer several benefits on the Australian people:
• improved levels of service from government, based on a strategic agreement
on what the focus should be
• better outcomes across a wide front
• increased productivity that will lift our living standards still further
• important new strategic initiatives.
Having been in public administration at the Commonwealth and state level, I
can say that talent and creativity are to be found at both levels of government.
We can harness these strengths to deliver enhanced economic and social outcomes
for Australia.
So I don’t intend to propose a radical solution, of either diminishing or
substantially enlarging the powers of one or another constitutional actor.
Of course, the lawyers among you might first think of constitutional reform as
the key to transforming Commonwealth–state relations for the better. That is
certainly a conversation worth having.
As the Special Minister of State remarked in his speech for Constitution Day
celebrations in July 2008, there was a strong case for updating what he described
as the ‘stump-jump plough’ of constitutions.
However, I can only agree with Senator Faulkner’s judgment that Australians
on the whole are a sceptical lot who must be thoroughly convinced that any
proposed changes will deliver practical and necessary improvements on the
current system.
Where constitutional reform is concerned, that has always been a tough job. A
number of ideas were put forward at the 2020 Summit for potential constitutional
reform. The government is currently considering these proposals.
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However, for those of us who deal in public policy, it is clear we have made
enormous progress even without any fundamental change in the institutions to
which the constitution gives rise.
We as Australians demand a great deal of ourselves and our governments. This
has led to the continuous pursuit of practical but necessary improvements within
the parameters of the current arrangements. And when challenges have arisen,
we have worked constructively to find a way through.
The cooperative forces that forged the federation compact in the first place have
continued to ensure that our country works. As greater fiscal power has moved
to the Commonwealth, community attitudes have also changed.
Now there is broader acceptance of the Commonwealth taking an interest in a
larger array of domestic government activity. But this is not to say the community
wants outright Commonwealth control.
We have all come a considerable distance—but this is not to diminish the
challenge still before us.
So in considering the future of Australian federalism, I would like first to discuss
some recent research, the core challenges for the future and then turn to the
ambitious program of reform that COAG currently has before it.
Griffith University’s federalism project
One of the most striking findings to emerge from Griffith University’s Federalism
Project was that over two-thirds of Australians thought the current federal
system was working quite well or even very well.
This might seem surprising, given the crowd’s well-publicised reaction at the
2020 Summit when former Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer declared that his
regional and rural stream had ‘almost abolished the states’.
Almost 80 per cent of respondents agreed that the Commonwealth should
intervene in cases where state governments had not resolved important issues.
And yet, over half of those surveyed also agreed with the principle of
subsidiarity, that decision-making power should be devolved to the lowest
competent level of government.
Clearly, the ways people view their relationships with governments are diverse
and complex.
While some Australians did support wholesale abolition of one or more levels
of government, almost one-third supported the addition of a new regional level.
Almost 60 per cent, given the choice, said they would prefer to have three or
more levels of government.
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When asked to consider all current levels of government, 50 per cent of
Australians rated the Commonwealth Government as the most effective at ‘doing
its job’.
In contrast, only 18.1 per cent rate the state level as the most effective, and 19.9
per cent rate the local level of government as the most effective.
Of course, views depended to some extent on the state the respondents called
home. As a Victorian, I couldn’t comment on the fact that almost two in five
New South Welshmen said they would be happy to do away with state
government altogether.
But it was heartening to learn that only one in four Victorians shared this view.
Twomey and Withers’ federalist paper for the Council for
the Australian Federation
There are undoubted benefits from federation. Professors Anne Twomey and
Glenn Withers—whom you’ve heard from earlier at this conference—summarised
the economic and social benefits of federalism in their first federalist paper.
They find that federalism:
• divides and limits power between different players in the system and protects
the individual
• gives Australians a wider range of choices and allows policies and services
to be tailored to meet the needs of communities
• spurs Australian governments, at all levels, to be more innovative and
responsive to the needs of the community.
Victorian Skills Reform package
One example of this innovation is the Victorian Skills Reform package announced
by the Brumby Government in August 2008. It is a perfect example of how state
governments, with the assistance of the Commonwealth, can create and implement
groundbreaking and far-reaching reforms, which will have a positive impact on
the economy and future generations.
The centrepiece of the package is a redesigned investment model, which pursues
two important reform agendas: a training guarantee and increasing market
mechanisms.
The introduction of a training guarantee in post-compulsory education is a world
first. In introducing this guarantee, the governments have committed to uncapped
public funding for all Victorians in need of training, and it demonstrates an
unparalleled commitment to developing a skilled workforce.
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The package is one of the most significant microeconomic reforms introduced
by a state government within the past 20 years. It creates structural change in
the training market by:
• placing the purchasing power in the hands of the clients
• increasing contestability and introducing price competition
• aligning government funding to public benefit.
With the support of the Commonwealth Government, all students studying a
diploma or advanced diploma will be able to access an income-contingent loan
in the form of FEE-HELP.
This initiative will mean additional hundreds of thousands of Victorians accessing
training related to employment in the next few years.
In Withers’ technical analysis, he found that, depending on which statistical
approach one took:
• for the past half-century, federations had a 15.1 per cent advantage in average
income growth
• the average advantage of federations in their practise of fiscal decentralisation
was 8 per cent
• the average federation benefit was 10.46 per cent.
On any of these figures, there is a distinct economic advantage to a federal system.
As compared with centralised unitary governments, federal nations such as
Australia tend to have more efficient governments, higher rates of economic
growth and higher income growth.
The reasons why we want and need to make federalism work better and enable
it to reach its full potential are summed up in the six ‘Cs’ as presented by Twomey
and Withers:
• a meaningful and effective federation is also a Check on power
• an effective federation offers Choice and diversity
• a federation provides Customisation of policies according to the different
needs of states and territories.
At the same time, a federation instils healthy Competition, Creativity and, most
of all, Cooperation.
Many of these elements underpin the approach to a reinvigorated COAG.
These perceived benefits have also guided significant devolution in France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom over the past decade.
However, when federalism is discussed, it is often about the inefficiencies of
federal systems. Instead, we need to focus upon improving it to get the most out
of it, socially and economically.
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It is not impossible. In an increasingly competitive globalised world, we also
need to undertake these reforms to position Australia competitively for the
future.
So we currently face a paradox: the federation provides considerable benefits
but it is also seen as the ‘horse and buggy’ of government arrangements.
It is easy to speculate on the reasons for this:
• there has been a deal of duplication and excessive levels of administrative
burden at the state and the national level of government
• this directly or indirectly can result in a lack of coordination of services for
the consumer and the community
• the blurring of lines of responsibility over time for clients can lead to
frustration and inefficiency—and the related blurring of political
accountability.
Taken together, these views might have contributed to a belief that the federation
is an accident of history irrelevant to contemporary circumstances.
This is not a view to which I subscribe, but as I have already said, it does not
mean that I do not see significant scope to improve the situation.
The Commonwealth Government has now been in office for a little over nine
months.
In the Prime Minister’s address to the National Press Club of 27 August, he
outlined the government’s long-term agenda for reform. Some of the particulars
might have been overlooked in all the commentary surrounding his vision for
an education revolution, but in essence, he set out the five key priorities for the
government:
• building a more secure Australia, given the national security challenges we
faced
• building a stronger Australia, with a successful economy to enable us to
deliver on the needs of our people
• building a fairer Australia, based on equality of opportunity, a humane safety
net and acting on disadvantage
• an Australia capable of meeting the significant new challenges of the
twenty-first century, including climate change
• a new way of governing.
It is clear that in so many ways, the work of COAG is contributing directly to
progressing these key themes.
In relation to the new way of governing, for example, COAG has a significant
role to play, in improving the mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation,
clarifying roles and responsibilities and establishing a new financial framework.
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It is not always possible, however, to reallocate functions on a ‘clean lines’
approach.
Sometimes power will need to be shared and, in such cases, needs will be
reassessed in the best interests of good outcomes for the community, in redefining
roles and managing these shared responsibilities.
Key challenges for the future
I turn now to the task of building a stronger economy and a fairer Australia,
capable of addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Whether it is climate change, an ageing population, long-term skill shortages,
infrastructure bottlenecks or productivity growth, Australia continues to face
major long-term challenges.
The Commonwealth can’t tackle all these challenges on its own, nor does it want
to. These challenges demand approaches that rise above traditional divides in
the federation.
According to Michael Keating and Glyn Davis in their book The Future of
Governance, 2  Australia’s current economic success is, in part, the product of
Commonwealth–state cooperation on competition policy in the 1990s.
Indeed, the Productivity Commission (April 2005) estimated that the National
Competition Policy (NCP) and related reforms in the 1990s directly increased
Australia’s GDP by 2.5 per cent, or $20 billion.
I think the current COAG process has now reached a point where it is apparent
that the total body of reform possibilities is broader and more substantial than
all of the national competition policy reforms of the 1990s.
We need a bold approach to reform. And to achieve such reform, we need a new
way of governing—in particular, increased cooperation between federal, state
and local governments, businesses and community organisations.
A renewed belief in the possibility of reform was apparent at the 3 July 2008
COAG meeting. Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the goals of the COAG
reform agenda to address the challenges of:
• boosting productivity
• increasing workforce participation and mobility
• delivering better services for the community.
Reforms in these areas will in turn contribute to achieving broader goals of social
inclusion, closing the gap on Indigenous disadvantage and environmental
sustainability.
An overriding principle is that the key to building a strong economy is long-term
productivity growth and participation in the workforce.
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As the Prime Minister has said, the Commonwealth is committed to building
long-term prosperity by investing in five key platforms for productivity growth:
• an education revolution—improving the qualitative and quantitative
investment in the skills of the workforce
• an infrastructure reform program—kicked off by the government’s
establishment of the $20 billion Building Australia Fund
• investing in innovation and the industries of the future
• creating a seamless national economy through business deregulation
• finally, taxation reform.
The long boom has convinced many that prosperity is solving most problems.
In truth, we cannot take prosperity for granted and the COAG reform agenda I
have outlined above will be crucial for delivering long-term productivity growth
to underpin a strong economy.
Creating a fairer Australia is also a key priority for the government. Disadvantage
holds the economy back by reducing workforce participation.
The government’s challenge is to bring these Australians back into the
mainstream through a reform agenda of social inclusion.
The Commonwealth Government will be pursuing new ways of doing this
including through COAG.
In March 2007, the Productivity Commission reported that the full
implementation of reforms in human capital, competition and regulation would,
over 25 years, grow the economy by 12 per cent (more than $100 billion a year)
and bring great economic and social benefits to individuals, families, communities
and businesses.
This is a substantial body of work and a tribute to the willingness of the state
and territory governments to end the blame game in the interest of Australia
and Australians.
COAG—a new reform framework
In December 2007, we all returned to the COAG table with renewed vigour and
a comprehensive reform agenda for Australia. Four COAG meetings have been
scheduled for 2008 to deliver a substantial body of work on the agenda.
Central to this is sweeping reform to the architecture of Commonwealth–state
funding arrangements. Key elements of a new intergovernmental agreement on
Commonwealth–state financial arrangements will be finalised by the end of 2008,
following extensive work by treasurers and the COAG working groups.
The intention of this reform is that states will be able to deploy Commonwealth
Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) more effectively and creatively, with enhanced
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public accountability. New National Partnership (NP) agreements will sharpen
the incentives for reform.
Specific Purpose Payment base funding has tended to be viewed in terms of
funding shares provided by each level of government.
The new agreements for SPPs will replace input controls with a rigorous focus
on the achievement of objectives, outcomes and outputs. That is, the agreements
will focus on what services the states and territories can deliver, without
prescribing how this is to be achieved.
The COAG working groups have been developing outputs, outcomes and
performance measures for the new agreements in areas such as health, schools,
vocational education and training, affordable housing and disabilities.
These new arrangements should lead to the greater choice, competition, creativity
and customisation that I referred to earlier—and ultimately to delivery by the
states and territories of better outcomes for people.
The new financial framework will result in fewer SPPs—many of the existing
payments will be combined into a smaller number of new payments—but no
reduction in total Commonwealth funding.
These reforms will better clarify roles and responsibilities, reduce duplication
and provide greater flexibility for states and territories to put money into areas
where they can produce the best outcomes for their communities.
The revised SPPs will be augmented by new NPs. These partnership arrangements
will:
• provide funding for specific projects in areas of joint responsibility, such as
in interstate transport
• provide payments to facilitate reforms to lift standards of service delivery
• reward states that deliver on nationally significant reforms.
This new Commonwealth–state financial arrangement will provide the platform
for improving economic, social and environmental outcomes.
This architecture will also be crucial to improving performance in service delivery
in the states. States and territories will have more flexibility to pursue different
forms of service delivery that best suit their circumstances.
But the flip side is that in return for increased Commonwealth funding under
NPs, the Commonwealth will expect improved delivery of services, key
measurable outcomes and outputs.
The states and territories are important partners in this process. The
Commonwealth Government’s challenge to them is to commit to concrete, tangible
reforms.
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And our commitment is to match ambitious policy reform delivering better
outcomes for people with new financial support. This bargain forms part of the
government’s upcoming negotiations for reform in the key areas of health,
education and Indigenous affairs.
This is a significant development in managing Commonwealth–state relations
and a step forward in improving government services to people. Let me talk
about some of these in more detail.
Health
COAG has agreed that the new National Healthcare Agreement would be signed
in December 2008 with new funding arrangements to commence on 1 July 2009.
This new agreement will go beyond previous agreements—and the current
hospital system—to encompass primary health care, prevention and the acute
and aged-care systems. And it will spell out the agreed accountability framework
of all governments (Commonwealth, state and territory) for the objectives,
outcomes and outputs in these areas.
Key priorities include reform and additional service provision in hospitals,
preventative health, closing the Indigenous health gap and fixing the intersection
of aged care, disability services and mental health roles and responsibilities.
The Commonwealth Government is willing to provide extra funding for
health—but expects in return real reform in the sector and for more funding to
result in the provision of more services.
Schools
In relation to schools, as the Prime Minister announced on 27 August, the three
central pillars of reform that the Commonwealth aims to achieve through COAG
this year are:
• improving the quality of teaching
• making school reporting properly transparent
• lifting achievement in disadvantaged school communities, including closing
the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous students in terms of literacy
and numeracy achievement, as well as year 12 (or equivalent) attainments.
A major thrust of the schooling reform agenda is to embed quality teaching.
Raising teacher quality provides the platform for lifting student engagement
and performance, as well as making progress on other school reforms.
A particular challenge for most education systems (including Australia’s) is to
attract quality teachers in ‘hard-to-staff’ schools.
In recent years, the United States and United Kingdom have implemented
innovative and successful programs—the Teach for America and the Teach First
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programs—where highly talented graduates are given an accelerated pathway
into teaching in difficult and challenging schools for two years.
These programs have given talented young graduates a taste of teaching—and
many have made it their profession as a result.
One aim of the Commonwealth’s new partnership with the states and territories,
beginning in 2009, is to establish a similar scheme in Australia.
These are just some features of two streams of COAG work.
Better ways to deliver
The new financial framework and reforms being pursued through COAG are the
result of creative experimentation and innovation.
We intend to keep monitoring how this innovation is working. The COAG
Reform Council will be able to make an independent assessment of whether
predetermined milestones and performance benchmarks have been met and it
will also highlight examples of good practice and performance around the
country.
In effect, it will provide continuous feedback on the success of the new financial
arrangements in driving reform that leads to better outcomes for Australians in
such important areas as health, education and closing the gap on Indigenous
disadvantage.
Conclusion and looking forward to 2009 and beyond
The COAG meetings during the remainder of 2008 will focus on finalising policy
reforms and the new financial arrangements, which will in turn reform
Commonwealth–state relations; I am confident this will be for the better.
As well as a full policy agenda, addressing these key challenges will be a major
focus of endeavour for COAG officials for 2009.
The new National Healthcare Agreement will set the groundwork for the first
stage of health system reform.
The final report of the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission in
June 2009 will provide recommendations for a second round of reforms to address
the interface between the public and private health sectors, the health workforce
and integration of care across the health system.
We also need to reform service delivery with a ‘citizen-centred’ focus that can
be more responsive to community needs.
As the Prime Minister said early in 2008, we must ‘continue to reform the system
of government and government service so that citizens lie at the centre, rather
than the inflexible behemoths of official bureaucracy’.
42
Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy
I agree with the Prime Minister that government is not the repository of all
wisdom, that there are limits to what governments can effectively do and that
the private and community sectors have much to offer.
We look forward to working with groups across the community to improve the
delivery of government services.
I believe the Commonwealth and state and territory governments have a great
opportunity to reach agreement.
And I am also confident, given the evidence of goodwill that I have seen from
states and territories and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA),
that we can achieve far-reaching reform.
From the Commonwealth’s point of view, it marks just the beginning—the
beginning of a period of long-term reform to tackle the nation’s long-term
challenges; we have to achieve this in order to ensure better outcomes for the
people of Australia.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as a keynote address at the ANZSOG Annual Conference on 12
September 2008.
2  Keating, Michael and Davis, Glyn 2000, The Future of Governance, Allen & Unwin, Melbourne.
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5. The reform imperative and
Commonwealth–state relations1
The Hon John Brumby MP, Treasurer of Victoria2
More than 40 years ago, the late Donald Horne coined one of the most memorable
phrases to describe our nation. He called Australia the ‘lucky country’. As many
of you no doubt realise, Horne was not singing Australia’s praises. Rather, he
was decrying Australia’s complacency, its lack of innovation in important forms
of industry and business and its failure to match the enterprise of other
prosperous industrial societies. Horne believed that Australia owed its prosperity
not to its native creativity and innovation, but rather to blind luck.
Horne warned that we were a nation taking it easy, that we were coasting along
and drifting with the tide. While I don’t agree with everything Horne argues
in The Lucky Country, I do believe his message is as apt today as it was in 1964.
Most importantly—as Horne cautioned 40 years ago—we need to remain focused
on national reform and innovation if we are to prosper in the twenty-first
century. While Australia’s economic performance has been solid through the
mid 1990s and in this decade, our productivity growth has stalled and our living
standards are slipping in relation to comparable OECD countries. And, as I will
address in some detail here, the challenges we face are not just economic.
In the health area, for example, the paradigm has changed dramatically. For the
first time in our history, the impact of non-communicable diseases now exceeds
that of communicable diseases. Yet our health system remains largely designed
to treat injury and infections.
New solutions, new reforms and a recommitment to cooperative federalism are
crucial to meeting the challenges facing our country.
The reform challenge
I want to talk here about how cooperative Commonwealth–state relations will
be crucial in meeting the reform challenges ahead. In particular:
• human capital (the National Reform Agenda)
• regulation (the National Reform Agenda)
• innovation (the National Innovation Agenda)
• climate change and water
• Commonwealth–state financial relations.
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As I have mentioned, our productivity growth is stalled, the gains from past
reforms are running out and we risk relying on blind luck yet again. Australia’s
first wave of reforms introduced by the Hawke Government in the mid 1980s
saw the floating of the dollar, the deregulation of financial markets and the
beginning of a phasing out of tariff barriers designed to protect Australian
industry.
These reforms lowered the cost of imports as inputs into Australian industry,
made exports more competitive and generally allowed the Australian economy
to begin the process of aligning with the global economy.
Under the leadership of the Keating Government, the introduction of enterprise
bargaining and the 1995 COAG agreement to implement a National Competition
Policy (NCP) were central to a second wave of reform that sought to increase
competition and productivity.
These measures were pivotal in boosting the competitiveness and growth of the
Australian economy. The NCP was groundbreaking in the sense that all
governments agreed to a common set of objectives, and it demonstrated what
could happen when Commonwealth, state and territory governments had a
common purpose and collaborated to implement major reforms.
Australia’s current economic success owes as much to past reform efforts as it
does to the resources boom. In the case of Victoria, for example, our leadership
in implementing the NCP as well as other micro-reforms has meant our economic
performance is much stronger than it otherwise would be. In fact, Access
Economics in its most recent Business Outlook described Victoria’s performance
as ‘magnificent’ despite ‘the onslaught of the $A, interest rates and drought’.
To ensure our prosperity in the future, Australians must take the next step in
reforming our economy, and cooperative federalism—governments working
together—is the best way to achieve these reforms.
Evolving federalism
Australia’s federal system has both strength and weaknesses. To engender a
more cooperative federalism, we need an overhaul of Commonwealth–state
relations; and, as someone who has served in state and federal parliaments, I feel
better qualified than many to draw that conclusion. I’ve seen
Commonwealth–state relations from just about every angle: as a federal MP in
the 1980s during the Hawke Government, as chief of staff to a cabinet minister
in the early years of the Keating Government, as Leader of the Victorian
Opposition for six years during the Kennett Government and as Victoria’s
forty-ninth Treasurer for the past seven years.
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There’s not much I haven’t seen, heard or experienced about the often very
volatile relationship between the Commonwealth, states and territories.
The causes of many of the problems in Commonwealth–state relations today
stem from the fractious relations that existed between the states that voted for
Federation in 1901 and the flaws in the constitution that they accepted as an
article of federal union. More than a century later, we are lumbered with
constitutional machinery that was intended to protect each state’s prerogatives
from each other and from the Commonwealth Government. This machinery has
frequently made the pursuit of national reform a difficult and complicated
endeavour.
Prior to federation, Australia’s states maintained fierce tribal rivalries with one
another. They levied customs excises on goods passing between their borders.
They laid rail track with different gauges. Victoria even celebrated the date of
its separation from the colony of New South Wales for nearly 50 years, prior to
Federation. Not surprisingly, the founding fathers of Australia’s constitution
were concerned to protect state power and they anticipated the federation would
function by allocating different responsibilities to the Commonwealth and the
state governments so that each could act autonomously within their respective
spheres of influence. However, despite these intentions, Australia has evolved
rapidly into what has been termed a system of ‘cooperative federalism’, where
the states and a federal government share responsibility for many areas of
government and must cooperate to carry out these responsibilities.
The seeds of cooperative federalism were sown in the constitution itself. Section
51 of the constitution, which outlines the Commonwealth’s powers, has always
been defined expansively by the High Court, allowing the Commonwealth to
assume powers that are implied or incidental to those powers. Section 96 of the
constitution further enables the Commonwealth to make payments to the states
on whatever conditions it determines. This has become the principal means by
which the Commonwealth has influenced or mandated policy in what have
traditionally been seen as state responsibilities.
Alfred Deakin was very prescient when he wrote, back in 1902, that the
constitution had made the states ‘legally free, but financially bound to the chariot
wheels of the Central Government’.
Vertical fiscal imbalance
The extreme degree of fiscal imbalance in the Australian federal system leads to
the need for substantial financial transfers from Canberra to the states. And
Canberra cannot resist the temptation to control how these funds are spent. This
undermines one of federalism’s key strengths, by narrowing the scope for policy
experimentation and innovation and restricting the capacity of states to respond
to local needs and preferences. The current Federal Government has repeatedly
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used its control of the purse strings to impose ill-considered, ideologically driven
compliance measures on the states’ delivery of core services, such as education
and health. These measures are typically focused on micro-managing the way
states deliver core services, rather than on the big-picture outcomes that we are
all striving to achieve.
As a result of vertical fiscal imbalance, and for many other reasons, a joint
Commonwealth–state approach is important. I’d like now to turn to what it will
be important for now and in the near future.
National Reform Agenda
Victoria has led the push for a new round of economic reform, by putting forward
the National Reform Initiative in August 2005—a third wave of reform to ensure
Australia’s future prosperity. This culminated in the National Reform Agenda
(NRA), agreed at COAG.
There are two broad dimensions to this new NRA. The first aims to improve the
economic environment through further competition and regulatory reforms.
The second and most important element of the reform agenda concerns human
capital. Together, these reforms will increase our standard of living through
raising economic productivity and workforce participation.
And the gains are significant: the Victorian Treasury has estimated that the
potential impact of the NRA on GDP will be up to 5 per cent over the next 10
years and 14 per cent over the next 25 years. After 10 years, this translates to a
fiscal dividend to the Commonwealth of up to $10 billion, with less than $3
billion shared between the states. After 25 years, this translates to a fiscal
dividend to the Commonwealth of up to $35 billion, with less than $5 billion
shared between the states. Even after one allows for the transfer of GST revenue
from the Commonwealth, the states receive only 28 per cent of the total tax
revenue in Australia, yet are responsible for the lion’s share of service delivery.
It is imperative to redistribute these fiscal dividends fairly to ensure that vertical
fiscal imbalance is not further exacerbated and the states can afford real reform.
Reforms in human capital, or workforce incentives, education and health, are
the areas that will produce the biggest economic gain and greatest benefits
through participation and productivity. Skills and education have never been
more important. We need to ensure that we are engaging people in learning
throughout their lives to enable and motivate them to participate in the workforce
more efficiently and for longer. And, of course, good health provides the
foundation for economic and social participation.
Health
I mentioned in my introductory comments the new health paradigm. In the old
days, people used to die from injury or infection, and we built whole health
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systems aimed at treating injury and infections, especially evident in our
investment in drugs and acute-care hospitals. But now, the developed world
has undergone an epidemiological transition. Now it is non-communicable or
chronic disease that will kill most people; in fact, chronic disease now accounts
for more than 80 per cent of mortality in Western countries and is rapidly
encroaching on communicable disease as a major cause of illness and disability
in the developing world also. By chronic disease, I mean diabetes, heart disease,
hypertension and other health conditions directly related to the more affluent,
inactive lifestyles of industrialised countries. In the twentieth century, we made
rapid advances in longevity and health on the back of three fundamental health
innovations: clean water, immunisation and antibiotics. Together they have
saved millions of people from the scourge of waterborne infectious diseases,
common infectious diseases like small pox, measles and polio and bacterial
infections like tonsillitis and blood poisoning. In a sense, each one has been a
magic bullet that has delivered better health for whole populations.
Today we don’t have a box of magic bullets at our disposal. Paradoxically, our
ill health is largely the result of social, economic and technological success; the
‘epidemiological transition’ has occurred as a direct result of social, economic
and medical progress. Let me put more of this in a practical context. The
Department of Human Services has estimated that more than $1 billion of income
is lost by twenty-five to sixty-four-year-old Victorians per annum due to poor
health associated with smoking, obesity and high blood pressure. This illustrates
the enormous benefits of focusing on prevention. It’s a simple concept: healthier
people equal a more capable workforce—capable of participating in the workforce
and capable of being productive by using the skills they have gained. However,
estimates of the economic cost of poor health usually encompass only the financial
costs of providing health care and the years of life that might be lost. Costs that
are less often considered include lost employment and productivity resulting
from poor health, but these are significant.
For example, new research from the Victorian Department of Treasury indicates
the presence of Types 1 and 2 diabetes in females aged twenty to sixty reduces
the probability of employment by about 12 per cent. The productivity effects
of poor mental health are even more pronounced. For example, a female with a
mild level of psychological distress is about 7.6 per cent less likely to be able to
hold down a job as her healthy counterpart. A male with high levels of
psychological distress is 36 per cent less likely to be able to do the same. To put
this in context, a mild level of psychological distress might mean feeling tired,
nervous, hopeless, fidgety and sad ‘most of the time’. A high level of
psychological distress might mean having these feelings ‘all of the time’.
The economic cost of poor health is a real one—and, of course, the flip side is
that good health provides the foundation for economic and social participation.
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To address this issue, we need a national approach to shift the focus of our health
system towards prevention rather than treatment, to reduce chronic disease and
achieve a healthier workforce. We need a fair share of the fiscal dividends the
Commonwealth is set to reap from the National Reform Agenda so that we can
boost our investment in preventative care.
National Innovation Agenda
While it is imperative that we improve our health, education and training
outcomes, this alone will not be enough to safeguard Australia’s prosperity and
productivity in the new century. The OECD estimates that in advanced industrial
economies, innovation and the exploitation of scientific discoveries and new
technologies have accounted for 50 per cent of economic growth. This is a fact
recognised by global powerhouses such as the United States, which in 2006
released its American Competitiveness Initiative—a 10-year US$137 billion
blueprint for investment in research and development capacity, skills and
training.
This would be equivalent to the Australian Government providing about $860
million a year in additional investment in science and technology research and
development. While Australia has no shortage of innovative and creative people,
it lacks a cohesive and focused nationwide system to best translate their work
into tangible economic gains.
Recently, the Australian Innovation Research Centre provided compelling
evidence, if we needed it, that the lucky country’s luck had just about run out.
In a sobering assessment, the centre cautioned:
Australian industry is no more innovative than it was a quarter of a
century ago. We don’t export a higher proportion of high-value goods,
the proportion of our stock market comprised of [sic] technology
companies hasn’t grown, our companies introduce fewer new products
and services than those of other countries, and our industries have
significantly lower ratios of research and development to sales than
comparable economies.
The NRA needs buttressing. This is why the Victorian Government will soon
release a National Innovation Agenda (NIA), which will build on and extend
the NRA.
Our vision for an NIA encompasses five critical areas:
• increasing incentives for business innovation
• building new innovation infrastructure
• developing new skills for the innovation economy
• creating a better regulatory environment for innovation
• forging better connections and collaborations.
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The NIA will ensure that additional value, jobs and wealth are created from the
NRA, as well as delivering significant economic and social returns in its own
right.
The National Reform Agenda
The NRA reforms will help to ensure that we have a labour force with the skills
business needs to innovate, even as population ageing and lower fertility rates
place pressure on the labour force and the growth of highly skilled industries
creates growing demand for skills.
Competition and regulation reforms will help to create a competitive regulatory
environment—one that promotes the competitive pressures that drive innovation,
and does not impede business as it responds to those challenges.
In this context, an NIA would complement and follow on from the NRA,
encouraging business to be more innovative and to take advantage of human
capital and competition and regulatory reform currently being pursued. So, for
example, new innovation infrastructure should include a clear national plan for
building the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure
that is required to participate effectively in international business and research.
The importance of such reform is illustrated by the evidence of Australia’s high
take-up of ICT equipment and the impact that take-up has had on the broader
economy.
GST distribution
Our current Commonwealth–state financial relations impede progress on these
vital challenges. I have already spoken about our extraordinary vertical fiscal
imbalance (VFI). Additional problems are generated by our problems of horizontal
fiscal equalisation (HFE).
In 2006–07, Victoria will receive only 87 cents of every dollar that Victorians
pay in GST. Victorians pay about $1.24 billion more in GST than we receive (we
pay $9.75 billion in GST and receive $8.51 billion back in General Purpose
Payments). We subsidise other states by $242 a person.
Despite the emergence of a ‘dual economy’ in Australia, where Western Australia
and Queensland are benefiting from high growth rates and booming mining
royalty revenues, New South Wales and Victoria are still carrying most of the
burden of HFE, with Queensland still a net beneficiary from HFE.
Now, the rationale for the redistribution of GST funding to the states becomes
more arcane with the passing of the years. The assessment methodology for the
redistribution comprises individual consideration of about 40 main expenditure
categories, 13 revenue categories, as well as about 30 Specific Purpose Payment
(SPP) categories. Then a further 350 expenditure component assessments and
about 40 revenue component assessments are applied.
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GST ‘black box’
Without delving further into this ‘black box’, I’ll simply point out that the
redistribution system intrinsically acts as a disincentive for states to undertake
reforms encouraging economic growth. Rather than seeing strong fiscal incentives
for promoting development and growth, states operate in an environment in
which direct revenue gains from public policy reforms are to a considerable
extent ‘equalised away’ by the current HFE arrangements because revenue
capacity growth is a key factor in assessments. There is a growing view among
businesspeople, opinion leaders and the general community that we need
fundamental reform of HFE in Australia. Victoria concurs and we are keen to
open up dialogue with the Commonwealth and other states to find a better,
simpler and more equitable way to distribute GST revenues.
Victoria supports the principle of equalisation and redistribution to those states
with small economies, however, resource-rich states with substantial financial
capacity, such as Queensland and Western Australia, should at a minimum be
able to stand on their own, and potentially help those states in clear need of
assistance.
Any reform model should be a simple and implementable approach that addresses
the significant deficiencies of the current system, while retaining the core concept
of horizontal fiscal equalisation based on the smaller states and territories
continuing to get the support they need from the larger and stronger states.
To achieve this, Victoria proposes that more substantial HFE reform should be
built around four pillars:
• protecting the fiscal positions of the smaller states and territories
• delivering greater certainty of GST revenues for all states in the medium to
long term
• reducing the distortions and deadweight costs imposed by the current system
• managing the transition to the new model.
We are keen to open a dialogue, with the Commonwealth as an active partner,
to find a better and simpler way to distribute GST revenues in order to provide
greater funding certainty and remove the disincentive for states to pursue
economic reform. We recognise that no model is likely to please everyone. But
we know that without these or similar reforms, Australia’s capacity to undertake
the NRA and NIA and address our key challenges in developing our human
capital, our competition and regulatory policy will be jeopardised. Doing nothing
about HFE is simply no longer an option.
Today I can say that Victoria will be advocating a new model in the very near
future.
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Our environmental challenges
The other major challenges we face as a federation are environmental: water and
climate change.
Climate change
In February 2007, the International Panel on Climate Change issued a report that
said the scientific evidence was now ‘unequivocal’ that global warming was
upon us and that the pace of climate change was due to human activity. While
there will always be debate about the extent and rate of climate change, the
reality is we must begin to act now to protect the environment and to provide
a degree of certainty for industry in a carbon-constrained world.
The Victorian Government has long recognised the need for action on climate
change. We have invested $1.8 billion in our Innovation Agenda since 1999,
allocated $103.5 million for clean-coal technologies (through the Energy
Technology Innovation Strategy), invested $30 million in the Centre for Energy
and Greenhouse Technologies, contributed $50 million to building the world’s
largest solar power station of its kind in Victoria and instituted the Victorian
Renewable Energy Target (which mandates 10 per cent renewable energy by
2016). In a number of these areas (clean coal and solar power), we have been
able to work very constructively with the Federal Government.
As another initiative, the government is supporting the development of a bio-fuel
industry and aims to manufacture more than 400 litres of ethanol or bio-diesel
by 2010 with significant environmental benefits. Our aim is that by 2010, 5 per
cent of all transport fuel will come from a bio source, leading to improved air
quality in metropolitan areas and significant regional investment in country
Victoria.
But it has long been clear that we also need a clear carbon price signal to bring
forward commercial investment in clean-energy technologies. Only when firms
and households face a clear price signal will the incentives be there to adopt
more energy-efficient, less greenhouse-intensive technologies.
Uncertainty about greenhouse policy, and the lack of a clear price signal, is now
becoming a significant impediment to needed new base-load investment in
long-lived electricity generation assets. This was clearly brought out in discussion
papers released in November 2006 by the COAG-commissioned Energy Reform
Implementation Group, based on extensive stakeholder consultation within the
energy sector. Our need for energy security alone tells us that we cannot allow
this degree of investment uncertainty to persist.
We have been strong proponents of a national emissions trading scheme to send
a clear price signal to energy producers and consumers and reward businesses
that adopt less carbon-intensive technologies. While all greenhouse abatement
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options entail costs for energy consumers, it is becoming increasingly clear that
the costs of inaction are likely to outweigh the cost of mitigation. And an
emissions trading scheme is the most effective means of abatement because it
provides real financial incentives for firms to reduce their emissions but leaves
it up to the market to implement the lowest-cost form of abatement. The
flexibility of permit trading means that the impacts on business and consumers
can be minimised. A domestic scheme can also be designed in such a way to
protect adversely affected companies and groups, and link in with international
schemes.
Leaders of major corporations and businesses in critical energy industries are
now breaking ranks with the Federal Government and calling for Australia’s
involvement in carbon emissions trading schemes. Recently, some of Australia’s
largest companies, including from the energy, resources and manufacturing
sectors, have submitted their views to a state and territory task force examining
a possible design for a national emissions trading scheme. Major companies such
as BHP, Rio Tinto, Shell and Insurance Australia Group have joined calls for the
implementation of an emissions trading scheme. Rio Tinto suggested that the
lack of a global mechanism should not be used as an excuse for inaction on the
domestic front.
Australia urgently needs national policy leadership on this vital issue; we cannot
wait until the rest of the world solves the problem or it will be too late. The
states and territories have done the groundwork in developing a workable design
for a domestic national emissions trading scheme.
Key elements of the state and territory proposal are:
• the scheme will be a national ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme initially covering the
stationary energy sector
• to provide certainty, investors will always have 10 years of firm caps, with
a range of caps for the following 10 years; the range of caps for the second
10-year period provides the flexibility to respond to any changes in
Australia’s international obligations or circumstances
• it will have modest initial emission reduction targets (to be agreed) to allow
a gradual transition for the economy
• assistance will be provided to adversely affected generators and
energy-intensive trade-exposed industries (most likely through a free
allocation of permits)
• the scheme will be able to be linked to international schemes in the future.
Now it is time for Canberra to accept the states’ longstanding offer to join them
in implementing a scheme as soon as practicable. I hope the Prime Minister’s
Task Group on Emissions Trading seriously considers the benefits of an early
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domestic scheme to prepare Australia for a future carbon-constrained world,
when it releases it discussion paper.
Water
To take another example, let’s take the currently very topical issue of water
management—one of Australia’s most significant national challenges.
If you believed the Prime Minister, you’d think the states had been doing nothing
to reform our water management framework or to protect our water assets. This
is far from the truth.
Victoria has been leading the nation on water reform for 20 years. In the past
couple of years, we unveiled our blueprint for securing Victoria’s water future
for the next 50 years, Our Water Our Future, which led to a more sustainable
balance between consumption and environmental uses of available water supplies,
a more robust system of water property rights and a more dynamic and efficient
water market than anywhere else in Australia.
Ultimately, however, it is likely to be beyond the efforts of any state acting alone
to resolve future water supply and demand imbalances in the most cost-effective
way. The Commonwealth has called for a transfer of powers over the
Murray-Darling Basin in order to accelerate the pace of water reform. Yet
Canberra’s record on water management does not stack up too favourably. In
The Age newspaper in February 2007, Andrew Macintosh described the Federal
Government’s $10 billion water plan as ‘a bad remake of Groundhog Day, only
without the happy ending’. Macintosh notes that the Commonwealth ‘has made
too many similar announcements in the past for it to be credible that this one
will solve the nation’s water problems’. In the past 10 years, no fewer than 12
such announcements have been made by the Commonwealth. None of them has
‘solved our water woes or even put our rivers on the path to restoration’. Nor
is there much real evidence of ‘reform’ in what the Commonwealth is proposing.
Our national vision should be for a secure set of diversion limits to ensure a
sustainable level of environmental flows and the allocation of all
non-environmental water through water markets. This calls for a water grid of
interconnected systems within South-East Australia facilitating the broadest
practicable basis of trade in water entitlements. Only in this way can we
ultimately secure a sustainable and efficient allocation between agricultural,
industrial, residential and environmental uses.
Let me be clear. Victoria will support a plan that acts in the national interest to
protect and preserve our most precious resource. Securing our water resources
for the future is one of the biggest challenges Australia has ever faced. The best
way to meet that challenge is to come up with new solutions:
• that are properly thought out
55
The reform imperative and Commonwealth–state relations
• that are developed in consultation with the community, industry experts
and relevant government departments
• that are properly costed
• that do not raise more questions than they answer
• that cannot be addressed by the Prime Minister issuing a media release
announcing his plan and then following that up a few days later with a letter
to the leaders of each state and territory.
This is unacceptable—unacceptable because you can’t unwind 100 years of
constitutional control of the river system with a media release and a letter. That
is why the Victorian Premier, Steve Bracks, has set three preconditions regarding
John Howard’s plan for the Murray-Darling:
• Victorian farmers and irrigators are not disadvantaged
• we want assurances from the Prime Minister and Malcolm Turnbull that this
is not privatisation of our water resources by stealth
• we want to see the existing federal $1.8 billion fund for water projects
actually flowing into projects that have been waiting for months for
Canberra’s approval.
Premier Bracks, together with the other premiers, is attending a meeting called
by the Prime Minister to discuss the $10 billion water package. Victoria had
already asked for such a meeting. We now go to that table wanting to see details
of the Prime Minister’s proposal, because—as far as I can see—there are no
details. Indeed, key federal departments including Treasury, finance and the
environment were left out of the process of formulating the package—unorthodox
at best; arrogant at worst.
I can tell you that our officials have examined the Prime Minister’s proposal.
And they have raised more than 40 significant issues that need to be resolved.
Steve Bracks has today written to the Prime Minister outlining those issues.
Issues around:
• the scope of the proposed arrangements








• urban water supply within the basin
• irrigators’ existing property rights
• metering and monitoring
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• implications for the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement
• any other further work.
These are serious considerations.
We are not talking about a modest medium-term state-based water-saving project.
The Prime Minister has proposed a $10 billion plan that dramatically reshapes
federal–state responsibilities. So how will that work?
Tell us about the funding model proposed for water reform and infrastructure
projects.
How will flows from the Snowy Hydro Scheme be accounted for and managed?
Will the National Water Commission have an ongoing role?
What is the process for determining the level of environmental flows?
And how do we find a balance between these and the entitlements of irrigators?
Does the Commonwealth propose to manage urban water supply in urban centres
around the basin.
Will the Commonwealth claw back flood-plain harvesting activities in the Darling
and other catchments?
The Victorian Government has been working hard for years putting in place the
right plans and projects to secure the state’s water resources for the future. We
understand there is more to be done. We also understand Victoria is not facing
this challenge in isolation.
Conclusion
I began by suggesting that while reform of Commonwealth–state relations might
not appear to be an exciting subject for discussion, it is absolutely crucial to
national economic and social planning for the next generation and beyond.
While Australia is adequately served by its constitutional arrangements that are
now more than 100 years old, we must recognise that we have failed to achieve
the right balance of shared responsibility and fiscal discretion between our state
and federal governments.
In addition, we must heed Donald Horne’s nearly 50-year-old call to action, to
realise that the days of the lucky country are well and truly numbered and that
substantive action is required if we are to become the clever country, or the
innovative country, or the prosperous country.
For this to occur, a joint approach between the Commonwealth and the state
governments is crucial to laying the groundwork for our future
prosperity—implementing the National Reform Agenda and the National
Innovation Agenda and meeting out water and climate change challenges.
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ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 6 February 2007.
2  John Brumby assumed the office of Premier of Victoria on 30 June 2007, after the resignation of Steve
Bracks.
58
Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy
6. Fostering creativity and innovation
in cooperative federalism—the
uncertainty and risk dimensions1
Mark Matthews2
Policy narratives in OECD nations are now starting to stress the importance of
‘innovation’ as a public sector objective. On one level, this reflects efforts to
align thinking with a wider discourse on innovation, arguably in an effort not
to be left out of the picture. For example, Geoff Mulgan3  has argued persuasively
that, contrary to some common assumptions, the public sector has a longer
history of innovation than the private sector. Indeed, public sector innovation
created the modern world—an operating environment in which private sector
innovation per se has flourished.4
In this essay, I focus upon a particular objective of innovation in the public
sector: the management of uncertainty and risk. In this context, following Knight
(1921), ‘risk’ applies to cases in which a probability of occurrence can be assigned.
Uncertainty refers to situations in which it is not possible to assign such
probabilities. The critical distinction is that the ability to assign probabilities
allows various other formal estimates related to risk and its consequences to be
estimated.5  I argue that governments place too great an emphasis on the
‘management of risk’ and not enough emphasis on the ‘management of
uncertainty’. A greater emphasis on the management of uncertainty, in turn,
helps us to understand what public sector innovation is—and why it is so
important.
This perspective applies a line of inquiry previously developed in relation to
innovation in the private sector to the specific issues faced in the public sector.6
In so doing, it also draws upon previous efforts to define a new ‘realist’ agenda
for science and innovation policy that addresses the distinctive role of the public
sector in providing the ‘prescience and preparedness’ for dealing with potentially
damaging future events.7 The essay also seeks to relate this treatment of the
public sector innovation challenge to the issue of cooperative federalism. This
is a particularly important issue when the uncertainties and risks governments
must address cross jurisdictional boundaries—as many do.
The theoretical underpinning for this policy-oriented discussion is that there is
much to be gained from exploring how our policy narratives can be informed
by drawing upon the ‘Austrian’ tradition in economics associated with Von
Hayek and others. For a flavour of this work, see Kirzner8  and Littlechild9  for
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a discussion of markets as processes. One can extract some very useful insights
from such thinking without necessarily subscribing to the full gamut of liberalist
stances associated with that body of work. As I set out to show, certain insights
in this ‘subjectivist’ tradition in economics are particularly useful for helping
us to develop strategies for effective innovation in the public sector.
Somewhat paradoxically, reframing key aspects of the policy narrative along
neo-Austrian lines in terms of the ‘management of uncertainty’ rather than the
‘management of risk’ does more to re-enforce the importance of the State than
undermine it. The trick is to recognise that whilst most of the discussion on the
management of uncertainty and risk in current policy narratives focuses on the
management of risk, the management of uncertainty is in fact what governments
spend more of their time actually grappling with. For instance, in 2007 the
Australian Public Service Commission moved to highlight the challenge posed
by ‘wicked problems’—complex intractable challenges with uncertainty over
causes and effects and also a likelihood of damaging unintended consequences
arising from policy interventions, see Australian Public Service Commission
(2007).10  Indeed, vast swathes of public expenditure (notably funding for basic
science) seek to translate uncertainty into risk. This is the essence of the process
of ‘discovery’: delving into the unknown to make it less threatening and easier
to live with—whether we are talking of diseases, near-Earth objects or climate
change.
Framing public sector innovation objectives as a response
to handling uncertainty and risk
A key difference between public sector innovation and private sector innovation
is that market-based selection mechanisms play a different role in the innovation
process. In the private sector, by definition, the litmus test for attempts at
innovation is market success. Not all innovations prevail in the market, and
indeed various other factors mean that the ‘best’ solutions might not become
the dominant solutions. However, markets do enforce selection processes that
tend to eliminate less-competitive solutions. Competing firms therefore do their
best to second-guess what will prevail in the market, often applying rigorous
structured decision-making processes (such as stage-gate methods) to weed out
less-promising concepts and solutions.
However, in the final analysis, it is the market, and the social and cultural
preferences that are reflected in markets, that will decide which innovations
succeed and which do not. The academic and policy literature on how these
processes work (and do not work) is well developed and full of useful insights.
These insights work backwards from market processes into the research and
development and demonstration stages that drive new product introduction.
They also work forwards into how market processes drive the incremental
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innovations that continue once new products have been introduced into the
marketplace.
In a public sector context, the relationship between innovation and markets (as
selection mechanisms) is significantly different. Governments deal with the
uncertainties and risks that markets cannot handle. This requires innovations
in what governments seek to do. But, crucially, governments cannot rely on
market processes to play the critical ‘weed-out’ stage in the innovation process
by eliminating solutions that do not align well with the preferences expressed
in markets and encouraging those that do. Rather, governments need to try to
mimic this aspect of the functionality of market-based selection processes without
the recourse of relying on markets to actually carry out this selection process.
This requires that the public sector draws heavily upon external and internal
expertise to weigh-up complex risks, often using large amounts of evidence.
When there is no market-based ‘short cut’ available, the sheer weight of evidence
that might need to be assessed poses major challenges and raises important
questions about whether ‘hierarchies of evidence’ are required to deal in a
rational way with the sheer quantity and complexity of information available.11
The point here is similar to that made by Mary Kaldor in relation to trajectories
in the advance of military technologies. ‘Baroque’ (overly complex) military
technologies evolve because the only real test of superiority is a ‘symmetrical’
war in which weapon systems with comparable missions are pitted against each
other. If there are no wars of that type—that is, no wars or only so-called
‘asymmetrical’ conflicts—then there is no ‘market-like’ test of technical
superiority. Technologies evolve—but not necessarily in ways that make them
‘fit for purpose’.12
As an illustration, consider what the recent government responses to the global
financial crisis have entailed. Governments have been grappling with the need
to act innovatively (over particularly tight time frames) in order to mitigate
severe failings in how financial markets have been operating. Rather than simply
seeking to miminise the risk of introducing an uncompetitive new product or
service into the market (the far simpler challenge faced by a company),
governments have been forced to address a far more severe challenge. If the
innovative market interventions attempted by governments fail then the global
economy could fail—dramatically. Rather than one or a few corporations failing,
whole industries could go out of business with catastrophic social and national
security impacts.
In short, the consequences of incorrectly judging what will and won’t work
when seeking to innovate are disproportionately greater for this type of public
sector innovation than for private sector innovation.
Furthermore, when private sector innovation goes wrong—for example, a new
drug that has unforeseen and terrible side effects—it is governments that bear
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the responsibility by virtue of their regulatory roles. This is why, in comparison
with the private sector, public sector decision-making processes can appear
cumbersome, risk averse and time consuming. The unintended consequences of
getting it wrong are far too severe to rely on the market to correct problems—as
in the private sector. The far greater complexity of what governments do
generates great uncertainty over what to do in response to challenges. The
extraordinarily damaging potential associated with unintended consequences
necessitates robust risk-averse decision making. I find it far more helpful to view
the role that central economic ministries play in setting public intervention
guidelines from this perspective rather than to critique them for being too risk
averse by (incorrectly) viewing them from a less-demanding private sector
risk-management perspective.
Given this, it is important to deploy a practice-oriented classification of public
sector innovation that highlights this aspect of risk exposure in the public sector.
Some aspects of public sector innovation are comparable with, indeed might be
almost identical to, aspects of private sector innovation (examples are business
processes improvements and many aspects of ICT—e-government—and so on).
However, as the arguments above highlight, there are other aspects of public
sector innovation, particularly those associated with policy innovation, for which
governments must bear responsibilities that greatly outweigh those born by the
private sector (national security, counter-terrorism, pandemic preparedness and
the like).
As discussions of public sector innovation evolve, it could therefore be useful
to draw a clear distinction between those aspects of public sector innovation
that are comparable with what is found in the private sector and those aspects
that are distinctive and far more severe in terms of the damaging consequences
of getting things wrong. There is a tendency for the literature to focus more
heavily on areas of public sector innovation that are similar to private sector
innovation (often in terms of ‘importing’ concepts and practices from the private
sector). There is less emphasis in this discourse on the most challenging types
of public sector innovation—the areas in which the consequences of getting
things wrong are far more severe than in the private sector. This is a shortcoming
that it is essential for current policy narratives on public sector innovation to
address.
In this context, it is not surprising that the uncritical acceptance of private sector
norms and business processes can potentially wreak havoc in the public sector.
Whilst it might suit some elements in the private sector to point to costly and
cumbersome decision-making processes in the public sector (usually as a
marketing-driven justification for emulating and eventually purchasing private
sector products and services), it is dangerous for governments to react to such
criticism defensively. Rather, the reaction should be to stress the sort of points
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made above: governments handle the uncertainties and risks that markets can’t
cope with. Creativity and innovation in the public sector are by necessity more
challenging and more critically important activities than private sector
innovation—not, as some would have us believe, activities with a lamentable
track record.13
By implication, senior officials in the public sector would be wise to articulate
far more clearly than at present the nature and extent of the differences between
public sector innovation and private sector innovation—especially in regard to
the far more severe consequences of getting things wrong when attempting to
innovate.
The prevailing emphasis in the literature on public sector innovation at present
is on areas of commonality with private sector innovation. This results in part
from efforts to import principles and practices from the private sector, with
relatively little emphasis on grasping what makes the public sector innovation
context significantly different.14 The treatment of risk is symptomatic of this
prevailing emphasis. There is far more discussion of the internal project
management-type dimension to risk taking—that is, when and how to take risks
in order to try something new—than of the external matter of the role that public
sector innovation plays in managing the uncertainties and risks that markets
either cannot cope with or (as recent experience in banking demonstrates)
generate themselves.
Similarly, there is much discussion of the use of information and communication
technology (ICT) in the public sector (e-government, customised service delivery,
and so on) and of how innovation is required to produce more ‘joined-up’
government. The discussion of innovation cycles and processes also frames risk
fairly tightly in relation to concepts of product and service development imported
from the private sector.15 Whilst such work is useful, it essentially amounts
only to providing a first step toward developing a more comprehensive and
appropriate framework for encouraging effective public sector innovation. Unless
these internal considerations (how best to make decisions about public sector
innovation) are related in practical ways to the wider external concerns of
governments, the guidance available to public servants will be biased—and
perhaps even dangerous. A ‘realist’ perspective on government’s role in handling
uncertainty and risk should help to bring these two aspects of the public sector
innovation challenge together. In order to do this, the appropriate conceptual
tools must be available and must be used effectively.
Choosing the best conceptual tools
One aspect of intellectual history that is relevant to understanding public sector
innovation is the way in which the study of innovation in the private sector
originated, in part, in a reaction against the difficulties faced by neo-classical
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economics in explaining technological advance. If one assumes a world of perfect
information and a state of equilibrium in which markets are operating in a stable
manner then technological advances must be treated as externally originating
deviations from these equilibrium conditions—processes of disruption to which
the economic system must respond and adapt. The finding that long-run
productivity growth had a large ‘residual’ element that could not be explained
by increases in the standard factors of production (capital and labour, and so
on) stimulated a large and productive line of investigation that eventually led
to the ‘innovation studies’ work that currently informs thinking on public sector
innovation. As innovation studies has evolved, it has moved away from economic
theory and econometrics and toward more managerial approaches—with a
particular (and useful) emphasis on documenting and understanding real practices
in business.
Inevitably, this emphasis on how businesses do innovation in practice leads to
a focus on how firms accumulate and exploit proprietary knowledge and
capabilities, how they seek to exploit intangible assets that their competitors do
not have. The emphasis is on differences between firms’ capabilities—on how
innovation drives markets in such a way that they are in continual evolution,
rarely in states of equilibrium. It should be of little surprise that the management
of uncertainty and risk features strongly in this perspective on innovation.
By evolving in this manner, work on innovation studies now has the (largely
unrealised) potential to converge with another stream of thinking in economics
known as ‘Austrian’ or subjectivist economics. This stream of thinking is
distinguished from neo-classical economics in some fundamental ways—and
ways that are highly relevant to understanding public sector innovation.
Rather than a world of quantitative uncertainty, the Austrian economic
perspectives describe a human condition in which creativity is a necessary
response to qualitative uncertainty (effectively ignorance) over what the future
has in store—both good and bad. In some circumstances, there are no
probabilities to assign to future states of the world, but rather the necessity to
act creatively in order to generate parameters that can be assigned probabilities
(and hence managed ‘rationally’). The resulting competition is inherently a process
of discovery and innovation. From this standpoint, markets are inherently
exploratory and innovative collective endeavours that operate via selection.
If we think about markets in this more analytical way—as exploratory processes
and selection mechanisms—then it is easier to understand their limitations and,
hence, grasp why public sector innovation is so important in helping us to
manage uncertainty. Markets can cope with risk (quantifiable likelihoods) but
they cannot cope with uncertainty as easily.
This is why governments spend vast amounts of taxpayers’ money on translating
uncertainty into risk. Many scientific and technological inventions are driven
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by the fundamental human desire to transform ignorance into uncertainty and
risk. There are whole rafts of imaging technologies (x-ray, ultrasound and
magnetic resonance imaging, microscopes, particle accelerators, telescopes,
seismic analysis, magnetic anomaly analysis, and so on) that provide us with
data that we would not otherwise have access to—that is, that translate ignorance
into indications and likelihoods. Much scientific theory is concerned with
translating ignorance into risk—that is, the analysis of complex data sets in
order to generate patterns of risk—such as crop planting strategies in the face
of unpredictable weather patterns. In short, investments in scientific
instrumentation and pattern recognition are, collectively, investments in
translating ignorance into risk. We are very rarely certain of what might happen,
particularly in complex situations such as human health, but we collectively
prefer to have more information than less information to guide our decision
making.
Another dimension to science and innovation policy that is relevant to
understanding innovation in the public sector relates to prescience and
preparedness. In previous policy work, I have sought to highlight why it is
important for governments to be more explicit than they are at present about
how their spending on public science generates useful outcomes that need not
require innovation or research commercialisation per se.16
In an uncertain and risky world, public science plays a critically important role
in ‘prescience’: identifying risks and associated costs that we might have to face
in the future (climate change being an excellent example). The widespread
dissemination of this information to business and the general community could
(eventually) help to change behaviours—and in turn changes what the future
might actually have in store for us. The objectives for innovation are driven by
this prescience—for instance, the rationale for investing in research and
development on lower-emission technologies.
Consequently, the benefits generated by this type of outcome from public science
tend to be reflected in less unfavourable futures than would otherwise be the
case. As the Stern Report seeks to stress, the economic value of mitigating risks
in this manner is massive. Preparedness reinvigorates the traditional concept of
capability building by highlighting the uncertainty and risk dimensions.
When these ideas were submitted to the Productivity Commission as part of its
2006 Review of Public Support for Science and Innovation, the approach gained
traction and the preparedness dimension featured strongly in their report.17
This momentum was, however, lost in the subsequent Review of the National
Innovation System in 2008, which sought to reinforce the link between
innovation policy and industry policy rather than seeking to explore new avenues
for articulating the benefits generated by public science.
65
Fostering creativity and innovation in cooperative federalism—the uncertainty and risk dimensions
The discovery-based perspective is also reflected in emerging views on how to
conduct public policy innovation. Charles Sabel has sought to promulgate an
‘experimentalist’ approach to innovation in US public policy. This work, which
draws upon innovation management experience in the automotive industry,
stresses the ways in which, in an uncertain decision-making environment,
managers in the public sector are better off explicitly adopting exploratory and
experimental approaches in which goals and intended outcomes are fairly fluid,
efforts are redirected as learning advances and overly hierarchical command
and control systems are avoided.18  Interestingly, as Ian Marsh19  points out,
contemporary commentaries on public sector reform tend to overlook this useful
strand of work.
Implications for cooperative federalism
The proposed policy narrative seeks to articulate a far more explicit and proactive
focus on managing uncertainty (rather than risk per se) as an objective for public
sector innovation. The public sector needs to be innovative because it holds
stewardship over the challenge of managing uncertainty.
I think it could be useful to think about the implications that such a policy
narrative would have for federal–state relations in Australia. Federal and
state/territory governments must cooperate in managing many major areas of
uncertainty and risk. When this comes to budget negotiations, this can be
contentious.
In this context, one of the more interesting public sector innovations that emerged
from the Blair Government in the United Kingdom was the ‘Invest to Save Budget’
(ISB). This was initially a joint HM Treasury–Cabinet Office (subsequently just
a Treasury) initiative aimed at providing ‘venture capital for oiling the wheels
of government’. The ISB set out to provide risk finance to allow innovative
partnership-based projects to be piloted and demonstrated in order to make it
easier for new and improved public services to be rolled out. By 2007, 487
partnerships had been funded at a total cost of £460 million.
The ISB has evolved through an explicitly ‘experimentalist’ process of
learning-by-doing based upon a series of fairly robust independent and internal
Treasury evaluations that have led to significant changes in how the ISB works.20
There is now a far stronger emphasis on supporting local and community projects
than at the launch of the ISB.
What makes the ISB interesting and significant is the notion that, in order to
generate net budget savings, central economic ministries should be willing to
sanction explicitly experimental partnership-based projects. The series of reviews
and evaluations of the ISB has highlighted how difficult it is for project
proponents to specify the risk taking they propose. Indeed, in the early phase
of the ISB, most tended to outsource the risk-based benefit–cost estimates that
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HM Treasury required them to provide—leading to ‘boiler-plate’ project appraisal
submissions provided by management consulting and accounting firms. These
problems would have been avoided if the ISB had opted for an uncertainty
management rather than a risk management-based approach. Hence one lesson
from the ISB experience is that it is much easier to implement experimentally
based public sector innovation programs if they are framed in terms of managing
uncertainty rather than just in terms of managing risk. Many partnerships sought
funding in order to work out what the risks would be: they set out to translate
ignorance into risk.
Another lesson from the ISB experience was that whilst HM Treasury took the
view that a successful ISB project that demonstrated that a new approach was
superior would lead to widespread adoption of the piloted approach, this tended
not to be the case in practice. Simply providing the information that a new
approach is better does not address the bureaucratic impediments to adopting
innovations—particularly those requiring partnerships. Hence evaluators’
recommendations that the innovative new concepts demonstrated by the ISB
would still need active ‘innovation adoption championing’ by powerful people
or teams found it hard to gain traction in a central economic ministry context.
The assumption tended to be that information would flow freely and that rational
decision making would lead to the adoption of innovative approaches.
The United Kingdom’s experience might be pertinent to federal–state cooperation
in Australia because it points the way towards a program that would explicitly
fund uncertain and risky experimental projects targeting cross-jurisdictional
concerns—especially those addressing major uncertainties in policy and service
delivery.
In this context, the 2008 Review of the National Innovation System proposed
that:
Experimentation in innovative policy and administration should be a
major theme of the current refashioning of federal relations. States and
Territories should be able to bid for federal funds to pioneer innovative
approaches and to have their innovations properly and independently
evaluated. This could be taken up within the COAG National Partnership
Rewards payments currently being negotiated.21
Perhaps it would be preferable for this sort of experimentation to be approached
as ISB-type partnership-based projects crossing federal–state jurisdictions,
involving mutual interests in addressing the major uncertainties and risks that
the state governments and the Federal Government need to address (such as
what climate change might have in store). This would help to generate consensus
and would avoid the contentious situation in which states/territories bid for
federal funds as the solution to their problems. An ‘Innovative Australian
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Federation’ scheme of this type could require a minimum of two states and one
federal partner—thus seeking to mitigate the other problem in cooperative
federalism: interstate rivalry.
Conclusions
If we are to avoid making serious mistakes in articulating how best to achieve
creativity and innovation in the public sector then it is essential to make clear
why the innovation imperative for government is significantly different from
that in the private sector. We should avoid approaching public sector innovation
as a form of downgraded private sector innovation game that overlooks critical
differences between the two sectors. Instead, we should define a robust account
of the distinctive and vitally important nature of public sector innovation and
actively promote this narrative. A focus on the ways in which governments
must handle the uncertainties and risks that markets cannot cope with provides
a key element in this evolving policy narrative.
This perspective could help those who work in the public sector to better
articulate why innovation in policy and service delivery (and particularly the
former) involves balancing the costs and consequences of not attempting to
innovate with the costs and consequences of misjudged attempts to innovate.
Too little public sector innovation is a problem. However, innovation for
innovation’s sake, in an attempt to emulate private sector norms without due
regard for what makes the public sector different with regard to the unintended
consequences of risk taking, can also be a problem.
It would therefore help if public sector and private sector innovators had access
to a better-developed framework for relating risks and uncertainties to both
‘rewards’ (upside considerations) and ‘punishments’ (downside
considerations)—rather than simply framing things in terms of a simplistic
risk–reward relationship.
There are important trade-offs between the rewards and the punishments faced
when seeking to achieve private sector innovation. Innovation exploits the
risk–reward relationship, whilst failures to innovate can be punished through
business failure (though as consumer preferences for older vintages of technology
over newer vintages, such as handmade bespoke clothing, illustrate, this is by
no means inevitable).
In the public sector, these trade-offs still exist but, thanks to the nature and
extent of the unintended consequences, there is arguably far more emphasis on
the punishments that arise through misjudged attempts to innovate (particularly
via the ballot box and through litigation).
There is also the inter-generational equity issue to consider. The private sector
applies relatively high discount rates when valuing possible future states of the
world—that is, it avoids worrying about the very long term. It is the prerogative
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of governments to concern themselves with being fairer to future generations
(balancing the needs of current generations against the needs of generations to
come). These low discount-rate objectives can amplify the consequences of
misjudged attempts to innovate. It is also inherent in governments’ role that
they must deal with the long-term consequences of damaging failures in private
sector innovation (such as chemically induced birth defects inherited by future
generations). Either way, the public sector must handle the punishments created
by misjudged innovations and the damaging unintended consequences of past
innovations.
This means that governments require superior methods for evaluating
uncertainties and risks—the consequences of slavishly emulating private sector
practices are far too severe. Now that innovation is becoming an explicit part
of the public sector reform agenda perhaps the time has come for the public
sector to define the nature and extent of its distinctive and vital role in the
evolution of modern innovative societies better than it does at present. We can
start by ceasing to talk about the ‘management of risk’ quite so much and start
to spend a lot more time talking about the ‘management of uncertainty’.22
In a cooperative federalism context, who bears primary responsibility for
managing risk is something that can be wrangled over endlessly. The challenge
of managing uncertainty is different: it encourages a more collective approach
based upon mutual interest and less scope for ‘passing the buck’, or, as Keynes23
observed, ‘The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark
forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future’.
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Part 2. Reflections on policy and
politics

7. Cabinet government: Australian
style1
Patrick Weller AO
So Tony Blair has gone. It is said of Tony Blair that he killed the cabinet in
Britain, that he held a few meetings that didn’t last very long and that in any
one year there were about half a dozen decisions made by cabinet—in a year,
not in a meeting. Gordon Brown will come into office and change the way the
decisions get made in Britain. Not because he needs to, but because he has to,
in order to illustrate that he is a different sort of leader. So the shape of cabinet
will change, even if the outcomes might not, or at least it will change initially,
because leaders can shape cabinets to their own style and their own
preoccupations. Brown will be different. His former head of department called
him a Stalinist, or said that he was Stalinist in the way that he approached
decision making, allowing no opposition, no debate. It will be interesting to see
if he tries to run the English government as Prime Minister the same way as he
acted when he was Chancellor.
But if the British system of organising and running cabinet is compared with
the Australian style, it’s really quite different. Cabinet here still appears to exist.
The ministers meet regularly, they have a formal agenda, a working committee
system and a process by which the majority of issues are at least discussed in
cabinet, even if some of the decisions might have been preordained and decided
beforehand.
I want to talk about the contrasts between the British and the Australian system.
As Rudyard Kipling said, ‘What can they know of England who only England
know?’ If we actually look only at the Australian cabinet, we take for granted
so many things that are surprising about the way the cabinet works. A
comparison with Britain encourages us to look at the things that happen here
and ask why they don’t happen in Britain. Then it is possible to understand
better the dynamics that push the Australian system.
It is also useful to ask how Australia has changed. By instinct, I’m a historian,
so I look at the contrasts, at the different ways in which prime ministers have
operated cabinets, at the different pressures on cabinet that have existed over
the hundred or so years of our federal politics. We know it has changed and
will change. We know that if Howard goes some time between now and the year
2015, the new Prime Minister, whether it be Costello, Rudd or somebody not
yet in the Parliament, will run the cabinet differently, in part to show that they’re
an individual. But they will be operating in Australia with the constraints that
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have been created by 100 years of history, just as in Britain Gordon Brown will
have to take account of the long history of England in how he chooses to operate
the system there. Comparisons across nations and across time help us understand
something about the way cabinet works.
Peter Shergold has said that only Australia maintains the true traditions of cabinet
government. Only Australia believes in collective decision making, in contrast
with Canada and Britain. In Canada, cabinet has been called a focus group. The
cabinet committees will meet to discuss new proposals and, at the end of the
day, they decide to support them or not support them. But there’s no money
attached, and they are effectively put in a folder. Around one budget time, the
British Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance (our Treasurer) sent out a
questionnaire to ministers saying, you have agreed to fund 50 programs, please
nominate your top 10. As ministers filled out the questionnaire, there was a little
bit of game-playing about, ‘well, they’re going to fund that one anyway, so I’ll
choose another one’. The Privy Council Office tallied up the results, but never
told the ministers what the outcome was. The Minister for Finance just announced
in the budget what was going to be funded. The stories are that in Britain, Tony
Blair at one cabinet meeting begged Gordon Brown to tell him what was in the
budget. I can’t quite imagine John Howard and Peter Costello working that way.
The traditions, it seems to me, are very different and essentially much more
collective still in this country than elsewhere.
So what is it that we’re looking at? Cabinet government is an arena, not a set of
rules by itself, not a simple institution. It’s a process by which people work. At
one stage, I asked senior officials in three countries to say what cabinet
government was. Let me give you their replies.
Canada: Cabinet government is the arrangements the Prime Minister
makes to ensure that decisions are made in the interests of the general,
rather than the individual minister, with a view to presenting a unified
program for legislation and supply.
Britain: Cabinet government is a shorthand term for the process by which
governments determine their policy and ensures the political will to
implement them.
Australia: Cabinet government is collective government and must
establish a coherent set of policies consistent with its strategic directions;
it needs policy coherence and political support.
They are all public service views, but they touch on what seem to be the two
key components of what cabinets do: gain political support and get some level
of policy decision or policy coherence. It’s politics and it’s policy; it’s not one
or the other. It’s the place where the political, the policy and the administrative
interests intersect. People who argue that cabinet spends too much time on
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politics seem, to me, to miss the point that that’s very much what they’re about
the whole time.
The other point about those interesting definitions is that, even though they
come from public servants, they are effectively process neutral. They tell you
what you must do; they make no suggestions how you must do it. There’s no
instruction about the way cabinets ought to operate, just what the outcomes
will be. And that’s because it’s difficult to find any coherent view about the
best way to operate. It’s a question I’ll come back to.
One of the questions that is often posed is: should things be discussed by cabinet?
Probably yes. Then by whom should they be discussed? What is ‘the cabinet’
in these situations? Is it a full cabinet, a cabinet made up of all the ministers or
all the cabinet ministers, since most countries have a distinction between who’s
in cabinet and who is not? Or something less? Every system will agree, but
perhaps not all the ministers. Every system has a war cabinet when there’s a
fight on. Every system has reduced to small numbers the people whom it wants
to discuss strategic and military decision making. So Australia in 1941 had a war
cabinet consisting of seven or eight people who took most of the crucial decisions.
It was briefed by the military. It was briefed by senior public servants. It had
the advantage of maintaining a small group of people with some sort of strategic
view. It also had the political advantage for John Curtin that he didn’t have to
put Eddie Ward and Arthur Caldwell in there, so that he could run it without
fearing they were going to leak the whole time. So it served a political and a
suitably administrative purpose at the same time.
Australia has had 20 years’ experience of the Expenditure Review Committee
process, by which a small group of ministers examines budgetary proposals each
year, supported largely by the Department of Finance. It’s regarded as a sort of
inner-expenditure cabinet, which can make the tough decisions. Howard
instituted a National Security Committee, which is responsible currently for
overseeing the way that issues in Iraq and Afghanistan and other security
problems are taken into account and it incorporates its own supporting
organisation of senior staff. So there’s never been an occasion when a particular
forum or a particular group alone constitutes ‘the cabinet’. It’s organised by
prime ministers on different occasions in a way that they can best ensure the
job is done.
Structures are devices to reach sensible decisions and maintain the necessary
support for the decisions that you’re going to make; it’s a combination of power
and good information. Getting support for good policies is significant because
good policies without support go nowhere.
If we go back to 70 or 80 years ago, we see process even then. There is nothing
new about a national security council or national security committee. It has a
lineage that goes back quite a long time. It always raises questions about the
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power of prime ministers in contrast to the power of cabinets. The critics talk
about the presidentialisation of the prime ministership, as though it reflects an
increase in the Prime Minister’s power. That is really a silly term, since most
American presidents would dearly love to have the same power as any Australia
prime minister. They would love to have the guaranteed support that exists
within the Parliament and the cabinet for what they wish to do.
The presidentialisation concept raises questions about individual power; we’re
much better talking about centralisation of power. Even then a sense of history
will quickly destroy any notion of trends towards greater authority for Australian
prime ministers. Billy Hughes went overseas for 15 months while he was Prime
Minister. He left in about April 1918 and came back in August 1919, which
would be difficult to do today. He ran the country by telegram, which meant
of course that the messages had to be coded, sent, decoded, read, considered by
cabinet, coded, sent back, decoded and considered by the Prime Minister. At
one stage, Hughes said, ‘I don’t want Cabinet to make any decisions without
consulting me first.’ The then Acting Prime Minister, a careful, methodical
person called W. A. Watt, exploded. He said, ‘You can’t run a country if
everything has to go to and from Britain.’ Watt said, ‘I sent you the details of
the last meeting in a telegram’ to America; it cost £100 to send that telegram, in
1918 values. Only later came the wonderful contraption of the overseas telephone.
When Joe Lyons was in London, he arranged a phone call to the cabinet in the
cabinet room. It took three days to organise. Hughes used to make decisions;
Watt used to complain that cabinet found out what the Australian Government
had decided by reading the newspapers (shades of CNN 100 years later). Hughes
was announcing decisions to the press and then the Australian cabinet was asked
to respond to them. Billy Hughes was maverick, individualistic; he had a crazy
way of running cabinet and he had more power than any Australian prime
minister has ever had before or since in terms of getting away with what he
wanted to do because he scared the hell out of all his colleagues. He was quite
a character, when you actually look at the way that he chose to operate.
But there’s another way of operating, another way in which you can run cabinet
from the prime ministership, and let me quote about a prime minister who did
it by a very different strategy. He said, ‘We adopted the idea of a definite agenda
and the circulation of papers by Ministers in respect to any item they put down.’
He had an arrangement that any minister with an item listed had to see the Prime
Minister before the meeting. This, he argued,
worked admirably…Notwithstanding the provision that the papers had
to be circulated by the Minister, it was obvious at Cabinet meetings that
the majority of his colleagues had not read them. With our system,
however, that wasn’t frightfully material. I always allowed a discussion
for half an hour, or some limited period, and then came into the ring
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myself, being fully informed in the matter by reason of my private
conversation with the Minister concerned beforehand. The weight of
the Prime Minister definitely on the side of the Minister, in the face of
the rest of the Cabinet—the majority of whom had not read the paper
and did not know what it was all about—proved it practice to be quite
decisive and we got through a great deal of work in minimum time.
So who was this Prime Minister who ran a very collective system, in which
everyone was permitted to talk, everyone was permitted to participate and he
decided in advance exactly what was going to happen? That was Stanley Bruce,
who came into office in 1923 with the inclinations of a businessman to try to
run government efficiently, although eventually of course his cabinet got into
more and more political trouble and it collapsed. I suspect that’s the more
common feature of prime ministers in cabinet. It’s not a choice between the
individual and the collective; it’s how the individual uses the collective.
When I went to see Malcolm Fraser to talk to him about writing a book on the
way he ran his government, he said to me, ‘Why do you want to write the book?’
I said, ‘Well, your image is of a totally dominant prime minister, but everyone
I talk to emphasised how much you consulted.’ He laughed. He said, ‘Just because
I consulted, it didn’t mean I didn’t dominate, you know.’ And, of course, that’s
precisely how he chose to run his cabinet; he consulted exhaustively, he
consulted until people were prepared to accept his particular proposals. When
he didn’t like what they were proposing, he would put it off, he’d ask for another
paper, he’d argue that time was needed to think about this a bit more, he would
decide to call a meeting later that day. There was a whole range of tactics that
he produced to ensure that his views were actually heard, but he worked through
the cabinet in a way that many of his equivalents in other countries never felt
the obligation to do.
What’s happened of course since the days of Hughes and Bruce is that the
circumstances have changed—not only the political circumstances, but all those
other things: the media, the access to prime ministers, the notion that anything
a prime minister says, whether deliberate or otherwise, can rapidly be circulated
right around the country within seconds on the Internet, or by other mechanisms.
A prime minister can be asked questions on any item at any time. Opinion polls
tell them what people think rather than them relying on their backbench or
other people to report on how the government is going. Imagine what Billy
Hughes would have done with those advantages. Imagine how he would have
manipulated the media. Imagine how he would have controlled the flow of
information. Imagine how, in his own, I suspect, unique way, he would have
managed to use the mechanisms to be just as dominant as any prime minister
possibly could be in the past, or in the future.
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Centralisation depends on style, on the different ways of running things. But I
suspect when we talk about the greater information for prime ministers and
greater support for prime ministers, some of it at least is a case of running hard
to keep up, not to get ahead. Prime ministers need to understand the immediacy
of the pressures that are landing on them rather than operating some time in the
future. Robert Menzies came out once from a meeting with the US President, he
had a press conference and somebody said to him, ‘Mr Menzies, you’ve had
private conversations with the President?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Can you tell us what you talked
about?’ He said, ‘Son, you’ve answered your own question.’ The reporter said,
‘What do you mean?’ Menzies said, ‘They were private conversations. Do you
expect me to tell you before I tell the Australian Parliament?’ He could get away
with it then; it would be much harder to do so now.
So how has the Australian cabinet changed over this period? First, there’s one
distinct line that is continuous: the bureaucracy surrounding cabinet has grown
more complex and more distinct over 100 years. At those first meetings of cabinet,
the Prime Minister used to keep the minutes; he used to write down on one side
of the minute book the topics, across the top the people who turned up and the
decisions on the opposite page—‘delayed’, ‘deferred’, ‘agreed’, or something.
And that was the only record; we’ve still got some of those notebooks.
Occasionally, we can see the frustration: conciliation and arbitration, deferred,
deferred, discussed, discussed, and after about 10 meetings, it says, ‘Kingston
resigns, decision finalised at last’ underlined. A huge sigh of relief springs out
of the page. But gradually prime ministers start formalising the process of
government. Eventually cabinet received the support that occurred in Britain
in the First World War. The first official to sit in cabinet sat in the war cabinet
in 1939–40. The first secretary to sit in the full cabinet was Frank Strahan in
1941. Gradually, official numbers moved from one to two to three to four, as
officers sat there to take notes of what was being decided. The handbooks, the
rules of cabinet, started at half a page, half a page in which Bruce actually
discussed with the head of cabinet what would happen, what would go in and
how it would be done. There are now two or three handbooks, as people add to
the rules that define the way that cabinets work and seek to maintain some sort
of control of the processes. It works to some extent but not always.
Sometimes mavericks can never be controlled. Let me read one cabinet submission
in 1936—hazard a guess about what it might be discussing.
We are faced with a situation which demands serious thinking and
courageous action. What is the greatest problem of nations today? We
are faced with world unrest which is causing great anxiety. We have
fierce economic wars between countries. We have the piling up of
armaments and behind all these we have the separation of peoples into
political camps of the most extreme kind.
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Armaments? Defence expenditure? Foreign affairs? No, Billy Hughes was Minister
of Health and was proposing the introduction of school milk. How you make
the connection, I’ve really no idea.
But there were different times, of course, in which others again tried to add to
the rules. Let me quote a comment from John Bunting about how cabinet should
be run. There was particular concern in the late 1950s that the cabinet load was
becoming too onerous, even if by modern standards it was scarcely onerous at
all. He particularly objected to the number of papers being presented by the
Treasury, and he wrote this to his superior:
These papers either waste time or the Cabinet gallops through them. And
galloping, once started, becomes the fashion. They are then apt to gallop
when they should work…I don’t want to pose as a reformer. For one
thing, there are certain virtues, from the point of view of the Prime
Minister and Treasurer, for example, in the confusion.
There is a recognition the cabinet is not about getting things right, it’s about
getting things done. A prime minister can appreciate that no-one except himself
and the Treasurer is probably briefed on what they’re discussing and thus has
some genuine advantages with which he likes to operate. So an examination of
the rules provides some idea of why they’re put there and for what purpose
they’re being applied. To quote Sir John Bunting, I like the slightly paternalistic
view of Menzies, who says to Bunting at one stage when he is proposing new
rules (you can imagine Menzies, can’t you?):
Lad, the thing is, if you’re taking over from someone, to assume that he
knew what he was doing. You can disagree later if you want to and make
a change, but if you’re wise about it, you will discover his reasons for
his actions before you disagree. You may find those reasons convincing.
In any case it’s always a gross error to assume that your predecessor was
a species of a fool.
There is a linear line of the organisation of cabinet, which makes it much more
bureaucratised than it’s ever been before. The informality of the early cabinet,
when you had nine people sitting around a table arguing without the benefit of
papers on a range of items, has now largely disappeared.
A second question, though, is how could you do it better? There’s been a struggle
for 100 years to work out how best to organise cabinet to get the best results.
We tend to assume that cabinets know what they’re doing; I suspect the closer
you get to cabinet, the more you appreciate the difficulties that cabinet has of
understanding the issues, and understanding exactly what it is that they’re
trying to decide.
Hugh Heclo used a lovely notion of governments ‘puzzling’—the government
is a sort of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf. I think that’s largely true
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in many of the issues that come before cabinet. When they were starting to
introduce satellites, there were 36 meetings of cabinet or its committees to try
to work out what on earth this meant. What were their implications? They
couldn’t understand them because nobody really knew what they were. So on
a range of issues, there have been 100 years of attempts to sort out how to deal
with information. How do ministers absorb it? How do they come up with
sensible decisions? The first cabinet committees were set up in 1903; cabinets
have been setting them up ever since as ways of allowing people to look at
particular problems. The basic problems are systemic: a lack of time, a lack of
capacity to absorb information or occasionally a reluctance to read too much
material. There is no single solution that can satisfy those sorts of issues, so prime
ministers are constantly looking at different ways, different committees, larger
and smaller cabinets, supporting groups of officials, strategic cabinets—all of
these have been attempted at different times. None of them by themselves has
solved the problems, because it’s basically an insoluble problem, which is going
to be readjusted to suit the individuals and particularly the Prime Minister’s
style and interests.
The third point about cabinet has never changed. It’s a political forum in which
ministers contest not only the items, but for their own position. Cabinet, someone
said, is a bull ring, in which everyone has their place and ensures they aren’t
knocked off too often. In those first years, Kingston and Forrest couldn’t stand
the sight of each other and fought long and bitterly over the conciliation and
arbitration bill; their animosity was reflected time and time again in cabinets in
which people fought tense battles for the sake of the policy and for the sake of
their own careers.
Cabinet is a tough forum in which people are operating all the time. That cannot
change. Our system of government is one of the few in which the Prime Minister’s
putative successors are probably sitting around the table, all conscious of the
fact that they want to make sure that some day in the future they get there.
So there is a long history of fights in cabinet, which can get dramatically
bitter—for example, over conscription. Also in the Great Depression, the Scullin
Government fragmented and cabinet was constantly buffered between a Senate
that would pass nothing and a caucus that would approve nothing. The image
of cabinet tick-tacking endlessly and fruitlessly with caucus is an illustration of
how badly cabinet government can sometimes work.
The question is: why, given all those problems, do we still have the system of
cabinet government in Australia, which exists in a much more collective style
than is true in Britain? What are the dynamics in Australia that keep cabinet
discussing things collectively, whereas in Britain it’s been handled much more
through committees and bilaterally and in Canada it has become little more than
a focus group?
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Three or four reasons can explain. First, cabinet still, in Australia, has some sort
of representational role. We are a federation that requires that state voices still
be heard or at least not be excluded too often. So we’ve always had different
states represented in the ministry and nearly always in the cabinet.
Second, there’s an egalitarian tradition that I suspect is cautious of giving too
much power to leaders—dramatically so in the case of the Labor Party. The
Australian Labor Party, from a very early stage, decided that ministers were the
delegates of caucus and could be instructed by caucus. In the battles that went
on between 1910 and 1913, 1914 and 1915, 1929 and 1931, there were occasions
when the demands of caucus effectively destroyed the government. Curtin and
Chifley, better politicians than Hughes and Fisher, were able, to some extent,
to work through the party in order to maintain the controls that they needed.
Not until the Hawke/Keating Government did the caucus gradually fall into a
more submissive role, accepting that if they wanted to stay in Parliament, they
could not constantly seek to direct cabinet.
But even in the Liberal Party, even in coalition governments, there was long a
tradition that people would listen in party committees. Even prime ministers
attend party committees. In 1941 in particular, Menzies had a constant battle
with his party room about whether he should stay in Australia or whether he
should go back to Britain, eventually to the extent that they drove him out of
the Prime Minister’s job. So there’s an egalitarian tradition that doesn’t accept
the royal prerogative as readily as happened, certainly, in Britain.
Third, there’s location. Everyone works out of Parliament House. They meet
each other on a regular basis. There’s a much greater notion of a group activity
in the Australian Parliament, whereas in Britain they are spread around
Whitehall. They see each other less often. They talk to each other less frequently.
There’s a hothouse atmosphere in Canberra that requires that people know what’s
going on.
But the key factor that maintains cabinet collective government in Australia is
the method by which parties select and remove leaders. From a very early stage,
the tradition was accepted that the caucus selected the leader and the caucus
could remove the leader. In Canada, since 1925, all Canadian leaders have been
elected by convention. As it takes a convention to elect a leader and a convention
to remove a leader, prime ministers there would say to their colleagues, ‘You
didn’t elect me and you can’t get rid of me’. The only way a Canadian prime
minister can be removed is through the calling of a leadership convention and
a vote of no confidence; that process will destroy the government so critics are
more restrained. In Britain, for a long time, conservative leaders ‘emerged’, but
now in both parties there is an external convention that elects them—a
conference that is broader than the parliamentary party. So for a prime minister
to be removed, critics have to organise…well, no prime minister has been
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removed by party revolt since the franchise was widened. Thatcher lost because
the selection then, at a particular moment, was in the hands of the parliamentary
party. No longer. It’s virtually impossible to get rid of a British prime minister
without destroying the government. Why did Gordon Brown wait for so long?
Because he had no choice.
When it comes to removing a prime minister in Australia, ask Paul Keating.
When he had the numbers, he used them. Ask Peter Costello. If he had had the
numbers, he would have used them. Look at the strategies of the three potential
leaders in the past 15 years across three countries. In the Canadian Chrétien
Government, Paul Martin was the leader in waiting. He became frustrated; after
10 years, Chrétien wouldn’t go. In fact, Chrétien said, ‘If you start campaigning,
I’ll stay in office longer’ and there was nothing the critics could do about it.
Paul Martin left the Parliament and campaigned for the leadership in the party
outside. After he won the party leadership at a convention, he had to win a seat
and only then take up his position as Prime Minister. He left and campaigned.
Gordon Brown didn’t have a mechanism for removing Blair. He had to wait him
out or start a revolt in the party and the cabinet, which was full of Blairites
because Blair had chosen them. He had to stay in the House of Commons to be
eligible when Blair eventually resigned. So he stayed and fumed.
Keating and Costello conspired and hoped to assassinate, at least potentially,
because the mechanism was there. If aspirants have the numbers within the
party, they can take the Prime Minister out on any occasion. Now turn that
position around on its head. If that is the way that the system works, what do
prime ministers need? And the answer is: the continuing positive support of
their senior colleagues. They need the continuing support of cabinet colleagues
to ensure that their position remains strong. They have to keep talking to the
parliamentary party because they’re the ones who elected them in the first place.
Australian government becomes collective because that is a matter of survival
for prime ministers. The party chooses, the party can remove, the party can
replace. The dynamics of the party make collective cabinet essential, because
otherwise a prime minister finds himself at odds with the most powerful people,
including his potential successor.
The consequence is that no prime minister in Australia will ever try to operate
again the way that Billy Hughes did, unless they are highly confident of their
position (and eventually of course even Hughes fell foul of the Country Party).
I suspect that, although his party claimed to be prepared to support him, they
weren’t that sorry to see him go. No prime minister now could survive spending
as much time overseas or could act continually in as arbitrary a fashion without
consultation with the cabinet.
So it’s the dynamics of the party and the dynamics of government; it’s the history
of politics and administration and the rules of succession that underpin the
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notions of a collective cabinet process in Australia. As long as the position
continues that members of cabinet and their supporters in the party can make
or break prime ministers, the prime ministers will be conscious of those rules
and make sure that that happens as seldom as possible. So maintaining the party’s
support, working with cabinet, maintaining a degree of contentment in cabinet,
consulting ministers even if only for the sake of going through the processes,
ensuring they know what’s happening—that’s all part of the process. It’s that
mixture of politics and policy that makes cabinet government significant.
John Howard commented in his dark days of opposition:
One of the tensions I find as a senior minister in the Fraser government
[is] the balance between the political role and the administrative role.
The extent to which too frequent a number of Cabinet meetings and too
cumbersome an administrative procedure can paralyse one’s political
activity and one’s political effectiveness, it’s a real constraint.
Too much policy discussion in cabinet and the politics can get forgotten. Too
much politics and the administration can decline. Getting that balance right is
one of the constant challenges for cabinets in Australia.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 16 May 2007.
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8. Consumers and small business: at
the heart of the Trade Practices Act1
Graeme Samuel AO
Thirty-four years ago when the Trade Practices Act was but a twinkle in the
Parliament’s eye, the then Attorney-General Senator Lionel Murphy accurately
summed up the state of the marketplace in his second reading speech introducing
the Trade Practices Act:
Restrictive trade practices have long been rife in Australia. Most of them
are undesirable and have served the interests of the parties engaged in
them, irrespective of whether those interests coincide with the interests
of Australians generally. These practices cause prices to be maintained
at artificially high levels. They enable particular…groups…to attain
positions of economic dominance which are susceptible to abuse…[and]
allow discriminatory action against small businesses.
‘Protecting the interests of Australians generally’ is the fundamental principle
at the very heart of the ACCC and the Trade Practices Act. We’re here to promote
the welfare of all Australian consumers, all 21 million of us in all our activities:
when we buy things from a retailer, when we compete in a marketplace of goods
and services, when we run a small business and deal with myriad suppliers.
Small business is an important and integral part of the economy. There are two
million small firms in Australia today and they account for nearly half of our
workforce and provide about one-third of our GDP. Small business is a vital part
of vigorous competition and, for the most part, the interests of small business
are consistent with those of consumers overall.
A fair and competitive marketplace is in all our interests; whether we are
consumers or small businesspeople, it is paramount and, to achieve this, we must
protect competition, not individual competitors.
The structure of the ACCC reflects the critical importance of these two areas,
with deputy chairs each having a specific focus: Peter Kell in Consumer Protection
and Michael Schaper in Small Business.
I started with the history of the Trade Practices Act from 1974. Let me take you
back now to the 1600s. In Simon Schama’s A History of Britain, he recounts with
great colour the period when James I opened up trade between his newly united
kingdoms of Scotland and England:
Once a ferocious border policing commission was in place and had started
to catch, convict and hang the gangs of rustlers and brigands who had
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made the Borders their choice territory, cross-frontier trade took off.
Fishermen, cattle drivers and linen-makers all did well. Duty-free English
beer became so popular in Scotland that the council in Edinburgh had
to lower the price of the home product to make it competitive.
Although these days we have different ways to deal with those wishing to restrict
competition or inhibit trade, the benefits stemming from a highly competitive
but fair marketplace are just as relevant in Australia today as they were to
Scottish beer drinkers in the early 1600s.
The economic reforms of the past 25 years have seen the floating of the Australian
dollar, the introduction of new players in previous monopoly industries and
Australia’s strong participation in the global marketplace. As a result, the nation
has become more efficient, more flexible, more productive and, above all, more
competitive.
And while the opening up of the Australian economy to greater competition
internally and from overseas has produced immense rewards, it has also provided
great benefits to consumers.
Vigorous competition provides consumers with:
• choice
• all the information to make that choice rationally
• convenience
• higher quality and lower prices for goods and services.
Business, too, is a beneficiary of competition policy. Competition—and this
includes intense and, at times, incessant price competition—benefits those
businesses that are able and motivated to take advantage of the powerful forces
driving their particular market.
The corollary, of course, is that those businesses unable or unwilling to respond
to the often-daunting challenge of competition will languish behind and might
ultimately fail.
But this is the essence of an open market economy.
As the story about the Scottish beer drinkers demonstrates, free-enterprise
economies have operated in one form or another for hundreds of years. It is just
the intensity and speed of change that are different.
I have no doubt that when that duty-free English beer first crossed the border,
the local beer makers appealed for some sort of protection. But ultimately what
was regarded as unfair by those who benefited from the previously closed beer
market was seen by the consumers who benefited from the end of that monopoly
as vigorous and fair.
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And they were right, because the purpose of competition policy must be to
benefit consumers—not competitors. The question to be asked must always be
what is in the long-term interest of consumers.
The principles of competition policy enshrined in the Trade Practices Act and
the National Competition Policy emphasise the primary purposes of a vigorous
competitive economy and the protection of the interests of consumers.
In this context, businesses that are motivated to take advantage of the competitive
marketplace will thrive. And, for the most part, small business is able to respond
to the rigours of competition more quickly and with more flexibility than many
of its larger competitors. As stated previously, the corollary is that businesses
that are unable or unwilling to respond to the challenge of competition will
languish and might ultimately fail.
In short, an open competitive economy is the best environment for small business
to flourish.
This message has greater significance against the backdrop of the current turmoil
in global financial markets, where we are seeing governments take strong and
often interventionist approaches in the interests of stability. It is important to
consider the impact of that priority and how it relates to competition and policy
development.
To a certain extent, government intervention in a particular industry can cushion
it from some of the realities of the marketplace. Earlier this month, for example,
the Australian Government committed to invest $6.2 billion over the next 13
years in the car industry under the New Car Plan for a Greener Future.
Whatever one’s view as to that commitment, one cannot but agree wholeheartedly
with the comments of Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, and the Minister for
Innovation, Infrastructure, Science and Research, Senator Kim Carr, that the
future of the car industry is dependant on research, innovation and global
integration rather than protection, quotas and tariffs. If the car industry does
not heed these calls, it simply won’t survive.
Similarly, the ACCC has been fielding calls in recent times from sectors of small
business about ‘giving them a fair go’. However, if government did intervene
to shield small business from some of the competitive rigours of the marketplace,
the result would not in fact be giving small business ‘a fair go’; it would be
artificially changing the dynamics of an open and competitive marketplace by
giving one player added protection that others do not have.
As a result, consumers overall would be given an ‘unfair go’ as a less competitive
marketplace invariably leads to higher prices and a poorer standard of goods
and services, as Attorney-General Murphy pointed out back in 1974.
87
Consumers and small business: at the heart of the Trade Practices Act
But such a solution also ignores the numerous and significant advantages that
small business has in the marketplace. However, they involve a lot of hard work,
perseverance and the ability to ‘think outside the square’.
Small business has the capacity to innovate—to adapt quickly to changing
market needs, provide personalised service and develop niche markets.
These qualities must be harnessed by small business to remain competitive in
the marketplace and benefit all Australian consumers. Governments and
regulators have an ongoing challenge in striking a balance that promotes
vigorous, lawful competitive behaviour that is likely to lead to significant and
sustained benefits for consumers, while preventing unlawful anti-competitive
behaviour that is likely to disadvantage us as consumers.
This is a task that needs to be undertaken independently, rigorously,
transparently and objectively to ensure it remains focused on the interests of
consumers. But this cannot result in the insulation of certain sectors of business
from normal competitive disciplines.
Now that is theory and it has been endorsed by the Dawson Committee Review
into the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act and the Senate
committee considering the effectiveness of the act in relation to small business.
The Dawson Committee Report summed up the issue as follows:
The Committee does not favour the introduction of competition measures
specifically directed to particular industries to respond to perceived
shortcomings in the relevant markets. Often the complaint when analysed
is not about reduced competition, but about the structure of the market
which competition has produced.
Concentrated markets can be highly competitive. It may be possible to
object to the structure of such markets for reasons of policy (the
disappearance of the corner store, for example), but not on the grounds
of lack of competitiveness.
Of course, concentrated markets should attract scrutiny to ensure that
competition is maintained, but the purpose of the competition provisions
of the Act is to promote and protect the competitive process rather than
to protect individual competitors. The competition provisions should
not be seen as a device to achieve social outcomes unrelated to the
encouragement of competition. As a matter of policy those outcomes
may be regarded as desirable, but the policy will not be competition
policy.
Nor should the competition provisions seek the preservation of particular
businesses or of a particular class of business that is unable to withstand
competitive forces or may fail for other reasons.
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Those are matters which may legitimately be the subject of an industry
policy, but that is not a policy which is to be found in the competition
provisions in Part IV of the Act.
The Senate committee considering the effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act
in relation to small business noted:
[T]he Committee considers that while the objects of the Act refer to
enhancing competition, these objects implicitly require—or at least
prefer—the existence of an effective number of competitors.
Having stated this, the Committee recognises that there is a significant
difference between protecting competitors, and protecting particular
competitors. The entry and exit of competitors from the market is a
normal part of vigorous competition. Market efficiency is often enhanced
by driving inefficient competitors from the market.
To summarise the Committee’s views on this issue, the purpose of the
Act is to protect competition. This can best be achieved by maintaining
a range of competitors, who should rise and fall in accordance with the
results of competitive rather than anti-competitive conduct. This means
that the Act should protect businesses (large or small) against
anti-competitive conduct, and it should not be amended to protect
competitors against competitive conduct.
These findings are consistent with the purpose of the Trade Practices Act as
outlined in Section 2: ‘The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision
for consumer protection.’
But while the theory is easy to state, it is not so clear that the principles are
either well understood or applied in practice. For while it is now widely accepted
that the purpose of competition policy is to promote competition in the interests
of consumers and not to protect competitors from the rigours of competition, in
practice the distinction between these objectives is confused and sometimes
leads to conclusions that are inherently anti-competitive in nature.
Competition policy regulators are required to deal with two issues. The first is
to analyse whether in the context of any particular market there exists a course
of behaviour that will have the effect or be likely to have the effect of
substantially lessening competition in that market. This requires rigorous,
economic analysis of the market and the likely impact of the behaviour of
competitors in that market. Then if that analysis reveals a likely anti-competitive
consequence, competition policy requires regulators to intervene to prevent it.
It might or might not be the case that to protect and nurture competition in a
market it is necessary to take steps to protect competitors or a class of competitors
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in that market from substantial damage or indeed elimination as a result of a
course of behaviour by another competitor. The provisions of Part IV of the
Trade Practices Act are designed to permit that intervention by competition
regulators to take place.
What is not clear, however, in the claims and counterclaims that are made by
small and big business respectively in relation to these matters, is whether the
primary case has been made for regulatory intervention. That is to say, it is not
apparent that a course of behaviour by one or more competitors in those markets
will lead to a substantially anti-competitive (and thus anti-consumer) impact.
If such an analysis leads to the conclusion that there is likely to be a substantial
lessening of competition in the relevant market, then of course the competition
regulator should intervene.
But if the analysis merely leads to the conclusion that some competitors in the
market might suffer damage or indeed be eliminated, but that competition in
the market will still be vigorous with consumer benefits, then there is a dubious
case for intervention by the competition regulator.
The difficulty in this area is that so often those who seek regulatory intervention
have failed to first demonstrate the case for it. Indeed, in some cases, they have
been reluctant to have the relevant market, and the course of behaviour
complained of, subjected to an independent rigorous analysis to determine
whether there is justification for intervention.
The point is, if we intervene too soon and without transparent, open and
independent analysis, we might be acting to protect competitors at the expense
of vigorous, lawful competitive behaviour and, as a consequence, disadvantage
the consumer.
Having spent 12, at times difficult, years undertaking an independent and robust
process of examination and reform of anti-competitive regulations pursuant to
National Competition Policy, I suggest policy makers need to be continually on
the alert that they are not drawn back by private interests to protect specific
sectors of business from the competitive environment.
No better example of this can be seen in the area of petrol. You might recall the
recent campaign directed towards government by some independent small petrol
retailers around Australia, calling for what they describe as a ‘fair go’. These
small retailers want the same wholesale pricing as Coles and Woolworths and
want the supermarkets’ shopper dockets petrol discount schemes outlawed.
Now I know that my response to this is not going to be popular with these small
independent petrol retailers or with parts of the media, but the truth is that
those small independent petrol retailers will find it very difficult to respond to
the price-competitive pressure that Coles, Woolworths and the large independent
chains such as United, Liberty, Gull and Matilda can provide.
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What is being sought is not a levelling of a playing field. It is a request for
protection against the rigours of the marketplace. In fact, the ACCC petrol inquiry
reported that the emergence of shopper docket schemes had not had an
anti-competitive effect but had delivered discounts to consumers and promoted
competition among retailers. And despite all the media hype about petrol prices,
consumers are voting with their wallets in support of any discount schemes that
offer cheaper petrol.
In these circumstances, the interests of small business are at odds with the
interests of Australia consumers. However, rather than lessening competition,
a better approach would be finding ways to make the petrol sector, at the source
of supply, more competitive, which of course is also in the interests of small
business.
The situation as it stands in Australia is that there are four major players in the
petrol market—BP, Shell, Mobil and Caltex—and they are responsible for refining
and importing 98 per cent of our petrol. This is why the ACCC’s focus is on the
wholesale petrol market, where we see an opportunity to expand competition.
Petrol Commissioner, Joe Dimasi, is working hard to see whether new players
can enter the Australian wholesale market and, if this happens, the new
wholesalers will need petrol outlets, which is where the independents could
come into their own.
Moving onto another contentious issue—groceries—it has long been claimed
that if smaller retailers are not protected from competition from the major
retailers, a market duopoly of Coles and Woolworths will result. This necessitates,
it is claimed, policy and regulatory intervention, for example, to retain
discriminatory shop trading hours, to limit the acquisition of additional market
share by the major retailers and to prevent price discrimination by suppliers to,
and price discounting—claimed to be predatory pricing—by, the major retailers.
In early 2008, the ACCC conducted an inquiry into the competitiveness of retail
prices for standard groceries and, overall, it found supermarket retailing is
‘workably competitive’.
However, there are a number of factors that bear closer examination, including
high barriers to entry for large-format supermarkets, a lack of incentives for
Coles and Woolworths to compete strongly on price and limited price competition
from the independent sector. It is our opinion that the appropriate response for
policy makers is to lower barriers to entry and expansion in retailing and
wholesaling to independent supermarkets and potential new entrants. As always,
the ACCC will continue to examine the acquisitions of existing supermarkets as
well as site acquisitions and leases for new supermarkets.
To that end, in May 2008 we issued a Statement of Issues concerning a proposed
lease of a new supermarket site in Wallaroo, South Australia, by Woolworths.
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In that statement, the ACCC expressed its preliminary view that the proposed
lease might constitute a substantial lessening of competition—on the basis that
if the lease did not proceed, it was likely that another non-Woolworths operator
would acquire the lease to operate a supermarket in competition with an existing
Woolworths supermarket in an adjacent locality. The ACCC is seeking the views
of interested parties to assist it in reaching a final decision on this matter.
The lack of incentives for Coles and Woolworths to compete strongly across the
board on price reflects the high level of concentration in the industry and
frequent monitoring of competitors’ prices. But despite this, Aldi has had a
significant impact on grocery retailing. Where Aldi stores are present in an area,
Coles and Woolworths have reduced prices. Aldi represents a new type of
retailing, which has overcome some of the barriers in place, and this innovative
approach is what small business needs to consider. Their strategy might well be
summed up as: ‘If I can’t win the game under the current conditions, why not
play a different type of game?’
Aldi has shown that a new player does not have to be a full-service supermarket
to generate a significant competitive reaction from Coles and Woolworths. The
entry of grocery retailers with differentiated business models poses a competitive
threat to the major supermarkets and benefits Australian consumers. Without
a doubt, retail groceries and petroleum have been experiencing, and will continue
to undergo, rapid change. Now supermarkets are four to five times their previous
size; service stations are fewer in number but significantly larger, located on
major highways and directly linked with substantial convenience stores, car
washes, fast-food outlets and even hotels.
These changes are driven by consumer preferences, and businesses operating
in these markets will continue to undergo rapid change. But those which do
adapt will survive, indeed thrive, while those unable to adapt or resting on the
belief that governments or regulators will step in to protect them will languish
and might ultimately fail.
I repeat, it is not the job of the Trade Practices Act or the ACCC to protect
competitors; it is our job to protect competition and the welfare of Australian
consumers. Let us not forget, however, that businesses are also consumers. Every
opportunity to reduce costs and increase choice, service and availability of goods
helps businesses as well, and allows them more options for innovation.
Protection of small business under the Trade Practices Act
This is not to say that small business has no protection under competition policy,
for competition policy is about encouraging lawful, vigorous, competitive
behaviour to benefit consumers—that is to say, the public interest.
The ACCC interacts on a number of levels with small business:
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• working with them towards voluntary compliance—by far the best outcome
for all parties involved
• educating and informing them of their obligations under the Trade Practices
Act with advice and publications
• providing measures to protect them from anti-competitive behaviour.
And, as part of this process, our outreach officers get beyond metropolitan
Australia to regional and rural areas to ensure small business and other operators
in those areas are aware of the Trade Practices Act.
Let me now illustrate how the Trade Practices Act and the ACCC actively protect
the interests of small business, while remaining consistent with the principles
of promoting the interests of Australian consumers in protecting competition.
Franchising
The ACCC plays a significant role in working with small business through the
Franchising Code of Conduct and the Trade Practices Act.
You might be surprised to learn that Australia is one of the most franchised
nations in the world. We have three times as many franchises per capita as the
United States, with about 1100 business-format franchise systems, up from 693
in 1998, which amounts to 71 400 individual franchises. Franchising employs
an estimated 413 500 people and contributes $130 billion to the Australian
economy each year.
The code and the Trade Practices Act provide a range of protections for
franchisees and prospective franchisees in their dealings with franchisors. These
include:
• ensuring prospective franchisees receive key information about a franchise
before making a financial commitment and entering into a franchise system
• ensuring that franchisees have certain rights in their ongoing franchise
relationship.
When disputes occur between franchisors and franchisees, there is capacity
under the code to resolve these effectively.
The ACCC uses a variety of tools to achieve this, including direct liaison with
affected parties, the Office of the Mediation Adviser and the various legal powers
of the ACCC. Similarly, in securing compliance, the ACCC considers a range of
measures that involves:
• consultation and liaison with, and education for, industry participants
• consideration of franchisee complaints
• detailed investigation, enforcement action or litigation.
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However, neither the laws nor the ACCC can guarantee that all franchised
businesses will thrive.
Franchised businesses can and do fail for reasons other than franchisor
wrongdoing. It is a part of the ACCC’s task, when assessing complaints, to
determine whether the cause of concern flows from conduct contravening the
law or whether the harm is the result of other factors. The ACCC has made
recommendations to the Parliamentary Inquiry into Franchising including:
• a review of mediation under the franchising code
• a review of the requirements for disclosure under the franchising code
• the introduction of civil pecuniary penalties for breaches of parts IVA
(unconscionable conduct), IVB (breach of the code) and V (consumer
protection) of the Trade Practices Act.
We strongly believe these changes will bolster the Franchising Code of Conduct
and the Trade Practices Act in providing greater clarity for franchisees and those
considering entering into franchise agreements.
Small business and Section 46
Now I’d like to speak about s.46 of the Act and how it can help protect small
business from the misuse of market power by larger competitors.
Effective misuse of market power provisions are an important part of any
competition law. They deal with situations where a firm has substantial market
power and uses that power to damage competitors or to prevent new firms from
competing. These provisions are an important adjunct to the other main pillars
of an effective competition law: the restrictions on the accumulation of market
power through mergers and acquisitions and anti-competitive agreements
between competitors.
These provisions are just as important to small business if they are targets of a
misuse of market power by a larger business. In this situation, the commission
will act to protect the small businesses involved. We do this not to protect a
particular business merely because it is a small business, but to protect
competition where small businesses are being targeted for anti-competitive
reasons by a more powerful firm.
While it is true that in the past the ACCC’s ability to litigate misuse of market
power allegations has been hampered by the High Court’s narrow interpretation
of the concept ‘take advantage’ in judgments such as Melway, Boral, Safeway,
NT Power Generation and Rural Press, this will no longer be the case.
Amendments to s.46, which became law in May 2008, clarify that if a
corporation’s market power drives its conduct then that is sufficient to prove
it has taken advantage of its market power. And then there is, of course,
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s.46(1AA) or the so-called Birdsville amendment, dealing with predatory pricing.
Much has been claimed and counterclaimed in relation to this amendment.
Only time and the courts will tell which of the claims are correct. Suffice to say,
the amendment introduces some new concepts into the competition provisions
of the Trade Practices Act, which will require interpretation by the courts before
business, big and small, can derive any certainty as to its implications.
The ACCC is closely examining the recent amendments to the Trade Practices
Act with respect to predatory pricing. We will be reviewing the operation of
this section in light of our own determinations, any litigation—whether instituted
by the ACCC or private litigants—and senior legal advice.
The ACCC plans to issue general guidance about the likely interpretation of the
terms in s.46(1AA), but this guidance will be qualified, as the ultimate
interpretation will be up to the courts and will take place on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, we will enforce s.46 and its components with the utmost vigour,
wherever our legal advice tells us we have reasonable grounds to do so. However,
a word of caution: small business should not place undue reliance on the misuse
of market power provisions.
It needs to be understood that these provisions require conduct that is damaging,
or potentially so, to competitors and for this conduct to be intended to, or to
have the purpose of, damaging specific competitors. It is not enough to point to
the fact that competitors, even small competitors, are being damaged by the
actions of a larger, more powerful business. Normal, even aggressive competition
is not on its own a misuse of market power. The conduct of the larger business
needs to be targeted or intended to damage particular competitors.
The misuse of market power provisions are not a panacea for the concerns of
business, and to achieve any outcomes the commission will require the assistance
of business.
The commission will investigate properly alleged instances of abuse of market
power and use its statutory powers to do so.
Unconscionable conduct
Many of the complaints received at the ACCC from small businesses do not relate
to concerns about direct competition with large businesses; the majority are
about their commercial relationships with large businesses. In these situations,
the more relevant provisions that apply are the unconscionable conduct laws,
particularly the statutory unconscionability provision, Section 51AC.
One business cannot use its power or influence over another for unconscionable
purposes. A business in a position of power threatening to withhold the supply
of products, especially where those products cannot be sourced elsewhere, in
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order to impose harsh and oppressive conditions will likely breach the
unconscionable conduct provisions of the act.
In the Simply No Knead case, the ACCC under s.51AC made it clear to franchisors
that they could not hold their franchisees to ransom with unreasonable terms
and conditions. The franchisor in this case withheld essential supplies unless
the franchisees bowed to a range of unreasonable conditions, including making
them pay for advertising that did not even include their stores’ details and
forcing them to buy many years worth of product at a time.
At one point, the franchisor demanded the surrender of diaries containing details
of current customers, while setting up his own businesses that competed directly
with his franchisees. The franchisor demanded unreasonable conditions, such
as refusing to consider meetings unless the request was received by mail, and
refusing joint meetings, when the franchisees tried to discuss their concerns
with him.
The court declared that the conduct of the franchisor was unconscionable, in
breach of the act and that the managing director of the franchise was involved
in the contraventions. The conduct of this franchisor beggared belief and the
franchisees in this case had no way forward in running their businesses.
The unconscionable conduct provisions seek to protect parties from unfair
dealing such as this, particularly where one of the parties is especially vulnerable.
Businesses should not take unfair advantage of a person in a vulnerable position
by entering into commercial arrangements without ensuring that the person has
full knowledge of its terms and effects.
The cases that the ACCC has pursued with regard to unconscionable conduct all
have an unscrupulous factor. It is more than tough negotiating. For a matter to
be regarded as unconscionable by the courts, a business must have crossed the
line and engaged in conduct that is not tolerated in a normal commercial
relationship.
It is important to reiterate that the law does not exist to inhibit businesses from
advancing their own legitimate commercial interests. The law will not apply to
situations where a business has merely driven a hard bargain, nor does it require
one business to put the interests of another party ahead of its own.
However, the ACCC has long recognised that when it comes to negotiating with
big business the playing field is far from level for small business in some contexts.
Collective bargaining
This leads me to the area where significant changes have been made to assist
small business—that of collective bargaining. Normally, where groups of
competing businesses come together to collectively negotiate terms and conditions
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and, in particular, prices, this is likely to raise concerns under the Trade Practices
Act.
The ACCC and the Act, however, explicitly acknowledge that it is sometimes
fairer to enable a relative mismatch in bargaining power to be evened up by
enabling small business to come together to bargain collectively. This is
legitimised under the authorisation process.
Through authorisation, the ACCC has the power to authorise protection from
court action for otherwise anti-competitive conduct where those proposing to
engage in that conduct can demonstrate that there is a net public benefit.
In 2007, changes were made to the process for small business seeking collective
bargaining authorisations. These changes were designed to make it easier for
businesses to access these authorisations through a new notification process.
While having many of the same characteristics as authorisation, the notification
process provides automatic immunity within 28 days from the date of notification
unless the ACCC is satisfied that the proposed collective bargaining arrangements
are not in the public interest. A notification also provides a three-year immunity
period from the date the notification is lodged. Another benefit of this process
is the low cost in submitting an application, which is currently $1000.
While we have encouraged, indeed exhorted, small business operators to
contemplate collective bargaining, and to contact the ACCC for guidance and
assistance on this matter, it is a constant source of frustration to us at the ACCC
that many small businesses which might benefit significantly from a collective
bargaining arrangement have shown a reluctance to proceed down that path.
National consumer law
Thus far I have focused my comments on the protections afforded by the Trade
Practices Act for small business. But, as has been emphasised by successive
reviews of the act, its primary intent is to enhance the welfare of all Australian
consumers.
So while the small business sector will concentrate on its status under the act,
21 million consumers will be keenly observing what can best be described as a
revolution that will bring Australia’s consumer laws into the twenty-first century.
I am talking about the adoption of a national consumer law, from which all
Australians will benefit.
Agreed to by the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs in August 2007, the
new national consumer law will operate in all states and territories.
This will provide consistency and certainty as consumers will no longer have
to consider whether federal or state law is relevant to their issue. It will also
mean if consumers move interstate, they will be covered by the same law, which
will no doubt boost confidence in the national consumer law system.
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Compliance costs should also reduce substantially for business as the national
consumer law will replace consumer laws across nine jurisdictions. In fact, the
Productivity Commission estimated a national consumer law could save consumers
and businesses up to $4.5 billion each year. It is pleasing that the national
consumer law will be based on the consumer protection provisions of the Trade
Practices Act as well as incorporating amendments reflecting best practice in
state and territory legislation.
There will also be a provision dealing with unfair contract terms. The
Commonwealth will be the lead legislator, through an application legislation
scheme, and enforcement of the national consumer law will be shared jointly
with the ACCC and state and territory fair trading offices. This is an important
achievement in harmonisation, which is very clearly in the public interest. We
eagerly await formalisation of the national consumer law in an intergovernmental
agreement, and anticipate that the national consumer law will be fully
implemented by 2011.
Summary
As I have described, it is not the role of competition policy, the Trade Practices
Act or the ACCC to favour one sector over another. Our role is to promote the
welfare of Australian consumers through a fair and competitive marketplace;
we’re not here to protect competitors, we protect competition.
The benchmark test for competition regulators is whether a course of conduct
is likely to lead to a substantial lessening of competition in a specific market for
goods or services.
One of the difficulties is that there is not a wide understanding of the difference
between protecting competitors and promotion of competition.
And while small business will seek the focus of competition policy to tend
towards greater protection of competitors, ostensibly in the interests of
competition, the voice of the consumer will be constant in urging that the focus
remain on the promotion of competition for the benefit of consumers.
The interests of consumers rest with consumer groups, governments and
regulators such as the ACCC to ensure that competition is muscular and lawful,
even if this implies that it be aggressive and potentially damaging to some players
in the market. For this is the way consumers derive the advantages of choice,
quality and price to which they are entitled and we ensure that our economy is
best able to adapt to maximise productivity and growth, especially in challenging
economic times.
The commission cannot interpret its responsibility to promote competition to
mean the protection of individual companies and the outlawing of vigorous,
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legitimate competition—even where that competition causes difficulties for
individual firms.
As I stated earlier, an open competitive economy is the best environment within
which small business can flourish.
Vigorous competition is not market failure and it is not the job of the ACCC to
preserve competitors or protect any sectors of the economy from competition.
The role of the ACCC and the Trade Practices Act is fundamentally to enhance
the interests of Australian consumers by promoting fair, vigorous and lawful
competition, whether it is between businesses big, medium and/or small.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 26 May 2008.
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9. Constitutional litigation and the
Commonwealth1
David Bennett AC QC
As a rule, Australians tend to be ignorant, perhaps blissfully so, of the existence,
terms and effect of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. A 1987
survey indicated that only about half of the population was aware that Australian
had a written constitution.2  A 1994 survey of people aged fifteen years or over
indicated that only 13 per cent felt that they knew something about what the
constitution covered and only 18 per cent actually showed some degree of
understanding of what the constitution covered.3
Of course, participants in, and keen observers of, Australian politics would be
well aware of the potential impacts of the courts’ decisions in constitutional
cases. An obvious example of a case that has attracted considerable attention in
this community is the High Court’s decision in the Work Choices case. This
decision has stimulated vigorous debate on the future of the federal arrangement
provided for by the constitution. However, the manner by which the disputes
that give rise to these decisions are conducted in the courts is, perhaps, not well
understood by many politicians and political scientists, let alone lawyers.
Potentially, the topic is both very broad and very technical. However, I will
confine myself to outlining the manner by which the Commonwealth participates
in, and thus influences the outcome of, constitutional cases before the courts.
When I refer to ‘the Commonwealth’ I refer, in a general sense, to the Australian
Government. Specifically, my essay will address the following questions:
• How do constitutional cases come before the courts?
• How does the Commonwealth become aware of constitutional cases?
• By what power is the Commonwealth able to participate in constitutional
cases?
• How does the Commonwealth participate in constitutional cases?
• What are the advantages of the way the Commonwealth participates in
constitutional cases?
How do constitutional cases come before the courts?
A court does not express its view on a question of law unless it has jurisdiction
in relation to a dispute between parties. And, by the word ‘dispute’, I do not
mean a dispute merely concerning what the law is—for example, a dispute over
what is the proper interpretation of a particular provision of the constitution.
Generally speaking, for a federal court to have jurisdiction in relation to a dispute
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between parties relating to a constitutional issue it is necessary, at least, that
there be a ‘matter’—that is, ‘some immediate right, duty or liability to be
established by the determination of the Court’.4 Thus, a constitutional dispute
must be real, not merely hypothetical or academic, before the courts will consider
it.
As some provisions in the constitution tend to be more productive of disputes
about the existence of relevant rights, duties or liabilities than others, the courts
have had the opportunity to consider and express their views on some provisions
in the constitution more than others. It is important to note that constitutional
litigation does not always, or even generally, arise between polities—that is,
the Commonwealth, the states and territories—or their officers, and so on.
Constitutional litigation may arise as a result of a disputed right, duty or liability
affecting only natural persons or corporations. There are many examples of such
cases. One example is Smith vs ANL Ltd ([2000] 204 CLR 493), which concerned
an employee who argued that he was entitled to assert his common law right to
sue his employer for damages for personal injury sustained during his
employment, despite the existence of a Commonwealth act that appeared to bar
him from doing so. The employee argued that the act was invalid to the extent
that it had the effect of acquiring the employee’s existing right of action without
providing just terms contrary to s.51(xxxi) of the constitution. The employer
argued that the act did not infringe s.51(xxxi). The High Court agreed with the
employee. The Commonwealth was not initially a party to the proceeding, as it
was not involved in any way on the facts. However, the Attorney-General did
intervene in the case in order to argue in support of the validity of the
Commonwealth act. (I discuss what is meant by the concept of ‘intervention’
below.)
Another, more recent, example is Australian Pipeline Ltd vs Alinta ([2007] 159
FCR 301), which concerned a provision of the Corporations Act 2001 that allowed
the Takeovers Panel to make a declaration that ‘unacceptable circumstances’
existed in relation to the affairs of a company in relation to a proposed takeover
bid. Having made a declaration of unacceptable circumstances, the panel could
then make various orders in relation to the circumstances. Failure to comply
with the orders was a criminal offence, and the panel could apply to the court
to seek to enforce its orders. The dispute arose between companies involved in
the proposed takeover. Again, the Commonwealth was not initially involved;
however, the Attorney-General intervened in order to argue in support of the
validity of the provision. The Full Court of the Federal Court held that the
relevant provision was invalid, on the basis that it purported to confer judicial
power on an administrative body. The judgment was then appealed to the High
Court, which came to the opposite view.
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How does the Commonwealth become aware of
constitutional cases?
Obviously, where the Commonwealth is a party to a case that involves a dispute
about the meaning or application of a provision of the constitution then it is
aware of that fact. The more interesting question is how the Commonwealth
becomes aware of constitutional cases to which it is not (originally) a party.
The effect of s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 is that, whenever a proceeding in
a federal or state court raises a constitutional question, the court hearing the
matter cannot proceed unless it is satisfied that a notice of this fact has been
provided to the attorneys-general of the Commonwealth, the states, the Northern
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. The purpose of the provision is
to give the attorneys-general the opportunity to ‘intervene’ in the proceeding
or to apply to the High Court to have the proceeding removed into the High
Court under s.40(1) of the same act. Incidentally, s.78B contains a trap for young
players seeking to comply with it. It requires the notices be given to the
attorneys-general of ‘the states’. The Act defines ‘states’ for this purpose as
including the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory.
By what power does the Commonwealth participate in
constitutional cases?
Obviously, where the Commonwealth has initiated a proceeding that involves
a constitutional issue, or where it is a defendant or respondent in such a
proceeding, it is able to participate in the proceeding. Again, the more interesting
question is: by what power does the Commonwealth participate in other
constitutional cases?
Section 78A of the Judiciary Act confers on the Attorney-General of the
Commonwealth the power to ‘intervene’ in a proceeding before a court if the
proceeding raises a constitutional question. As an intervener, the
Attorney-General is taken to be a party to the proceeding, with the effect that
the Attorney-General is able to address arguments to the court in relation to that
question, even though the Commonwealth’s rights, duties and liabilities might
not be directly affected by the outcome of the case. As an intervenor, the
Attorney-General is also able to appeal from a judgment given in the proceeding.
There are a number of factors that can influence the Attorney-General’s decision
whether to intervene in a constitutional case, including:
• whether the matter involves an attack on the validity of a Commonwealth
law (as was the case in Smith vs ANL and Australian Pipeline Ltd vs Alinta,
the cases referred to above, where the Attorney-General intervened)
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• whether the constitutional principles involved are well established by
decisions of the High Court, or are the subject of a reserved judgment of the
High Court
• the level of the court (that is, lower court or superior court, single judge or
appellate court)
• whether there is likely to be an appeal from the judgment of the court
• whether a Commonwealth party is already involved in the matter
• whether the applicant is represented, and whether the applicant’s
constitutional argument is well conceived.
How does the Commonwealth participate in constitutional
cases?
If the case is one to which the Commonwealth is not a party, the first step is for
the Attorney-General to decide whether to intervene. Generally, s.78B notices
are received in the Attorney-General’s office, which forwards the notice to the
Constitutional Litigation Unit of the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS).
AGS is a law firm owned by the Commonwealth. Pursuant to the Legal Services
Directions 2005 (which are made under the Judiciary Act), generally speaking,
and subject to my role as the Solicitor-General, constitutional work can be
performed only by AGS and the Attorney-General’s Department.
AGS forms a view on whether the Attorney-General should intervene. In doing
so, AGS consults with the Solicitor-General, the Constitutional Policy Unit of
the Attorney-General’s Department and any other area of the department or
other department that has a policy interest in the subject matter of the notice
(for example, if the constitutional issue is the validity of a Commonwealth law,
AGS consults with the department that administers that law). If AGS and the
Solicitor-General agree that there should be no intervention, the Attorney-General
is not further consulted and there is no intervention.
If the Attorney-General approves intervention, generally, AGS acts for the
Attorney-General in the conduct of the matter, but briefs counsel to appear for
the Attorney-General at the hearing. Generally, AGS will brief one senior and
one junior barrister. The pool of talent from which counsel are selected includes
the Solicitor-General, senior constitutional lawyers employed by AGS (for
example, AGS’s Chief General Counsel, Henry Burmester) and private barristers
with expertise in constitutional law. Generally, where the matter is of significant
importance to the Commonwealth, or where the matter is particularly complex,
AGS will brief the Solicitor-General to appear, along with a junior barrister. The
Attorney-General has issued guidelines on briefing the Solicitor-General.
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What are the advantages of the way the Commonwealth
participates in constitutional cases?
In my view, the way that the Commonwealth handles constitutional litigation
allows it to present its arguments to the court in a way that ideally combines
the experience and expertise of the public sector as well as private practice.
AGS and the Attorney-General’s Department employ outstanding constitutional
lawyers, many of whom have careers advising, and acting for, the Commonwealth
in relation to constitutional matters. This deep well of experience and expertise
is obviously invaluable to the Commonwealth in the conduct of its cases. AGS
and Attorney-General’s Department lawyers and advisers generally have strong
relationships with, and the trust of, the government. These lawyers have finely
honed skills in constitutional law and policy, as well as long memories of cases
won and lost in the past and a good sense of some of the reasons why.
However, by also involving private counsel, the Commonwealth is able to draw
on the particular skills and attributes of the private bar.
Whereas the public sector brings the advantages of specialist expertise in public
law, private barristers bring specialist expertise in advocacy. Advocacy is as
much a specialisation as constitutional law; a person who does something all the
time will tend to do it better than someone who does it only occasionally.
Second, private barristers offer the attribute of independence. As sole
practitioners bound by the cab-rank rule to act for all who come to them
regardless of their personal views, private barristers tend to practice on both
sides of the record. That is, leading private barristers in Australia with expertise
in constitutional law will have acted for the Commonwealth and its emanations,
the states and territories and their respective emanations, corporations, citizens
and others over the course of their careers at the bar. They will have argued for
and against the validity of Commonwealth legislation. A barrister who represents
all sides over time is better able to advise his or her client at any particular time;
he or she tends to have a broader view of the law than a solicitor who acts only
for or against the Commonwealth.
Third, by retaining private barristers to appear for it, the Commonwealth
enhances its capacity sensibly to cooperate with opponents in the conduct and,
occasionally, settlement of cases. Almost universally, private barristers with
expertise in constitutional law trust one another. These barristers represent a
small pool of lawyers who regularly appear with, and against, each other. These
circumstances facilitate a highly respectful and cordial professional culture that
is amenable to the smooth conduct of litigation.
In many respects, the Solicitor-General (who, incidentally, is neither a solicitor
nor a general!) tends to have a combination of these various skills and attributes.
The Solicitor-General is a statutory office-holder, appointed by the
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Governor-General for a term (see the Law Officers Act 1964). The functions of
the Solicitor-General are: a) to act as counsel for the Commonwealth and its
emanations, and so on; b) to advise the Attorney-General on questions of law
referred to him by the Attorney-General; and c) to carry out such other functions
ordinarily performed by counsel as the Attorney-General requests. As a matter
of practice, the dominant function of the Solicitor-General has been to appear
on behalf of the Commonwealth in important constitutional cases.
Thus, like AGS and Attorney-General’s Department lawyers, the Solicitor-General
tends to possess the skills that arise from appearing in the area of constitutional
law over time. However, the Solicitor-General has generally been selected from
the pool of private barristers with expertise in constitutional law. Thus, the
Solicitor-General also tends to bring with him (so far, the eight solicitors-general
since Federation have all been male) the skills developed over a long career as a
specialist advocate at the bar, representing many interests over that career and
forging many strong relationships with fellow barristers. Finally, there is an
advantage in the Solicitor-General appearing in almost all the major constitutional
cases because of the importance of the Commonwealth not putting submissions
in one case that are inconsistent with its submissions in another and the
desirability of not giving an answer to a question from the Bench in one case
that might be used against the Commonwealth in another. This is not a problem
when one appears for a private litigant.
Conclusion
I have attempted to demonstrate that the ways in which the Commonwealth
conducts constitutional litigation enable it to combine the best aspects of
constitutional legal experience in the public sector with the specialist skills and
knowledge of the private bar. Hopefully, from this mix of expertise, we are
better able to advance the public interest.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 16 July 2008.
2 Final Report of the Constitutional Commission. Volume One, 1988, p. 43.
3  ANOP Research Services Pty Ltd (1994), referred to in Patapan, Haig 1994, ‘The forgotten founding:
civics education, the common law and liberal constitutionalism in Australia’, Griffith Law Review, vol.
14, no. 1, p. 91.
4 The Advisory Opinions case (1921) 29 CLR 257.
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10. Evidence-based policy making:
what is it and how do we get it?1
Gary Banks AO
In an address sponsored by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government,
I thought a couple of quotes about government itself might be a good place to
start. P. J. O’Rourke, who is scheduled to speak in Australia in April 2009, once
said, ‘the mystery of Government is not how it works, but how to make it stop’.
In an earlier century, Otto von Bismarck is famously reported to have said, ‘Laws
are like sausages: it’s better not to see them being made.’
Those witty observations have become enduring aphorisms for a reason. They
reflect a rather cynical and widespread view of long standing about the operations
of government. Also, let’s face it, within government itself, many of us today
find ourselves laughing knowingly at the antics of The Hollowmen, just as we
did with Yes, Minister; and perhaps also cringing in recognition at how a carefully
crafted policy proposal can be so easily subverted, or a dubious policy can
triumph with little real evidence or analysis to commend it.
The idea for The Hollowmen was apparently conceived, and the first few episodes
developed, under the previous government. That said, a change of government
did not seem to reduce the program’s appeal, or its ratings. No doubt that is
because it contains some universal realities of political life—notwithstanding
which party happens to be in power. And, indeed, notwithstanding the greater
emphasis placed by the current government on evidence-based policy making,
as reflected in a variety of reviews and in new processes and structures within
the Commonwealth and COAG.
Thus, we have seen considerable public debate about the basis for a range of
recent policy initiatives. These include: the ‘alco-pops’ tax, the change in the
threshold for the private insurance surcharge, the linkage of Indigenous welfare
payments to school attendance, Fuel Watch, Grocery Watch and the Green Car
Innovation Fund. There was similar public debate under the previous government
about the basis for such initiatives as the Alice-to-Darwin rail link, the
Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, the Baby Bonus, the banning of filament
light bulbs, Work Choices and the National Water Initiative, among others.
Moreover, where public reviews inform such initiatives, they have themselves
been subjected to considerable criticism—in relation to their make-up, their
processes and the quality of their analysis. This too is obviously not a new
phenomenon, but it illustrates the challenges of properly implementing an
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which can be crucial to community acceptance of consequent policy decisions.
Advancing further reforms will be challenging
It is as important that we have a rigorous, evidence-based approach to public
policy in Australia today as at any time in our history. Australia faces major
long-term challenges—challenges that have only been exacerbated by the
economic turbulence that we are struggling to deal with right now. When the
present crisis is over, we will still have the ongoing challenges of greenhouse,
the ageing of our population and continuing international competitive pressures.
We should not underestimate the significance of these challenges, which place
a premium on enhancing the efficiency and productivity of our economy.
The good news is that there is plenty of scope for improvement. COAG’s National
Reform Agenda embraces much of what is needed—not just the completion of
the old competition agenda, but getting further into good regulatory design and
the reduction of red tape, efficient infrastructure provision and the human capital
issues that will be so important to this country’s innovation and productivity
performance over time. The Productivity Commission’s modelling of the National
Reform Agenda indicates that the gains from this ‘third wave’ of reform could
potentially be greater than from the first and second waves.2 The problem is
that there are few ‘easy’ reforms left. The earlier period had a lot of low-hanging
fruit that has now been largely harvested.
Even in the competition area, rather than further deregulation, we are confronting
the need for regulatory refinements that are quite subtle and complex to assess.
In the new agenda to do with enhancing human capital, complexities abound.
We don’t know all the answers to the policy drivers of better health and
educational outcomes, for example, let alone to the pressing goal of reducing
Indigenous disadvantage.3
These are all long-term issues. They also have an inter-jurisdictional dimension,
bringing with them the challenge of finding national solutions to problems that
have been dealt with by individual states and territories in the past. This has
‘upped the ante’ on having good analysis and good processes to help avoid
making mistakes on a national scale, which previously would have been confined
to particular jurisdictions.
In an address to senior public servants in April last year, the Prime Minister
observed that ‘evidence-based policy making is at the heart of being a reformist
government’.4  I want to explore why that is profoundly true, what it means in
practice and some implications for those of us in public administration. In doing
so, I will draw on the experience of the Productivity Commission—which, with
its predecessors, has been at the heart of evidence-based policy making in
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Australia for over three decades5 —to distil some insights into what is needed
across government generally if we are to be successful.
Why we need an evidence-based approach
I don’t think I have to convince anyone of the value of an evidence-based
approach to public policy. After all, it is not a novel concept. (I read somewhere
that it is traceable to the fourteenth century, motivated by a desire to discipline
the whimsical rule of despots.) Its absence in practice, however, has been long
lamented. Over a century ago, for example, Florence Nightingale admonished
the English Parliament in the following terms: ‘You change your laws so fast
and without inquiring after results past or present that it is all experiment,
seesaw, doctrinaire; a shuttlecock between battledores.’6
The term ‘evidence-based policy making’ has been most recently popularised
by the Blair Government, which was elected on a platform of ‘what matters is
what works’. Blair spoke of ending ideologically based decision making and
‘questioning inherited ways of doing things’.7
Of course, ‘inherited ways of doing things’ meant to the Blair Government the
ways of the previous Thatcher administration! The advent of a new government
is clearly a good time to initiate an evidence-based approach to public policy,
especially after a decade or more of a previous one’s rule. I think that resonates
too with the take-up in Australia of these ‘New Labour’ ideas from the United
Kingdom, commencing with the Bracks Government in Victoria.
But, again, evidence-based policy making is by no means new to this country.
Probably the oldest example, or the longest-standing one, would be tariff making,
which for many years was required under legislation to be informed by a public
report produced by the Tariff Board and its successor organisations (notably the
Industries Assistance Commission). The nature of those evidence-based reports
changed dramatically over time, however, from merely reporting the impacts
on industries under review to also reporting the effects on other industries and
the wider economy.
Other key economic policy reforms that have drawn heavily on evidence-based
reviews/evaluations include the exchange rate and financial market liberalisation
of the 1980s, the National Competition Policy reforms of the 1990s and the shift
to inflation targeting in monetary policy in 1993. Examples from the social policy
arena include the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) in its initial
configuration and the introduction of ‘Lifetime Community Rating’ provisions
in private health insurance regulation.
The tariff story illustrates the crucial point that the contribution of an
evidence-based approach depends on its context and the objectives to which it
is directed. Evidence that is directed at supporting narrow objectives—a
particular group or sector, or fostering use of a particular product or
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technology—will generally look quite different to that which has as its objective
the best interests of the general community. Of course, this depends on having
the analytical tools to enable such a broad assessment to be undertaken.
Developments in this area were also an important part of the story on tariffs, as
well as in other policy areas.
While the systematic evaluation and review of policy have not been
pervasive—and arguably have been less evident in the social and environmental
domains than the economic—Australia’s experience illustrates its potential
contribution. It also reveals the sterility of academic debates about whether
evidence can or should play a ‘deterministic’ role in policy outcomes. It will be
clear to all at this gathering in Canberra that policy decisions will typically be
influenced by much more than objective evidence or rational analysis. Values,
interests, personalities, timing, circumstance and happenstance—in short,
democracy—determine what actually happens.
But evidence and analysis can nevertheless play a useful, even decisive, role in
informing policy makers’ judgments. Importantly, they can also condition the
political environment in which those judgments need to be made.
Most policies are experiments
Without evidence, policy makers must fall back on intuition, ideology or
conventional wisdom—or, at best, theory alone. And many policy decisions
have indeed been made in these ways. But the resulting policies can go seriously
astray, given the complexities and interdependencies in our society and economy
and the unpredictability of people’s reactions to change.
From the many examples that I could give, a few from recent Productivity
Commission reviews come readily to mind:
• in our research for COAG on the economic implications of Australia’s ageing
population,8  we demonstrated that common policy prescriptions to increase
immigration, or raise the birth rate, would have little impact on the
demographic profile or its fiscal consequences (indeed, higher fertility would
initially exacerbate fiscal pressures)
• our report into road and rail infrastructure pricing9  showed that the
presumption that road use was systematically subsidised relative to rail was
not borne out by the facts (facts that were quite difficult to discern)
• in our inquiry into waste management policy,10  we found that the objective
of zero solid waste was not only economically costly, but environmentally
unsound
• our inquiry into state assistance to industry showed that the bidding wars
for investment and major events the state governments engaged in generally
constituted not only a negative sum game nationally, but in many cases a
zero sum game for the winning state11
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• our recent study of Australian’s innovation system12  reaffirmed that,
contrary to conventional opinion, the general tax concession for research
and development acted mainly as a ‘reward’ for research that firms would
have performed anyway, rather than prompting much additional research
and development
• our recent draft report on parental leave13  indicated that binary views in
relation to whether child care was a good or a bad thing were both wrong,
depending on which age group you were looking at, and that there were
many subtle influences involved.
To take a separate example from the education field—which is rightly at centre
stage in COAG’s National Reform Agenda—the long-term policy goal of reducing
class sizes has received very little empirical support. In contrast, the importance
of individual teacher performance and the link to differentiated pecuniary
incentives are backed by strong evidence, but have been much neglected. (That
illustrates not only a lack of evidence-based policy in education, where social
scientists appear to have had little involvement, but the influence over the years
of teachers’ unions and other interests.)
Among other things, policies that haven’t been informed by good evidence and
analysis fall more easily prey to the ‘law of unintended consequences’—in
popular parlance, Murphy’s Law—which can lead to costly mistakes. For
example, the commission found, in a series of reviews, that the well-intentioned
regulatory frameworks devised to protect native flora and fauna, and to conserve
historic buildings, were actually undermining conservation goals by creating
perverse incentives for those responsible.
Our report for COAG, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage,14  is littered with
examples. One of the first field trips that I did as part of establishing that process
was to Alice Springs, where I learnt of one instance of an unintended consequence
that would be amusing if the issues weren’t so serious. It involved children
taking up petrol sniffing so that they could qualify for the various benefits and
give-aways in a program designed to eradicate it. That this might happen no
doubt would not have occurred to any of us in Canberra, but it could well have
occurred to some of the elders in the community if they had been asked.
But, as Noel Pearson and other Indigenous leaders affirmed, perhaps the most
calamitous and tragic example of all was the extension of ‘equal wages’ to
Aboriginal stockmen in the late 1960s. Despite warnings by some at the time,
this apparently well-motivated action led to the majority losing their jobs, driving
them and their extended families into the townships—ultimately subjecting
them to the ravages of passive welfare, with liberalised access to alcohol as the
final blow. Good intentions, bad consequences; very, very difficult to remedy.
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Now I am not saying that policy should never proceed without rigorous evidence.
Often you can’t get sufficiently good evidence, particularly when decisions must
be made quickly. And you can never have certainty in public policy. All policy
effectively is experimentation. But that does not mean flying blind; we still need
a good rationale or a good theory. Rationales and theories themselves can be
subjected to scrutiny and debate, and in a sense that constitutes a form of
evidence that can give some assurance about the likely outcomes. Importantly
though, all policy experiments need to be monitored and evaluated and, over
time, corrected or terminated if they turn out to be failures. These are things
that governments typically find hard to do—particularly the termination part.
Arguably the biggest-ever case of policy making under uncertainty is the
contemporary challenge posed by global warming. With huge residual
uncertainties in the science, economics and (international) politics, there can be
little confidence that anyone can identify a uniquely ‘correct’ policy prescription
for Australia at this point. The only sensible way forward, therefore, is to start
gradually, to monitor, to learn by doing as we develop institutions and see the
effects of carbon pricing on our economy and community, and as we wait for
others to come to the party—in other words, an adaptive response. That appears
to be broadly the strategy that the government has ultimately adopted in its
recent white paper.15 That said, the success of such a strategy still depends on
judgments about the most appropriate timing and extent of action by Australia,
and indeed the particular form of the policy action itself—notably, the mechanism
for pricing carbon, its coverage and compensation provisions. These remain
subject to ongoing debate.
Conditioning the political environment
Complexity and uncertainty would make policy choices hard enough even if
they could be made purely on technical grounds. But policies are not made in a
vacuum. Rather, they typically emerge from a maelstrom of political energy,
vested interests and lobbying. Commonly, those with special interests will try
to align their demands with the public interest. The average person (voter)
rationally doesn’t do the hard work necessary to find out whether that is correct
or not, but often feels intuitively supportive.
In that realpolitik, evidence and analysis that are robust and publicly available
can serve as an important counterweight to the influence of sectional interests,
enabling the wider community to be better informed about what is at stake in
interest groups’ proposals, and enfranchising those who would bear the costs
of implementing them. Tariff reform again provides a classic instance of evidence
being used to galvanise potential beneficiaries from reform in the policy debate.
In Australia, the losers under the tariff regime were the primary exporting
industries—the farmers and the miners—who started to appreciate, with help
from the Industries Assistance Commission, the extent of the implicit taxes and
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costs they were bearing; and they soon became a potent force for tariff reform.
The National Competition Policy has seen a similar political role being discharged
through evidentiary processes.
To take a quite different example, the gambling industry got a lot of political
support for deregulation essentially based on a myth—namely, that it would
generate many jobs but have only minor adverse social impacts. The commission’s
report showed the reverse to be true.16  Gambling did not (and could not)
generate significant additional jobs in the long term and had very substantial
social impacts. Establishing that gave community groups a stronger platform to
push for reforms to gambling regulation and the development and funding of
harm-minimisation measures.
My point is that good evidence can ameliorate or ‘neutralise’ political obstacles,
thereby making reforms more feasible. That is part of the reason why, as the
Prime Minister has said, a reformist government needs to have an evidence-based
approach at centre stage.
The essential ingredients
For evidence to discharge these various functions, however, it needs to be the
right evidence; it needs to occur at the right time and be seen by the right people.
That might sound obvious, but it is actually very demanding. I want to talk
briefly now about some essential ingredients in achieving it.
Methodology matters
First, methodology. It’s important that, whatever analytical approach is chosen,
it allows for a proper consideration of the nature of the issue or problem, and
of different options for policy action. Half the battle is understanding the
problem. Failure to do this properly is one of the most common causes of policy
failure and poor regulation. Sometimes this is an understandable consequence
of complex forces, but sometimes it seems to have more to do with a wish for
government to take action regardless.
A contemporary example that has received a bit of airplay as a consequence of
the commission’s report on waste management is the move to ban the ubiquitous
plastic shopping bags from our supermarkets. This initiative drew much support
from the alleged problems that these bags posed for the litter stream and for
marine health. But closer investigation by the commission soon exposed gross
inaccuracies and overstatements in those claims. Indeed, some of what passed
for ‘evidence’ was contrary to commonsense and some was outright hilarious.
(A Regulation Impact Statement soberly cited media reports from India that a
dead cow on the streets of New Delhi had 35 000 plastic bags in its digestive
system!)17
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In situations where government action seems warranted, a single option, no
matter how carefully analysed, rarely provides sufficient evidence for a
well-informed policy decision. The reality, however, is that much public policy
and regulation are made in just that way, with evidence confined to supporting
one, already preferred way forward. Hence the subversive expression
‘policy-based evidence’!
Even when the broad policy approach is clear, the particular instruments adopted
can make a significant difference. Thus, for example, economists overwhelmingly
accept the superiority of a market-based approach to reducing carbon emissions,
but they differ as to whether a cap-and-trade mechanism or an explicit tax (or
some combination of the two) would yield the best outcomes. Australia’s apparent
haste to embrace the trading option remains contentious among some prominent
economists, illustrated by recent public advocacy by Geoff Carmody18  (in
support of a consumption-based tax) and Warwick McKibbin19  (in support of
a ‘hybrid’ scheme, with trading and taxation components).
How one measures the impacts of different policies depends on the topic and
the task—and whether it’s an ex-ante or ex-post assessment. There is a range
of methodologies available. There is also active debate about their relative merits.
Nevertheless, all good methodologies have a number of features in common:
• they test a theory or proposition as to why policy action will be
effective—ultimately promoting community wellbeing—with the theory
also revealing what impacts of the policy should be observed if it is to succeed
• they have a serious treatment of the ‘counterfactual’—namely, what will
happen in the absence of any action
• they involve, wherever possible, quantification of impacts (including
estimates of how effects vary for different policy ‘doses’ and for different
groups)
• they look at direct and indirect effects (often it’s the indirect effects that can
be most important)
• they set out the uncertainties and control for other influences that might
impact on observed outcomes
• they are designed to avoid errors that could occur through self-selection or
other sources of bias
• they provide for sensitivity tests
• importantly, they have the ability to be tested and, ideally, replicated by
third parties.
Australia has been at the forefront internationally in the development and use
of some methodologies. For example, we have led the world in ‘general
equilibrium’ modelling of the ‘direct and indirect effects’ of policy changes
throughout the economy. Indeed, the Industries Assistance Commission, with
its ‘Impact Project’ under Professors Powell and Dixon, essentially got that going.
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But Australia has done relatively little in some other important areas, such as
‘randomised trials’, which can be particularly instructive in developing good
social policy.20 We seem to see a lot more (proportionately) of this research
being done in the United States, for example.
Most evidence-based methodologies fit broadly within a cost–benefit (or at least
cost-effectiveness) framework, designed to determine an estimated (net) pay-off
to society. It is a robust framework that provides for explicit recognition of costs
and benefits and requires the policy maker to consider the full range of potential
impacts. But it hasn’t been all that commonly or well used, even in relatively
straightforward tasks such as infrastructure project evaluation.
The head of Infrastructure Australia’s secretariat recently commented in the
following terms about many of the infrastructure proposals submitted to that
body: ‘the linkage to goals and problems is weak, the evidence is weak, the
quantification of costs and benefits is generally weak.’21
It is very welcome, therefore, that Infrastructure Australia has stressed that any
project that it recommends for public funding must satisfy rigorous cost–benefit
tests.22  It is particularly important, as Minister Anthony Albanese himself has
affirmed, that this includes quantification of the more ‘subjective’ social or
environmental impacts, or, where this proves impossible, that there is an explicit
treatment of the nature of those impacts and the values imputed to them.23  In
the past, this has proven to be the Achilles heel of cost-benefit analyses for major
public investments: financial costs are typically underestimated, non-financial
benefits are overstated.
Rubbery computations of this kind seem to be endemic to railway investment
proposals, particularly ‘greenfield’ ones, which rarely pass muster on the
economics alone. It is disquieting to observe, therefore, that rail projects feature
heavily among the initial listing by Infrastructure Australia of projects warranting
further assessment, totalling well over $100 billion. Among these we find such
old chestnuts as a light rail system for the Australian Capital Territory and a
very fast train linking Canberra with Sydney and Melbourne. (The rail proposals
are not alone in evoking past follies, however. I note that expansion of the Ord
River Scheme is also on the list.)24
It is undoubtedly challenging to monetise some of the likely costs and benefits
associated with certain areas of public policy. But often we don’t try hard enough.
There are nevertheless some examples of creative attempts. These include work
by the Productivity Commission in areas such as gambling, consumer protection
policy and even animal welfare.
The key is to be able to better assess whether benefits are likely to exceed costs,
within a coherent analytical framework, even if everything cannot be reduced
to a single number, or some elements cannot be quantified. Thus, in our gambling
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and consumer policy reports, for example, we could provide estimates only of
net benefits within plausible ranges. In the analysis required under the National
Competition Policy of the ACT Government’s proposal to ban trade in eggs from
battery hens, we quantified the likely economic costs and identified the potential
impacts on the birds.25  However, we drew short of valuing these, as such
valuations depend on ethical considerations and community norms that are best
made by accountable political representatives.
Good data are a prerequisite
A second essential ingredient, of course, is data. Australia has been very well
served by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the integrity of the national
databases that it has generated. But in some areas we are struggling. Apart from
the challenges of valuing impacts, and disentangling the effects of simultaneous
influences, we often face more basic data deficiencies. These are typically in
social and environmental rather than economic domains, where we must rely
on administrative collections—or indeed there might be no collections at all.
Data problems bedevil the National Reform Agenda in the human capital area.
Preventative health strategies and pathways of causal factors are one example.
Indigenous policy provides another striking one, involving myriad problems to
do with identification, the incidence of different health or other conditions and
their distribution across different parts of the country—all of which are very
important for public policy formation. In the crucial education area, obtaining
performance data has been an epic struggle, on which I will comment further.
In the COAG priority area of early childhood development, a recent survey
article from the Australian Institute of Family Studies concludes: ‘The dearth of
evaluation data on interventions generally…makes it impossible to comment on
the usefulness of early childhood interventions as a general strategy to sustain
improvements for children in the long-term.’26
Data deficiencies inhibit evidence-based analysis for obvious reasons. They can
also lead to reliance on ‘quick and dirty’ surveys or the use of focus groups, as
lampooned in The Hollowmen. A colleague has observed that a particular state
government in which he had worked was a frequent user of focus groups. They
have a purpose, but I think it is a more superficial one, better directed at
informing marketing than analysing potential policy impacts.
The other risk is that overseas studies will be resorted to inappropriately as a
substitute for domestic studies. Sometimes this is akin to the old joke about the
fellow who loses his keys in a dark street, but is found searching for them metres
away under a lamppost, because that is where there is more light. Translating
foreign studies to Australia can sometimes be perilous, given different
circumstances and the scope for misinterpretation.
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One topical example is the celebrated work by James Heckman27  in the United
States demonstrating the benefits of preschool education based on the Perry
Program. That work has become a policy touchstone for advocates of universal
intensive preschool education in Australia. While that policy could well prove
to be sound, Heckman’s work does not provide the necessary evidence. As he
himself clearly acknowledged, the Perry Project was confined to disadvantaged
children. And the main gain from the intensive preschool treatment that those
kids got came from reduced crime. So if there is relevance for the Perry work
in Australia, it might be mainly confined to areas where there is concentrated
disadvantage.
A major failing of governments in Australia, and probably worldwide, has been
in not generating the data needed to evaluate their own programs. In particular,
there has been a lack of effort to develop the baseline data essential for
before-and-after comparisons. As an aside, I should note that quite often even
the objectives of a policy or program are not clear to the hapless reviewer. Indeed,
one of the good things about having reviews is that they can force some
clarification as to what the objectives of the policy should have been in the first
place. Examples of policies with unclear objectives from the Productivity
Commission’s current work program include the Baby Bonus, drought assistance
and the restrictions on the parallel importing of books.
In the commission’s first gambling inquiry, we had to undertake a national
survey to get a picture of the social impacts, as there were no good national data
around. We recommended that, in future, consistent surveys should be
undertaken periodically, but this has not happened; the field has become a bit
of a shemozzle, and we seem to be confronting the same problems again in
revisiting this topic 10 years on. Moreover, while in this time there has been a
multitude of harm-minimisation measures introduced by different jurisdictions
around the country, very few of these have been preceded by trials or pilots to
assess their cost effectiveness or have been designed with the need for evaluation
data in mind.
In the Indigenous field, even the much-anticipated COAG trials lacked baseline
data. The only exception, as I recall, was the Wadeye trial, but those data were
derived from a separate research exercise, which took place before the trials
commenced. More generally, we don’t even know how much money has been
spent on Indigenous programs, let alone how effective those programs have
been. (There is currently an initiative under way to remedy that, through a new
reporting framework involving all jurisdictions, with secretariat support from
the Productivity Commission.)
Overall, we are seeing funding for data collection actually being cut. This is
partly a consequence of the so-called ‘efficiency dividend’ in the public sector
and the blunt way it is imposed. A consequence is that in agencies that have
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responsibility for collecting data, vital survey information and other data
collections are being jeopardised. This seems particularly perverse at a time
when governments are seeking to promote evidence-based policy making!
In contrast, Australia has made great strides in assembling comparable
performance data across jurisdictions through the Government Services Review.28
(This is currently being reviewed by a COAG senior officials group.) Foreign
government officials visiting Australia have often expressed astonishment at
what we have achieved. And international agencies such as the OECD and the
United Nations have praised the Blue Book and Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage reports.
But Australia could and should have done a lot more to take advantage of its
federal system as a natural proving ground for policy learning across
jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, rather than encouraging data provision to
enable comparisons across jurisdictions, the basis for such comparisons has
actually been suppressed. I mentioned earlier a lack of data on school learning
outcomes. Such data are better now than in the past, but it has been a real
struggle. And the data we have managed to collect and publish are highly
aggregated. It certainly hasn’t got down to the level of individual schools and
involves very weak tests that don’t reveal much about comparative learning
outcomes across the country. The OECD’s PISA data have generally been more
revealing as well as more timely—despite being collected internationally.
Andrew Leigh from The Australian National University has published an
interesting paper with a colleague, analysing the impact of individual school
performance on literacy and numeracy.29  But his research had to be confined
to Western Australia, which was the only jurisdiction that released school data.
Even then, the data were only revealed implicitly in charts. Leigh was obliged
to digitise the charts to get the numbers to allow him to do his novel analysis.
So I think there is an opportunity, under the new federalism banner, to fund
the evidence base that we need to compare policy performances across our
federation, and thereby to devise better national policies where national
approaches are called for. An important recent initiative in this direction is the
allocation of additional funding, as part of a $3.5 billion education package, for
a new performance reporting framework for schools. The minister, Julia Gillard,
in endorsing the new framework, stated, ‘It is my strong view, that lack of
transparency both hides failure and helps us ignore it…And lack of transparency
prevents us from identifying where greater effort and investment are needed.’30
Real evidence is open to scrutiny
This leads directly to the third area that I want to talk about: transparency.
Much policy analysis actually occurs behind closed doors. A political need for
speed or defence against opportunistic adversaries is often behind that. But no
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evidence is immutable. If it hasn’t been tested, or contested, we can’t really call
it ‘evidence’. And it misses the opportunity to educate the community about
what is at stake in a policy issue, and thereby for it to become more accepting
of the policy initiative itself.
Transparency ideally means ‘opening the books’ in terms of data, assumptions
and methodologies, such that the analysis can be replicated. The wider the
impacts of a policy proposal, the wider the consultation should be—not just
with experts, but with the people who are likely to be affected by the policy,
whose reactions and feedback provide insights into the likely impacts and help
avoid unintended consequences. Such feedback in itself constitutes a useful
form of evidence. The commission’s processes are essentially based on maximising
feedback. I cannot dwell on this much here, other than to say that, in a range
of areas, we’ve learned a great deal through our extensive public consultation
processes, particularly in response to draft reports. If you compare the drafts
with our final reports you will often see changes for the better—sometimes in
our recommendations, sometimes in the arguments and evidence that we finally
employ.
Transparency in policy making helps government too, because it can see how
the community reacts to ideas before they are fully formed, enabling it to better
anticipate the politics of pursuing different courses of action. So the signs of a
greater reliance again on green papers by the Australian Government, as
advocated by the Regulation Taskforce, are very welcome.31  For example, the
policy-development process for addressing global warming clearly benefited
from an elevated public debate after the green paper was released.
Evidence building takes time
Transparency can have its downsides. In particular, it ‘complicates’ and slows
the decision-making process; transparency involves time and effort. That is what
appears to have militated against draft reports in a number of the recent policy
review exercises. This was a shame, especially for the major industry policy
reviews last year, which contained recommendations with important ramifications
for the community and economy. There is an obvious clash between any
government’s acceptance of the need for good evidence and the political ‘need
for speed’. But the facts are that detailed research, involving data gathering and
the testing of evidence, can’t be done overnight. As already noted, in some cases,
the necessary data will not be available ‘off the shelf’ and might require a special
survey. In other cases, data needed for program evaluation might be revealed
only through pilot studies or trials with the program itself.
On a number of occasions in the past decade I have been approached about the
possibility of the commission undertaking an attractive policy task, but in an
amount of time that I felt was unreasonable for it to be done well, particularly
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in view of the time people need to make submissions and give us feedback.
When the commission does something, people rightly expect to be able to have
a say. As a consequence, those tasks have more often than not ended up going
to consultants. (And in most cases the results have vindicated my position.)
Good evidence requires good people
The fifth area of importance is capability and expertise. You can’t have good
evidence and you can’t have good research without good people. People skilled
in quantitative methods and other analysis are especially valuable. It is therefore
ironic that we appear to have experienced a decline in the numbers with such
skills within the Public Service at the very time when it has been called upon
to provide an evidence-based approach that relies on them. Again, that’s been
largely a consequence of budgetary measures over a long period. Research tends
to be seen as a more dispensable function when governments and bureaucracies
are cut back.
Several manifestations of the consequential reduction in capability have struck
me. One is the lower calibre of some of the departmental project teams that I
have observed trying to do review and evaluation work. Second, there appears
to be increased poaching of research staff within the public sector, or at least
pleas for secondments.
We are also seeing major new initiatives to train staff. One significant example
is the Treasury’s sponsorship of a new program, to be run by Monash University,
to teach economics to non-economists. (We have seen shrinkage of the recruitment
pool of economics graduates in recent years and I wonder whether the study of
economics might be turning into a niche discipline in our universities.)
We’ve also seen a major increase in the contracting of policy-related research
outside the Public Service. A lot of those jobs have gone to business consultants
rather than to academics. This contrasts with the experience in the United States,
where the academic community seems to be utilised much more by government.
Contracting out is by no means a bad thing (some of my best friends are
consultants!). It has been happening progressively for decades. But it does seem
to be changing in character more recently. The focus seems to be broadening
from provision of inputs to policy making to preparation of outputs—the whole
package. This gained public prominence last year through media reports of the
Boston Consulting Group working up an ‘early childhood policy’ and developing
a business plan for the ‘global institute’ for carbon sequestration. Also, KPMG
seems to have become active in the infrastructure policy area.
There are clear benefits to government from using professional consultants: new
ideas, talented people, on-time delivery, attractive presentation and, possibly,
cost—although some of the payments have been surprisingly large. But there
are also some significant risks. Consultants often cut corners. Their reports can
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be superficial. And, more fundamentally, they are typically less accountable
than public service advisers for the policy outcomes.
Whether academics could be drawn on more is a key issue. In an earlier era, the
involvement of academics was instrumental in developing the evidentiary and
analytical momentum for the first waves of microeconomic reform. Examples
from the trade and competition policy arena alone include Max Corden, Richard
Snape, Fred Gruen, Peter Lloyd, Bob Gregory, Ross Garnaut, Fred Hilmer, among
others. Where are the new academic generation’s equivalents in support of the
‘third wave’? Only a few names come to mind, for example, of academics making
a notable public contribution to policies bearing on human capital development.
Such involvement is of course a two-way street—with both demand and supply
sides. The supply side seems to have been diminished over time, partly as
promising academic researchers have sought more attractive remuneration
elsewhere and partly as their time has been increasingly consumed by their ‘day
jobs’. On the demand side, one sometimes hears senior public servants complain
that academics can be very hard ‘to do business with’ or that they are too slow
or lack an appreciation of the ‘real world’. There might be some validity in these
perceptions, though I suspect that they also reflect an unrealistic view of how
much time is needed to do good research—and perhaps a lack of planning.
Perhaps also a desire for greater ‘predictability’ in the results than many
academics would be willing to countenance. As Brian Head from Queensland
University has observed: ‘Relatively few research and consulting projects are
commissioned without some expectation that the reports may assist in upholding
a certain viewpoint.’32  (As I recall it, Sir Humphrey Appleby’s maxim—akin
to Rumpole’s first law of cross-examination—is that ‘one should never
commission a study without knowing what the answer will be’.)
Independence can be crucial
Evidence is never absolute, never ‘revealed truth’. The choice of methodologies,
data, assumptions, and so on can all influence the outcome, and they do. Anyone
who did first-year statistics at university probably read Darryl Huff’s book How
to Lie with Statistics, which was an early indication of the potential and the
problems. Given the unavoidable need for judgment in evaluation, evidence is
more likely to be robust and seen to be so if it is not subjected to influence or
barrow pushing by those involved. Good research is not just about skilled people,
it is about whether they face incentives to deliver a robust product in the public
interest.
Some years ago, following a talk that I gave at a gambling conference in
Melbourne, an American academic came up to me and said that the Productivity
Commission’s report was being used extensively in public debate in the United
States. I expressed surprise, given the extent of home-grown research there. She
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said, ‘Yes, but we don’t know what to believe.’ That appears to be because
research is polarised in that country between that sponsored by community and
church groups and that sponsored by the industry. And there is suspicion that
‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’.
Independence is even more important when dealing with technical research than
with opinions. People are better able to judge opinions for themselves, but the
average person is naturally mystified by technical research. They look for proxies
to help them know whether the results of such research are believable. The
status of the researcher (or whoever is paying for the research) is one such proxy.
Economic modelling is replete with these sorts of issues. Any model comprises
many assumptions and judgments, which can significantly influence the results.
For example, the Productivity Commission and industry consultants used similar
models recently to estimate the economic impacts of reducing tariffs on cars.
The commission found that there would be significant economy-wide gains from
maintaining scheduled tariff reductions. The other modellers, using different
(and some less conventional) assumptions, projected net losses—with the current
tariff rate coincidentally turning out to be ‘optimal’.
You might also recall that in modelling the potential gains to Australia from a
mooted free trade agreement with the United States, the Centre for International
Economics, in work commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, obtained a significant positive result, whereas separate work by ACIL
Tasman projected negligible gains at best. More recently, modelling of the
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target in conjunction with an emissions trading
scheme either found it to impose substantial additional costs on the economy or
to yield substantial benefits, depending on the modeller and the sponsor.33
(COAG’s final decision to implement a 20 per cent target nationally essentially
favoured the latter estimates. However, Productivity Commission researchers
found the sources of gains in that modelling difficult to justify.)34
A ‘receptive’ policymaking environment is fundamental
We come to the final and most important ingredient on my list. Even the best
evidence is of little value if it’s ignored or not available when it is needed. An
evidence-based approach requires a policymaking process that is receptive to
evidence, a process that begins with a question rather than an answer, and that
has institutions to support such inquiry.
As has been found through the work of the Office of Regulation Review, and
now the Office of Best Practice Regulation, often we see the reverse, especially
for more significant proposals. The joke about ‘policy-based evidence’ has not
been made in the abstract—we have long observed such an approach in operation
through the lens of regulation making in Australia.
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Ideally, we need systems that are open to evidence at each stage of the
policy-development ‘cycle’: from the outset when an issue or problem is identified
for policy attention to the development of the most appropriate response and
subsequent evaluation of its effectiveness.
The ongoing struggle to achieve effective use of regulation assessment processes
within governments, which I describe in more detail elsewhere,35  tells us how
challenging that can be to implement. These arrangements require that significant
regulatory proposals undergo a sequence of analytical steps designed first to
clarify the nature of the policy problem and why government action is called
for, and then to assess the relative merits of different options to demonstrate
that the proposed regulation is likely to yield the highest (net) benefits to the
community.
These steps simply amount to what is widely accepted as ‘good process’. That
their documentation in a regulation impact statement has proven so difficult to
achieve, at least to a satisfactory standard, is best explained by a reluctance or
inability to follow good process in the first place. I admit that an evidence-based
approach undoubtedly makes life harder for policy makers and for politicians.
Lord Keynes, who seems to be well and truly back in vogue, said in the 1930s:
‘There is nothing a Government hates more than to be well-informed; for it
makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult.’36
I think we can see what he meant. But against this are the undoubted political
benefits that come from avoiding policy failures or unintended ‘collateral damage’
that can rebound on a government, and from enhancing the credibility of
reformist initiatives.
Some implications for the Public Service
I will conclude now with some observations about how those of us in the Public
Service can help advance the cause of evidence-based policy making. We begin
with the considerable advantage of explicit endorsement by the Prime Minister
and senior ministers for an evidence-based approach to public policy. In his
speech to the Senior Executive Service last year, Kevin Rudd37  declared, ‘we
cannot afford a Public Service culture where all you do is tell the Government
what it wants to hear’. We’ve also heard from the head of the Public Service,
Terry Moran, that ‘for civil servants, a capacity to analyse problems rationally
and empirically and to advance options for action by Governments is a basic
ethical duty’.38
What both are talking about, in old parlance, is ‘frank and fearless’ advice:
robust advice that does not second-guess the politics or the politicians. So the
first suggestion I have for advancing evidence-based policy making is for us to
be frank and fearless. That doesn’t mean being a loose cannon, or acting contrary
to a government’s broad objectives, but using the opportunity of such political
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support to strengthen the bureaucracy’s capacity to provide evidence-based
advice—and delivering that advice, even if it is against the current or not
confined to a minister’s or government’s favoured position (which often aren’t
set in concrete anyway).
Making better use of existing processes
There exist currently vehicles and frameworks within government that can be
used more effectively to this end. Indeed, the recently upgraded regulation
assessment requirements are ready-made for that purpose. As noted, these are
based on a best-practice ‘policy cycle’, with explicit provision for evidence to
be utilised at each step. With the recent introduction of higher analytical hurdles,
including greater quantification of benefits and costs, in conjunction with
stronger sanctions for inadequate compliance, the line of least resistance for the
bureaucracy should be moving in favour of an evidence-based approach. The
extent to which this is happening remains unclear. Relatively high overall
compliance rates under the new system, as recorded by the Office of Best Practice
Regulation in its annual report,39  appear promising; though, as in the past, the
compliance record is worse for the more significant regulatory proposals.
In relation to spending programs, there is also likely to be scope to enhance some
of the requirements, particularly to strengthen ex-ante evaluation and to make
explicit provision for ex-post review. This might be assisted by the financial
crisis. For example, Finance Minister, Lindsay Tanner, observed recently: ‘Every
government dollar wasted on a poor program is a dollar that a working person
doesn’t have to spend on groceries, health care and education. It is also a dollar
that the Government does not have available to spend on its policy priorities.’40
A heightened sense of the trade-offs has become apparent, for example, in some
of the advocacy for publicly funded paid parental leave, with questions being
raised about the relative pay-off from expenditure on industry support programs.
Integral to advancing an evidence-based approach are the processes and
institutions within government that enable different perspectives and information
to be brought to bear at the ‘pointy end’ of a policy decision. These are well
described by Meredith Edwards in her book Social Policy, Public Policy.41  Crucial
elements are the proper functioning of interdepartmental committees, the cabinet
submission process (with ‘coordination comments’ on policy proposals by all
relevant agencies) and, ultimately, well-informed discussions within cabinet
itself.
Effective COAG arrangements
At the COAG level, we have a new working group structure, which is well placed
to advance an evidence-based approach to public policy, given sufficient space
and lead time. That said, these arrangements in themselves represent an
experiment. Their novel design, in which state department CEOs essentially
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report to Commonwealth ministers, faces obvious challenges. More problematic,
in my view, are the time constraints imposed on COAG processes under the
punishing dictates of the quarterly cycle of meetings. The seeming imperative
for bureaucrats around the country to be constantly preparing for these meetings
appears to be displacing some of the work that should be done to inform
decisions. After all, those meetings are at the highest level and decisions need
to be made to justify them. While the frequency of meetings might have initially
been good for pressure and momentum, if maintained, it could prove
self-defeating for evidence-based policy making. It is to be hoped, therefore,
that over time we might see a return to a more measured approach, which retains,
or even strengthens, the new framework of working groups behind the scenes,
but involves more time between meetings of COAG itself and thus for the
gathering of the evidence that decisions require.
Building greater institutional capacity
Building capacity—or rebuilding it—is also very important. But it can’t happen
overnight. For one thing, we need to be recruiting into the Public Service more
graduates in the social and economic sciences. The United Kingdom saw a
doubling in the number of researchers in the civil service in one decade under
the Blair Government. (There is some irony in the fact that many of those at the
top of the bureaucracy began their careers in the Public Service as research
officers and probably remain more highly skilled analysts today than many of
their current subordinates.)
Any agency that is serious about encouraging an evidence-based approach needs
to develop a ‘research culture’. Establishing dedicated evaluation units, achieving
a critical mass of researchers, strengthening links with academic and other
research bodies are all integral to this. There is also the broader question of
‘institution building’ to underpin better evaluation generally across government.
Some initiatives have developed out of the foreign aid programs and literature
that might be instructive. These include ‘evaluation clubs’ or forums that promote
cross-fertilisation, peer support and learning about ‘what works’—in relation
to methodologies and policy approaches themselves. We could think of
developing comparable institutions as centres of excellence to foster greater
inter-jurisdictional learning in Australia—a kind of ‘Cochrane Collaboration’42
in the policy arena. Government/COAG sponsorship for such institution building
is worth considering. Indeed, it could be contemplated as a useful extension of
the role of ANZSOG, given its ‘ownership’ by all governments in Australia and
New Zealand.
Better use of external contracting
When it comes to the (inevitable) use of external contractors, I think we need
to give far more attention to defining the task and to identifying how contractors
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can best help us to make good public policy. Choosing the contractor—getting
the right consultant for the task—is obviously fundamental. I would suggest
that in many cases, it is better to go directly to the experts rather than to the
big jack-of-all-trades management consulting firms that might be willing to
tackle anything, but have an indifferent performance record in policy-related
work (to say the least). Such firms often rely on subcontractors anyway, so why
not go directly to those with a reputation in the field?
Part of the challenge, if consultants are to become contributors to a truly
evidence-based approach, is to limit their tendency to ‘second-guessing’, which
can compound bureaucrats’ own tendencies in this direction. As noted
previously, this might be less of an issue for academics, who typically do not
rely on such sources of income, than for business consultants, who do. An
evidence-based approach ideally requires contractual arrangements that create
neutral ‘incentives’ for the researcher to make robust findings—for example,
by making it clear that his or her work will be peer reviewed.
More generally, monitoring and reviewing the quality of such external work
are crucial and, again, academic specialists would seem particularly well placed
to help with that, as well as helping agencies choose which consultant to use in
the first place. Peer review can also be very worthwhile for the research that is
done within government, but this is not common practice. It is especially valuable
where political sensitivities require secrecy during the policy-development
phase, but where there might be significant downside risks for the community
from ‘getting it wrong’.
Resourcing evaluations properly
We need to ensure that all government programs are designed and funded with
future evaluation and review in mind. That includes data needs, especially
baseline data, and making explicit budgetary provision for that. We should be
pushing harder for more and better data generally, particularly in the social and
environmental areas. Instead of being seen as an extra or a luxury, data for policy
evaluation need to be recognised as a necessity—and a funding priority right
now if we are serious about developing an evidence-based approach.
As already emphasised, we also need to be building in more time, where it is
needed to come up with robust evidence that is adequately tested. In a crisis
situation such as the present, time is of the essence, of course, and some decisions
need to be made quickly. That is inevitable. But it is important that we lay the
groundwork now to evaluate the consequences of those measures later, so the
inevitable problems can be detected and timely adjustments made.
In the current context, this is particularly important for spending initiatives
motivated by short-term demand management objectives, which could have an
ongoing impact, or create a sense of entitlement and political pressure for their
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retention. For example, increased assistance to an industry—by strengthening
its ability to withstand foreign competitors in a recessionary market—might
initially help to shore up that industry’s workforce. But this selective support
will tend to weaken job retention in other local industries and, if sustained,
inhibit overall job creation and productivity growth in the longer term.
Bottom line
In conclusion, the goal of evidence-based policy making is unquestionably
important, and it is encouraging that it has received vocal support at the highest
political levels. However, measured against the various ingredients for an
effective approach, it seems clear that current practice continues to fall short.
Addressing this is now largely up to the Public Service. Not only is there a need
to improve the capacity of the Public Service to deliver evidence-based policy
advice, there is a need for it to improve political understanding of what that
entails. If we fail, it won’t just vindicate the public’s cynicism about The
Hollowmen syndrome; it will compromise government’s capacity to implement
the beneficial national reforms that this country needs for the long term.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 4 February 2009. Early versions
of this paper were presented to an Australian Public Service Commission Leader-to-Leader seminar in
October 2008 and as a keynote address to the Annual Conference of the Economics Society in August
2008.
2  Banks, G. 2008. Riding the Third Wave: Some challenges in national reform, Productivity Commission,
Melbourne, March.
3  Banks, G. 2007, Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage in Australia, Presentation to the second OECD
World Forum on Statistics, Knowledge and Policy: Measuring and fostering the progress of societies,
Istanbul, Turkey, 29 June.
4  Rudd, K. Address by the Prime Minister to Heads of Agencies and Members of Senior Executive
Service, Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra, 30 April.
5  Banks, G. and Carmichael, W. B. 2007, Domestic transparency in Australia’s economic and trade
reforms: the role of ‘the commission’, Paper for the Lowy Institute and Tasman Transparency Group
Conference Enhancing Transparency in the Multilateral Trading System, Sydney, 4 July; and Productivity
Commission 2003, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 years of ‘the commission’
, Melbourne.
6  Karl Pearson, 1924, The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton, Cambridge University Press, Vol.
2, p. 418.
7  Blair, T. and Cunningham, J. 1999, Modernising Government, Prime Minister and Minister for the
Cabinet Office, London, United Kingdom; Wells, P. 2007, ‘New Labour and evidence based policy
making: 1997–2007’, People, Place and Policy Online, vol. 1, pp. 22–9.
8  Productivity Commission 2005, Economic implications of an ageing Australia, Research Report, Canberra.
9  Productivity Commission 2006, Road and rail freight infrastructure pricing, Report No. 41, Canberra.
10  Productivity Commission 2006, Waste management, Report No. 38, Canberra.
11  Banks, G. 2002, Interstate bidding wars: calling a truce, Speech to the Committee for Economic
Development of Australia, Brisbane, 6 November.
12  Productivity Commission 2007, Public support for science and innovation, Research Report, Canberra.
13  Productivity Commission 2008, Paid Parental Leave: Support for parents with newborn children, Draft
Inquiry Report, Canberra.
127
Evidence-based policy making: what is it and how do we get it?
14  Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 2007, Overcoming Indigenous
Disadvantage: Key indicators 2007, Productivity Commission, Canberra.
15  Department of Climate Change 2008, Carbon pollution reduction scheme: Australia’s low pollution
future, White Paper, Canberra, December.
16  Productivity Commission 1999, Australia’s gambling industries, Report No. 10, Canberra.
17  Environment Protection and Heritage Council, 2008, Decision Regulatory Impact Statement:
Investigation of options to reduce the impacts of plastic bags, April.
18  Carmody, G. 2008, ‘User pays key to climate’, The Australian, 29 August.
19  McKibbin, W. 2009, ‘Five problems to fix in a flawed policy’, Australian Financial Review, 15 January.
20  Boruch, R., De Moya, D. and Snyder, B. 2002, ‘The importance of randomized field trials in education
and related areas’, in F. Mosteller and R. Boruch (eds), Evidence Matters: Randomised trials in education
research, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.
21  Deegan, M. 2008, Presentation given at the Industry Leaders’ Luncheon, Sydney, 9 October,
<http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au>
22  Infrastructure Australia 2008, A Report to the Council of Australian Governments, Sydney, December.
23  Albanese, A. 2008, Address to Australian Davos Connection Infrastructure Summit 21 by the Minister
for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Brisbane, 7 October.
24  Infrastructure Australia, A Report to the Council of Australian Governments.
25  Productivity Commission 1998, Battery eggs sale and production in the ACT, Research Report, Canberra.
26 Wise, S., Silva, L., Webster, E. and Sanson, A. 2005, The efficacy of early childhood interventions,
Research Report No. 14, Australian Institute of Family Studies, Canberra, July.
27  Heckman, J and Masterov, D. 2007, The productivity argument for investing in young children,
Paper presented at Allied Social Sciences Association annual meeting, Chicago, 5–7 January; Donohue,
J. 2001, The search for truth: in appreciation of James J. Heckman, Working Paper No. 220, Stanford
Law School, July.
28  Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 2009, Report on Government
Services 2009, Productivity Commission, Canberra.
29  Leigh, A. and Thompson, H. 2008, ‘How much of the variation in literacy and numeracy can be
explained by school performance?’, Treasury Economic Roundup, Issue 3, pp. 63–78.
30  Gillard, J. 2008, Leading transformational change in schools, Address by the Deputy Prime Minister
to the Leading Transformational Change in Schools Forum, Melbourne, 24 November.
31  Regulation Taskforce 2006, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory
Burdens on Business, Report to the Prime Minister and the Treasurer, Canberra, January.
32  Head, B. W. 2008, ‘Three lenses of evidence-based policy’, The Australian Journal of Public
Administration, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 1–11.
33  CRA International 2007, Implications of a 20 Per Cent Renewable Energy Target for Electricity Generation,
Report for Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association Limited, Canberra; McLennan
Magasanik Associates 2007, Increasing Australia’s Low Emission Electricity Generation—An analysis of
emissions trading and a complementary measure, Report to Renewable Energy Generators of Australia,
Melbourne.
34  Productivity Commission 2008, What Role for Policies to Supplement an Emissions Trading Scheme?,
Productivity Commission Submission to the Garnaut Climate Change Review, May.
35  Banks, G. 2005, Regulation-making in Australia: is it broke? How do we fix it?’, Public Lecture
Series, the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics (ACORE) and the Faculty of Economics and
Commerce, The Australian National University, Canberra, 7 July; Banks, G. 2006, Tackling the underlying
causes of overregulation: an update, Presentation to the conference Australian Regulatory Reform
Evolution, Canberra, 24–25 October.
36  Moggridge, D. and Johnson, E. (eds) 1982, ‘The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume
21. Activities 1929–1939’, World Crisis and Policies in Britain and America, Macmillan, London.
37  Rudd, K. 2008, Address by the Prime Minister to Heads of Agencies and Members of Senior Executive
Service, Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra, 30 April.
38  Moran, T. 2007, Leadership lecture, Leadership Victoria, Melbourne, 7 June.
39  Office of Best Practice Regulation 2008, Best Practice Regulation Report 2007–08, Department of
Finance and Deregulation, Canberra.
128
Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy
40  Quoted in Franklin, M. 2008, ‘Out, out damned waste’, The Australian, 20 September.
41  Edwards, M. 2001, Social Policy, Public Policy: From problems to practice, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
42  Cochrane Collaboration, <http://www.cochrane.org>
129
Evidence-based policy making: what is it and how do we get it?

Part 3. Reflections on governance and
leadership

11. The two cultures re-examined: a
perspective on leadership and policy
management in business and
government1
Philip M Burgess
In this essay, I will reflect on my experience as a student of governance, working
for many years in the academy and as a practitioner or clinician of the same,
working in the United States, East Asia, Europe and, of course, Australia, in
order to make some observations about the key differences between the political
cultures of the United States and Australia as they relate to public policy making.
The two cultures of business and government
For a long time, I have been fascinated by the decision-making environments of
public administration and business administration. I believe the differences are
much more important than the similarities.
As shown in more detail in Appendix 11.A, these differences are many. For
example:
• goal setting in the enterprise sector—to delight customers and reward
shareholders—is relatively narrow compared with the comprehensive ‘public
interest’ objectives pursued by government
• enterprise sector leaders almost always enjoy the support and encouragement
of their policy board; by contrast, public sector leaders are nearly always
opposed by a vocal segment of their policy board—the legislature—which
tries to embarrass, trip up or otherwise undermine the authority and standing
of the leader
• enterprise leaders have enormous control over the decision process—the
who, what, when and how of decision making; the CEO can decide who will
participate on what issues at what time in what arena; public sector leaders
do not have this kind of control 2
• enterprise leaders have substantial control over staffing and other ‘factors
of production’; public sector leaders are much more constrained in the hiring,
sacking and assignment of people.
As a result of these differences, there is a lot of room for misunderstanding
between the wealth-creating institutions of society and the institutions of
government. It is often difficult for the CEO and his enterprise leadership to
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understand and take account of the fact that the public sector leader typically
needs:
• a public interest rationale (that is, ‘cover’ or an inspired or ‘creative’
explanation) for doing something that involves or benefits the enterprise
sector; because everything is public, the mission of the public sector is the
public interest and the public is often sceptical (not without reason) of
government–business relationships3
• time—because public leaders need to make sure key stakeholders are on
board; this is a process that takes time, especially when some have a formal
or informal ‘veto’ power
• occasions for decision (or decision situations) that bring distributed benefits
(what the game theorist calls ‘side payments’) for relevant
stakeholders—because the building and maintenance of coalitions require
benefits (what the game theorist calls ‘pay-offs’) for everyone participating
in the winning coalition.
These decision-making needs of the public manager—for a public interest
rationale, time and distributed benefits to players beyond the buyer and the
seller—are not typical considerations to the ‘let’s do it now’ orientation of most
enterprise leaders who value results and often devalue or don’t understand the
process requirements of coalition building.
Therefore, we should not be surprised that the two sectors sometimes find
themselves on a collision course—and occasionally even collide, usually with a
loud crash when it happens. And we should also not be surprised that the two
cultures often find it hard to cooperate.
The two cultures of the enterprise sector and the government will never be
totally comfortable with the other. Nor should they be. They have different
missions and a different modus operandi. Instead, they should make things work
in the context of a healthy tension.
The public order and the civic order
Let’s look more deeply at the public policymaking equation in a democracy—one
that involves a relationship between:
• the public order, which includes government and other public authorities
(legislative, executive, judicial and quasi-judicial regulatory agencies) at
every level
• the civic order, which includes the private or enterprise sector (for example,
business enterprises) as well as voluntary and non-profit organisations such
as neighbourhoods, sports clubs, peak industry associations, think tanks,
service clubs, churches, mosques, synagogues, centres for the performing
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arts, museums and other cultural resources—indeed, all the things voluntary
associations do.
A strong civic order is a key element of a healthy and resilient democracy. The
enterprise sector is a key element of the civic sector—not the least because it is
the primary wealth-producing segment of society. Hence the domination of one
over the other—in either direction—is not good for democratic governance, and
we should all work to keep the relationships in balance.
In my view, that relationship is out of balance in Australia, where the public
order dominates the civic order through agenda setting, money and expectations.
The political cultures of the United States and Australia
I arrived in Sydney on 4 July 2005 expecting to stay only a month or perhaps
two at the outside. The first question people typically ask is, ‘How do you like
it here’ or ‘What do you like most about Australia?’ That’s easy:
• the people—the upbeat, curious, welcoming and down-to-earth character
of the people
• the dominant values—such as ‘mateship’, ‘a fair go’ and a willingness to call
‘rubbish’ what it is
• the ‘no worries’ spirit that embodies a forgiving temperament and gives
people a lot of latitude
• the ‘good onya’ that encourages, heartens, gives confidence and shows
appreciation
• the whole concept of ‘stuffing it’ that shows an ability to impose standards
without disparagement
• the breathtaking natural resources—the land, the flora and fauna, the coastal
waters4  and…the mines. I love mines, especially open-pit mines. 5
Invariably, the second question people ask is, ‘What has been your biggest
surprise since arriving here?’ Then they often give me ‘hints’, such as:
• ‘You’ve taken some baths in the media, mate. Wasn’t that a surprise?’
• ‘Politics here is pretty “rough”, don’t you think? Were you prepared for
that?’
• ‘I’ll bet you’re surprised how well known your eighty-eight-year-old mum
became in such a short time?’
I have to say the media hasn’t been a surprise. I have spent most of my
professional life in public positions so playing the role of the spear carrier—with
the spears sometimes in my back—is something I’m used to.
Nor have I been surprised by the politics. For 15 years, during the academic
part of my career, I taught comparative politics. We always covered the various
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forms of parliamentary government, including the Westminster system practised
in the United Kingdom and throughout most of the Commonwealth.6
Put another way, I understand very well the differences between the presidential
system of the United States and the parliamentary system of Australia—and I
especially understand how the ‘fusion of powers’ in the parliamentary system
concentrates enormous power in the hands of a minister. That is very different
from the United States.7
In the presidential system, as most of you know, the cabinet secretary is one
voice among many. He or she has enormous influence, to be sure, but is hemmed
in on all sides by the realities of the ‘separation of powers’ invented by
Montesquieu but first put into practice in the American Constitution of 1789.8
In the US system, if you don’t like what the cabinet secretary is doing, you have
many options—the most important of which include going to the White House
or to Congress.
When you go to Congress, you have 12 choices to go after a minister’s decision.
You can go to the department’s oversight committee in the Senate, or the House
that might be chaired by the opposition, or the authorisation or appropriations
committees that provide the department’s money.9
These are each separate political systems, each with its own power structures
and own rules—each of which is a constraint around the neck of the cabinet
secretary. I must say, in passing, that my experience here has given me a new
appreciation of Montesquieu’s genius.
And, of course, in the United States, every major issue area is surrounded by a
‘permanent’ campaign that includes:
• research-based professional messaging
• tracking polls
• the segmentation and clustering of constituencies
• massive and ongoing constituency lobbying
• targeted advertising and messaging in the mass media
• wide use of new media such as the Internet (blogs, podcasting, social media
such as YouTube) and talkback radio
• direct lobbying of the principals.10
Punchline: the enormous concentration of power in the hands of the minister
limits the give and take that you normally ascribe to good policy making. When
the minister is against you, your options are limited to what I call ‘the four
strategies’: sit, fight, join or run:
• appeal to the Prime Minister (fight)
• grin and bear it (join)
• give in, retreat or go do something else (run)
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• appeal to the people because in a democratic society the people, in the final
analysis, call the shots (fight).
In the case of our National Broadband Plan proposed by Telstra in August and
September 2005, when faced with ministerial opposition to broadbanding
Australia with fibre and other fixed-line assets, we invoked three of the four
options.
Option one: we appealed to the Prime Minister (John Howard). It didn’t work.
Option three: when we hit a dead-end with appeals, we decided to move to the
largely unregulated wireless space to build a nationwide high-speed broadband
network. We call it Next G. It is now the world’s largest, fastest and
most-advanced wireless broadband network.
Option four: simultaneously, we decided to appeal to the commonsense of the
Australian people. We informed and educated people through our Broadband
Australia Campaign, called ‘BACk’. We mobilised people through Telstra Active
Supporters (TAS). We did all of this using our alternative web site
(<nowwearetalking.com>)—the nation’s first corporate alternative web site—and
other channels, including:
• direct mail to shareholders, who have a big stake in what the government
does that might devalue shareholder value
• personal visits by Telstra executives to more than 100 communities to get
our story out (I personally visited 54 communities during the nine-month
campaign)
• op-ed commentaries in mainstream national media as well as regional and
local print and electronic media.
As a result of these initiatives, we were able to increase awareness and interest
in broadband from the single digits (7 per cent in one early poll) to more than
60 per cent in about six months. Then the broadband issue was picked up as a
campaign issue and public awareness and interest soared.
Now, let me turn to the ‘roughness’ of politics in Australia. I have not been
surprised because we have a saying where I come from that ‘politics ain’t
beanbag’. I’ve learned that this is also the case here. I think politics is rough
everywhere—and, in a way, it should be. After all, a lot is at stake.11
So even though there are differences, the media and the politics have not been
a surprise. However, there have been two other surprises.
First, I have been surprised by the lack of interest in real dialogue and debate
by public authorities—regulators, elected officials and public servants—with
the industry on matters that extend beyond laws and regulations. When we
tried to have these discussions under the previous government:
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• political operatives said their hands were tied by the regulators
• regulators pointed to the ministers
• ministers pointed to the departments
• the departments either went dark or gave a routine defence of established
positions and that took us full circle to the four options, which were now
down to two: grin and bear it and/or mobilise the public.
The lack of dialogue between government and business is not ever a healthy
situation—but especially not in a sector characterised by intense global
competition12  and rapid technological change.13
My view is different: when people disagree, we should welcome argument and
seek to resolve it, relying as much as possible on facts, data and reason—pushing
emotion and prejudice as much as possible into the background. That way, more
times than not, we will reach the right decision. And if we don’t, we fix it.14
There was a second surprise. I was gobsmacked by the timidity of civic leadership
and the lack of robust civic institutions.
Put another way, I am most surprised that think tanks, peak industry groups
and other non-governmental organisations are not more assertive about the work
they do addressing many of the critical issues of the day.
Many of these issue areas, where decisions will have an impact for generations
to come, are too important to be left to governments. 15 They deserve broad
public dialogue that is civil and informed.
I believe that democratic societies are stronger when the civic order can challenge
the public order.16
The civic order must provide venues where serious people can come together
to investigate and discuss issues of national importance around the rule of reason
informed by facts and data.
In Australia, there are many, though not an abundance, of what I call ‘civic
leadership institutions’ that do very good policy research and hold forums where
serious people can come together to address issues of national importance.17
For example:
• there are international think tanks such as the Lowy Institute for International
Policy (Sydney) and the Australian Institute for International Affairs
(Canberra)
• there are domestic policy think tanks, such as the Institute for Public Affairs
(Melbourne), the Tasman Institute (Melbourne) and the Australia Institute
(Canberra), and new ones are on the drawing board18
• there are peak industry groups that do policy research and hold forums,
such as the Business Council of Australia (BCA, Melbourne) and the Committee
for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA, Melbourne and Sydney)19
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• there are consultancies such as Concept Economics (Canberra) and Tasman
Asia Pacific (Melbourne) that do outstanding analytical work and hold forums
from time to time 20
• there are independent institutions that hold forums, but don’t do research,
such as the Sydney Institute, the National Press Club in Canberra, the Foreign
Correspondents Press Club in Sydney, the Trans-Tasman Business Circle and
Davos Australia.
Why are these other venues needed, one might ask? These kinds of groups
assemble influential opinion leaders from all walks of life—the very people who
should be exposed to balanced discussions or even formal, Oxford-style debates
of the cardinal issues of our day, of which investment in telecommunications is
certainly one.
When issues are taken up in the media, they are almost always discussed either
in personal or political terms or in ‘horse-race’ who’s winning terms.
When issues are taken up in forums dominated by lawyers or regulators, they
are typically discussed in strictly legal terms that often drive out commonsense
and shrink the opportunity for the creative, no-fault or win-win solutions.
Once issues get to the courts, a whole new dynamic, including new rules of
evidence, takes over. This happens when politics fails and democratic policy
making gives way to the judicial process—though Clausewitz might say, ‘A law
suit is an extension of politics by other means’.
When the issues are taken up in forums dominated by economists, well, everyone
knows what happens then. They make a lot of money because no-one knows
what they are talking about.
So, what surprises me is this: Australia has a wide range of accessible and capable
civic leadership groups that do not seem to have as much impact as they should
in sparking public debate, shaping the public dialogue and influencing public
policy. Instead, they try to influence Canberra and leave the public to shift for
themselves.
Maybe my 34 months in Australia are a bad sample of time. That could be. But
I have also been told by elected leaders from different political persuasions and
by public servants who have been around for a long time that the influence of
civic leadership groups has waned in recent years, that they used to play a larger
role in agenda setting, the clarification of alternatives and the assessment of
results.
Speaking to the telecom issues I care most about professionally, I am surprised
by the relative lack of interest in the long-term benefits of the digital revolution
and its importance for the future of the people, enterprises and communities of
Australia. Instead, people talk about the politics of telecommunications (not its
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societal benefits), about the details of regulation (for example, the role of the
ACCC, structural separation and other diversions) and whether or not Telstra is
a monopoly or a community property, when it is neither. But, they seldom talk
about what the digital revolution means for jobs, growth, productivity and the
economic development of Australia.
That, I think, is unfortunate, because, once again, these issues are too important
to be left to government or the ‘experts’. Indeed, the business and public service
professionals along with the economists and the regulators have carved out a
special language—such as ‘unbundled local loop’ and ‘operational separation’
and on and on with impenetrable jargon—that makes it impossible for the
ordinary citizen to participate in the debate even if he or she wants to.
I will leave it to people such as Hugh Mackay, Bernard Salt and others much
smarter than I to lay bare the reasons for an anaemic civic sector and timid civic
leadership, but I think it is an issue that we need to address because a strong
civic order goes to the heart of building a strong and resilient society that can
withstand social, political, economic, demographic or natural resource tremors
now unforeseen.
Some might suggest that the 2020 Summit was a breakthrough for civic leadership
in Australia. I would argue it was almost the exact opposite: a gathering of
delegates selected by government, elevated by government and media managed
(brilliantly) by government. That is not an example of a robust civic society in
action.
Leadership profiles in the United States and Australia
The other side of the coin of Australia’s tepid civic leadership in public policy
is a highly state-centric approach. It is the job of elected leaders to address any
and all issues of concern to the public, but in Australia that also means senior
members of the Public Service—bureaucrats, administrators and
regulators—speak out regularly on matters of public concern. The views of
public servants convey high legitimacy and authority in the political culture—not
just in a formal legal and political sense but in a wider civic sense.
Hand in hand with this, there is great interest (especially in the elite media) in
the lives and leadership perspectives of leading public service figures. Again,
I’m not talking about elected leaders. One thinks, for example, of the high profiles
of individuals such as:
• Treasury Secretary, Ken Henry
• ACCC Chairman, Graeme Samuel
• Productivity Commission Chairman, Gary Banks
• former head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold
• Reserve Bank Governor, Glenn Stevens, and his predecessor, Ian Macfarlane.
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The same could be said of Professor Allan Fels during his distinguished tenure
as the Chairman of the ACCC.21
Punchline: the visibility, salience, ‘presence’ and authority of public service
leaders are very high when compared with the voices of civil society in Australia.
That includes the voice of business. The difference, I would argue, is not just
one of degree, but of kind. Like most social observers, I think of business as a
key element of the civic order. But it’s my experience that business leadership
in Australia tends to be viewed more in a private domain—not unlike one’s
family or personal life.
As a result, business leadership is a fairly low-profile calling, at least compared
with countries such as the United States, Germany, Sweden or Japan. When you
think of a great Australian business leader such as Frank Lowy, for example,
his civic role is viewed almost exclusively through the prism of his chairmanship
of Football Federation Australia or as the founder and chief benefactor of the
Lowy Institute for International Policy, rather than, principally, as a business
leader. 22
I have found that Australians are encouraged by the media to feel angry, or at
least slightly embarrassed, about business leaders who are financially rewarded
for their success. When an Australian actor or sportsperson commands millions
to make a movie or play a match, they are treated as national heroes. Nicole
Kidman demands $10 million per movie, the Wiggles earn $45 million annually
and Hi-5 receives around $15 million a year. Yet, when a leader of business earns
in the neighbourhood of six to eight figures, they are most often condemned as
greedy and undeserving.
In the United States, by contrast, the views of leading business figures (and not
just the salaries they earn) are the subject of intense interest—not just in the
media, but in the wider public. Stroll around any book store in the United States
and you find books by business giants such as:
• GE’s Jack Welch
• Microsoft founder, Bill Gates
• Chrysler CEO, Lee Iacocca
• IBM CEO, Lou Gerstner
• Berkshire Hathaway CEO, Warren Buffett. 23
They write on a variety of issues, including:
• leadership
• lessons learned in life and business
• the changing workplace
• the emerging global marketplace
• the future of technology
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• challenges facing society.
Moreover, these books regularly find their way onto non-fiction bestseller lists.24
In fact, there is pretty good evidence that a well-known and respected CEO can
give a couple of points of lift to share values. 25
In Australia, by contrast, the business book genre invariably is of the ‘rise and
fall’, ‘ups and downs’ and ‘trials and tribulations’ variety. The market is defined
much more by the shortcomings of business leaders than by the inspiration and
insight their experience can offer to making organisations work or to making
the world a better place. One thinks, for example, of works by Trevor Sykes,
Paul Barry and Mark Westfield, shining a torch on the hubris and folly of the
commercial world.26
Result: the civic authority and legitimacy of business leaders are diminished
when they speak about the public interest in the public square.
If I’m right, what explains this contrast? To my way of thinking, there are two
sources.
First, the diminished role of civil society means a diminished role for civic
institutions and the men and women who lead them. This includes foundation
executives, universities and think tanks as much as the big end of town. In fact,
to the extent these civic leaders are ‘players’ they play in arenas organised by
the public order—as evidenced by the 2020 Summit.
Second, there might be historical reasons for the diminished role of civic
leaders—and of business leaders especially. I am new to Australia’s history, but
my reading over the past 34 months tells me that Australia did not experience
the giant accumulations of private wealth associated with the heroic era of
industrial growth in the United States in the nineteenth century. In the United
States, heroic individual capitalist titans built:
• railroad, telephone and electricity networks
• oil and gas pipelines
• massive irrigation systems
• great financial, mining and manufacturing conglomerates.
This first wave of industrialisation was a time of rapid growth—and change—and
was shaped by business leaders such as Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, John
D. Rockefeller, Thomas Edison, Harvey Firestone and Henry Ford—household
names to every American today.
Those capitalists and entrepreneurs acquired a profile, together with public and
private power, that was a striking feature of America’s political and social
landscape. These men—and they were all men during this era—also articulated
a public ideology of stewardship that expressed itself in philanthropy, reflecting
a wide range of beliefs from the ‘social gospel’ to ‘social Darwinism’.27
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After the turn of the century, when the capitalist titans were replaced by business
administrators, the new, bureaucratised ‘managerial elite’ were well-known,
admired and influential individuals—the likes of Theodore Vail at AT&T, Gerald
Swope at GE or Alfred Sloan at General Motors. In fact, AT&T executive Chester
Barnard wrote The Functions of the Executive, which is a classic on executive
leadership in business administration as well as public administration. 28
In Australia, by contrast, the State took the lead in the building of national
infrastructure, drawing mainly on capital borrowed from Britain. As a result,
the leaders who helped forge that infrastructure—men such as Sir John
Monash—were largely administrators of the business of the State, rather than
forces separate from and external to it. As for manufacturing and mining, with
a few exceptions, major Australian operations were foreign owned and those
who ran them were subordinate to a head office located in London or elsewhere
overseas.
Public policy also played a role, especially in the embrace of
protectionism—‘protection all round’—and centralised industrial relations in
the early twentieth century.
Protectionism and industrial relations enmeshed business in the political system
in a way that weakened its capacity to act as a counterbalance to the State in
terms of civic legitimacy and authority.
These pillars of what Paul Kelly has called the ‘Australian settlement’ not only
deadened the entrepreneurial impulse of Australian business; I would argue
they weakened the civic culture of a new nation. 29 The result was a sort of
corporatist, state-centred, ‘mother-may-I’ mentality that W. K. Hancock described
so brilliantly in his classic study of Australia in 1930.30
Even when Australian business found a more outward-looking, reformist and
competitive voice in the 1980s, there was a powerful view that it should try to
come together around a national ‘consensus’, rather than simply accept that a
degree of civic head-butting was a healthy, normal part of a mature democracy.31
Business leaders did engage in great policy debates at times; I think of episodes
such as the bank nationalisation battle of the late 1940s, which appears to have
played an important role in the defeat of Ben Chifley and the election of Robert
Menzies. Yet, the individual presence of business leaders was less marked, their
role was more in the backroom of politics and their civic standing was more
contested.
There were, to be sure, business voices advocating the floating of the dollar, the
liberalisation of tariffs and the deregulation of the labour market—but it also
has to be said they were few and most often muted.
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It reminds me of my own experience working at Telstra. When we were faced
with difficult issues with the government and the regulator, we were advised
that ‘a public stoush with the government won’t work’, that ‘it will offend the
minister’ and ‘that is not the way we do it in Australia’. That might be true, but
I think the record will show that what some people call a ‘stoush’ others call
‘public education’—and when the public is educated, they can move issues a
lot more effectively than all the lobbyists and backroom politics put together.
Conversely, biting your tongue and playing the backroom game serves only to
reduce the voice and authority of civil society—including business.
I’m reminded in this context of a wonderful essay by the late Donald Horne,
entitled simply ‘Businessmen’, which captures the diminished place of business
in Australian civic life by the second half of the twentieth century.32  Horne
writes:
Business and businessmen are almost completely unwritten about in
Australia…Many intellectuals—especially those who are in the
universities or the cultural world or the professions, or the more remote
kinds of government departments—confidently express as fact about
the nature of Australian businessmen what is really the repetition of
fashionable myth. These people never meet businessmen; they never
read about them (except to read a repetition of fashionable myth); they
are not really interested in them and would not bother to cross the street
to find out a fact about them; but they have them neatly taped and
ticketed for all that—in the most unscientifically generalised terms that
seem to include everybody who does business, from the local estate agent
to the chairman of directors of BHP.
Horne goes on to list what he calls the ‘hive-full of preconceptions’ that swarm
around the idea that Australian businessmen are ‘uneducated, provincially
ignorant, suburban-minded, vulgar, anti-intellectual, reactionary, materialistic
bores, more Babbitt than Babbitt’.
This piece of socio-cultural commentary is grating to the ear of this American.
It’s like fingernails on the chalk board. I grew up on a diet of Horatio Alger
stories that celebrate hard work, entrepreneurial drive and the American dream.33
When I was in the seventh grade, we began each day with the pledge of
allegiance to the flag and a 10-minute Horatio Alger story played over the school
intercom.34
Let me pose as an open question to you: except for the need to replace
‘businessmen’ with a more gender-neutral term, how much has changed in the
four and a half decades since Donald Horne penned that essay?
I’m not suggesting there is anything sinister here or that business perspectives
on public policy deserve legitimacy independent of their merits. Nor is this a
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prelude to some latter-day version of ‘what’s good for Telstra (or Holden or BHP)
is good for the country’.
Like many of you, I’ve read my Adam Smith. Good public policy assuredly
demands alertness to rent seeking, brazenly self-interested behaviour and
‘conspiracies against the public’ on the part of business.
My real point concerns the degree to which good policy and a healthy democracy
require multiple and, in some sense, counterbalancing voices of legitimacy and
authority in public policy debates. Without this, we tend to be left with the
comfortable status quo, and that can impose very large costs and extract very
severe penalties.
Put another way, I believe that:
• the public interest is too important to be left to the public sector, however
wise our public officials might be
• politics is too important to be left to the politicians.
Ordinary people and civic institutions have much to contribute in a literate and
developed society. The late William Buckley, a giant among public intellectuals
in the United States, once said, ‘If I had a choice between being governed by
the Harvard faculty or the first 100 names in the Boston phone book, I would
take the phone book.’ There is a lot to ponder in those words, especially in view
of the mess that technocrats made of the twentieth century.
Telecommunications regulation in the political culture of
Australia
Let me conclude with a few words about the business I’m
in—telecommunications—and my job, to make the case for reform of
telecommunications regulation in this country. The telecommunications debate
in Australia highlights in stark relief the issues I have been discussing—in
particular, a presumption that public policy debate should be a matter for
government and its intimates, and not an open debate in which civic leaders,
including business leaders, and civic institutions play a vigorous, transparent
role.
Closely associated with that is a persistent confidence in the public sector in
what regulation can achieve—despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
Indeed, the call for proposals to build high-speed broadband fibre out into the
neighbourhoods of the nation—called FTTN or fibre-to-the-node—contains a
‘gag order’ that asks those making proposals not to speak publicly on the
substance or the process of their proposals at the risk of being eliminated from
the bidding process.35
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The reality I deal with every day is that Australia’s telecommunications regime
is failing under a burden of regulatory overreach. I am not talking here about
mere faults of implementation, but rather deep-seated, underlying problems
with the design of the regime—its systems, style, structures and processes—and
the reality that technology has changed, consumer preferences have changed
and the competitive environment has changed, but regulations have not. That’s
why there is an urgent need to:
• reduce the scope of regulation
• place stronger limits on regulatory discretion
• separate the functions of cop, judge, jury and hangman
• increase overall accountability in the regulatory regime.
Good regulation serves three primary functions:
• it protects the consumer, including health and safety as well as providing
more choices for consumers
• it encourages investment, in part to spark innovation to give consumers
more choices and cheaper prices
• it fosters a healthy and competitive industry.
Using these established standards for assessment, the ACCC’s performance in
the telecommunications space is not just a failure, it is a dismal failure:
• consumers have been denied choices in the marketplace
• investment growth in telecommunications is negative over the past three
years if you take Telstra out of the mix
• Australia’s telecommunications industry is anything but healthy.
The ACCC has fumbled, badly, in the case of telecommunications and things
need to be fixed.
More specifically, we need a regulatory regime that:
• affords regulated parties due process and procedural fairness
• makes decisions on the basis of facts and data—not conjecture
• applies consistent and predictable standards in both the application of the
law and in the decisions made
• uses special powers judiciously and sparingly—particularly powers that
impinge on fundamental rights
• builds and maintains trust.
Unfortunately, my experience suggests that these principles are honoured more
in their breach by the ACCC in decision making about the telecommunications
industry.
Effecting change involves a larger issue that goes to leadership and culture. It
concerns Australia’s willingness to embrace a dynamic, future-oriented approach
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to the regulation of telecommunications technology and to leave behind a static
and defensive one.
Telecommunications seems to be one of those policy areas where this wonderfully
successful New World country seems strangely ambivalent—and anxious—about
the future. The ambivalence is found in the public sector and the civic sector.
That’s why it is time to engage. That’s why the future requires a different
approach. And that’s why business leaders and others who speak for civil society
and our civic institutions must stand up and be counted. Public policy is not
just about government.
Appendix 11.A: Decision making in the public and private
sector is different
Public SectorEnterprise SectorDecision-making Function
Broad: to maintain a
minimum winning
Relatively narrow: to turn
consumers into
Goal setting of the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO)
coalition amongcustomers, delightand the Elected Executive
Officer (EEO) competing interests andcustomers, increase
competing stakeholders inshareholder value —
pursuit of multiplethough the corporate




















have a large minority that
Boards of directors
generally give high
Support of the policy
making board
continuously squabblessupport to the CEO — or
they get rid of him/her. with the majority,
consistently opposes the
initiatives of leadership,
and regularly tries to
embarrass or otherwise
trip up the EEO.
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Low control over the
decision process and the
High control over
decision process and the
Control over the decision
process
who, what, when, how ofwho, what, when, and
decision -making. Thehow of decision -making.
legislature, public interestCEO can decide who will
groups and otherparticipate on what issues
stakeholders, media,at what time in what
arena. awareness of FOI
vulnerabilities — all
constrain the ability of the
EEO to more than shape
the process.
Low control because the
EEO is formally
High control — though
the CEO can and does set
Decision rules
constrained bystandard operating
procedures establishedprocedures (SOPs) for the
externally by law (therest of the enterprise, s/he
‘bureaucratic process’ ‘)can easily and quickly
and informallymake exceptions or






Somewhat less freedom to
set rules in a regulated
industry.
Low, because in the
process of forging a
High, though for public
companies the
Flexibility
winning coalition entailsimperatives of disclosure
commitments — promisesand, for all enterprises,
and rewards;, threats andcapital planning impose
significant constraints. punishments — thant
cannot be easily revisited.
Low in the hiring and
sacking of people and
High in the hiring and
assignment of people;
Control over staffing
very limited in the
assignment of people.
some constraints on
sacking imposed by laws
and regulations.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 30 April 2008. These remarks
are my personal views and are not necessarily the views of Telstra Corporation Ltd or of the Public
Policy and Communications group that I lead.
2 The legislature, public interest groups and other stakeholders, media, awareness of freedom of
information vulnerabilities—all constrain the ability of the public sector executive to do more than
shape the process.
3 That means the value of initiatives must satisfy national needs and multiple stakeholders, and that
expanded or ‘spill-over’ value is not always self-evident to stakeholders, opinion leaders or the public.
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4  I am a sailor. I love to ‘mess about in boats’, as Kenneth Grahame, the venerable English writer, put
it in The Wind in the Willows, his 1908 classic that reflected a new way to look at the world. So, living
on a large island between the Pacific and Indian Oceans suits me fine.
5  I used to teach at the Colorado School of Mines and worked a lot on coal exports. I have to say, I love
to visit large mines, as I have done in Australia—from the coalmines in Queensland and New South
Wales to the awesome gold mine in Kalgoorlie. See Burgess, Phil (ed.) 1981, Western Coal Exports and
Pacific Rim Markets, (Six volumes), McGraw Hill, New York, December 1981.
6 The Westminster system, a series of procedures for operating a legislature, is used in most
Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth nations, originating in England and then transported first to
the Canadian provinces and other colonies in the mid nineteenth century. It is also used in Australia,
India, the Republic of Ireland, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malta. The Parliaments
of Italy, Germany and Japan take a different approach to parliamentary rule.
7  In fact, I was amused to read a commentary this past weekend (April 2008) in The Australian where
the writer talked about the ‘strong’ executive in the United States versus the strong Parliament in
Australia. In fact, it is just the opposite. The United States has a relatively weak executive compared
with almost any parliamentary system, where the Executive controls the Parliament through the party
system, as it does in Australia. Senator Barnaby Joyce gave an insightful talk on this issue a couple of
years ago, lamenting how the role of the Senate in Australian policy making had been fundamentally
altered and weakened by Australia’s strong party system—a diagnosis that seemed spot on to me. Joyce,
Barnaby 2006, Crossing the floor: political hero or renegade?, Address to the Law Institute of Victoria,
26 July 2006, <http://www.barnabyjoyce.com.au/news/default.asp?action=article&ID=170>
8 That America’s founding fathers were deeply fearful of lodging too much unchecked power in the
hands of one person or one institution was expressed most forcefully and persuasively in The Federalist
Papers by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay—and especially in Federalist no. 51.
9 You can also go to an oversight, authorisation and appropriations committee on both the Senate and
House sides and then choose between the Republican side or the Democrat side. So, in Congress alone,
you have 12 options if you are having a problem with a minister or his or her department. Plus you can
always go to the White House staff and to the party apparatus. So, there are at least 14 appeals to a
minister’s decisions.
10 The opportunity provided by the issues campaign for broad public education and broad public
participation in the resolution of political issues seems to be missing here, though I understand it has
surfaced in the past around important issues—one of which I will discuss later.
11  Let’s not forget that governments are the only institution in society that can legally take away our
freedom and our wealth and, in countries with the death penalty, our life. That’s what sovereignty
means. So politics should be rough.
12 Though it doesn’t get much traction with ministers, public servants or the media, the major threats
to Telstra’s future are not Optus and AAPT. The major threats are Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and other
offshore enterprises. Achieving a common understanding about what the future holds is one of many
important reasons why there should be a steady and continuing dialogue between industry and
government.
13  Just think of what you can do in the digital space today compared with five years ago. Yet, in 2005,
we were told there would be no changes to regulations for five years. Five years is a lifetime in a sector
driven by changing technology, changing consumer preferences and a changing competitive structure.
For example, who would have thought five years ago that by 2009, 99 per cent of consumers and
businesses in Australia would have access to 21 Mbps over the mobile Internet called Next G?
14  In short, we find truth in a free society by mixing it up in the marketplace of ideas—and if we don’t
find the truth, then we can at least find an approach or a policy that will provide the greatest good for
the greatest number. As Winston Churchill famously said, ‘Democracy is the worst form of government
except for all those others that have been tried.’ Actually Churchill was sometimes ambivalent about
democracy. He also said, ‘The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the
average voter.’
15  For the role of think tanks in Australia, see Marsh, I. 1994, ‘The development and impact of Australia’s
think tanks’, Australian Journal of Management, December; Murray, Georgina and Pacheco, Douglas
2000, ‘Think tanks in the 1990s’ and ‘The economic liberal ideas industry: Australasian pro-market
think tanks in the 1990s’, Journal of Social Issues, May; and Beder, Sharon 1999, ‘The intellectual sorcery
of think tanks’, Arena Magazine, June–July. For an outstanding study of the role of think tanks in the
United States, see Smith, James A. 1993, The Idea Brokers: Think tanks and the rise of the new policy elite,
The Free Press, New York.
149
The two cultures re-examined: a perspective on leadership and policy management in business and government
16  On the distinction between the civic order and the public order, see the writings of Harold D.
Lasswell—for example, Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham 1950, Power and Society: A framework
for political inquiry, Yale University Press, New Haven; Lerner, Daniel and Lasswell, Harold D. 1951,
The Policy Sciences: Recent developments in scope and method, Stanford University Press, Stanford;
McDougal, Myres, Lasswell, Harold D. and Vlasic, Ivan A. 1963, Law and Public Order in Space, Yale
University Press, New Haven; Lasswell, Harold D. 1971, A Preview of Policy Sciences, Elsevier, New
York; Rubinstein, Robert and Lasswell, Harold D. 1966, The Sharing of Power in a Psychiatric Hospital,
Yale University Press, New Haven.
17  Georgina Murray and Douglas Pacheco, cited earlier, cite research by B. Herd estimating a total of
80–90 think tanks in Australia (and six in New Zealand). They employ 1600 people, publish 900 reports
and discussion papers and hold almost 600 conferences and symposia a year—but with a collective
budget of around $130 million, they are not well funded.
18  I’ve noticed that the media and other opinion leaders sometimes tend to dismiss their findings and
conclusions as ‘predictable’. That is unfair and unfortunate, based on what I have seen of their work.
These critical issues of government regulation and the impact of advanced communications technologies
need to be addressed from every vantage point—and not just from the point of view of the regulator
or the government administrator or the competitors. At the end of the day, there is the national interest.
19 These groups are membership organisations and their members include perspectives, skills and
information from all points on the compass. They are already playing an important role on issues such
as taxes, regulation, workplace relations, infrastructure development and economic and regional
development—and they should, because they are uniquely positioned to inform and educate the public
about the consequences of policy decisions and regulatory practices and how they affect the ability of
the nation’s wealth and job-creating institutions to survive, compete and prosper.
20  Even though the work they do is properly guided by an agenda that grows out of their business
and not out of the public policy agenda, groups such as this have a rich base of talent that needs to be
enlisted to help educate the public as well as the policy makers and elevate the public dialogue about
these critical issues.
21  See Brenchley, Fred 2003, Allan Fels: A portrait in power, John Wiley, Sydney.
22  For background on Frank Lowy’s business career, see Margo, Jill 2001, Frank Lowy: Pushing the
limits, Harper Collins, Sydney.
23  See Welch, Jack with Byrne, John A. 2001, Jack: Straight from the gut, Business Plus; Welch, Jack
with Welch, Suzy 2005, Winning, Collins; Gates, Bill 1995, The Road Ahead; Gates, Bill 1999, Business
@ the Speed of Thought; Iacocca, Lee and Novak, William 1984, Iacocca: An autobiography; Iacocca, Lee
with Kleinfeld, Sonny 1988, Talking Straight, Bantam Books; Iacocca, Lee 2007, Where Have All the
Leaders Gone?, Scribner; Gerstner, Louis V. jr 2002, Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?, Harper Collins;
Buffet, Warren, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for corporate America.
24  In fact, in the United States we have ‘business bestseller’ lists and many listings are books not by
academics or journalists but by business leaders.
25 See Watson Wyatt Worldwide’s Effective Communication: A leading indicator of financial performance.
26  Examples include: Two Centuries of Panic (1988) and The Bold Riders (1994) by Trevor Sykes; The
Rise & Fall of Alan Bond (1991) and Rich Kids (2003) by Paul Barry; and HIH: The inside story of
Australia’s biggest corporate collapse (2003) by Mark Westfield.
27  See the essays collected by Kennedy, Gail (ed.) 1949, Democracy and the Gospel of Wealth, D. C. Heath,
New York.
28  Barnard was president of Pennsylvania Bell and then New Jersey Bell in the Bell system operated
by AT&T. Barnard wrote The Functions of the Executive (1938, Harvard University Press, Cambridge).
In 1948, he wrote Organization and Management, another widely reviewed and highly regarded book
that is still cited today.
29  See Kelly, Paul 1992, The End of Certainty: The story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
30  Hancock, W. K. 1930, Australia, Ernest Benn, London.
31 The use of controversy as a strategy to clarify ideas and the character of people is well established.
It’s not just the well-known idea that you have to break eggs to make an omelette. I like to think about
it this way: Thomas Aquinas wrote that ‘[c]ivilization is constituted by conversation—that is, by
argument’. However, G. K. Chesterton reminded us that arguing was not the same as quarrelling.
According to Chesterton, ‘The principal objection to a quarrel is that it interrupts an argument.’
Theologian Michael Novak says ‘civilized people…argue with one another. Barbarians club each other,
as if values are mere “preferences”—and reason is nowhere to be found. So when people disagree, we
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should welcome argument, and if the other side doesn’t want to engage, well, that tells us something
too.’
32  Horne, Donald 1962, ‘Businessmen’, in Peter Coleman (ed.), Australian Civilization, F. W. Cheshire,
Melbourne.
33  Alger was a nineteenth-century author of more than 100 ‘dime novels’ recounting rags-to-riches
stories celebrating how the down and out might be able to achieve the American dream of wealth,
success and social standing through hard work, courage, determination and concern for others.
34  I attended the first school in Lafayette, Indiana, to have an electronic intercom. It was a big deal—not
unlike today, where we have technology looking for content.
35  See the FTTN tender RFP, Sections 11.1 and 11.2.
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12. Leading the Australian Defence
Force1
Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston AO AFC
The basis of successful leadership in the Australian Defence
Force
There are five basic principles that are imperative to the successful leadership
of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The first principle is to provide clear
direction. It is necessary to provide a vision, intent and goals that are successfully
communicated to other people. If this clear direction is met effectively, people
tend to follow you. The second principle is to establish and maintain the right
culture, a value-based culture. Values should define the way the leadership in
the organisation behaves. If you can establish the right culture in your
organisation, goals are much easier to achieve.
The third principle is effective leadership. People demand and require leadership
that is focused on people. Therefore, effective leadership is essential when dealing
with people. Leadership is also about empowering your people and avoiding
micro-management. The fourth principle is communication. Face-to-face
communication is the most effective form of leadership and I find that if you
engage in this type of communication you get much better results than if you
try to lead via the written word.
Finally, the fifth principle is to develop cooperative and harmonious relationships.
Having relationships with people in the leadership frame promotes good results
and thus relationships are vitally important. Without being able to develop
relationships, I would have got absolutely nowhere and, of course, the most
important relationship of all for me, in the present context, is the relationship I
have with the Secretary of Defence, Nick Warner. This relationship is known
as a diarchy and forms a partnership and a very effective form of leadership.
Strategic direction
The Australian Defence Force needs to be a balanced, networked and deployable
force staffed by dedicated and professional people who operate within a culture
of adaptability and who excel at joint interagency and coalition operations. At
present, every operation the Australian Defence Force conducts is a joint
operation and it is imperative that these operations are run in this fashion.
Single-service operations are no longer a viable option. The Australian Defence
Force needs to be a balanced force with high-end capabilities as this is the
ultimate insurance policy in terms of defending the integrity and sovereignty
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of the nation. There are no measured threats to the integrity of Australia as a
nation at present, yet maintaining these capabilities is vital to this integrity and
sovereignty.
Australia’s defence force needs to be able to respond to all challenges in the
strategic environment and this requires the ADF to have the ability to perform
across the spectrum of operations, across the operational continuum and thus
necessitates the need for a balanced force. Australia’s experience in recent times
demonstrates the need for high-end capabilities, as an ultimate insurance policy,
to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. In terms of a deployable
force, most of Australia’s combat power lives in the south. The north of Australia
highlights a substantial deployment challenge. Indeed, operations in Australia’s
neighbourhood require a substantial deployment and in geographical terms
Australia is a long way from the rest of the world. Thus, Australia needs to have
a defence force that is able to deploy effectively.
An emphasis on joint interagency and coalition operations needs to be considered.
Indeed, Australia has now moved into an era of a focus on interagency
collaboration. We need to see all agencies within government working together.
If we have a look at some of the stabilisation operations Australia is involved in
at the moment, we need to work very closely with our colleagues in the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with AusAID, the Australian Federal
Police and, of course, with all the services within the defence force.
And, of course, there are other agencies as well who we have to work with,
particularly when we go overseas. Inevitably, we are in some form of coalition
and, in my view, this coalition requires a whole-of-agency approach or a
whole-of-government approach. I think one of the deficiencies in Afghanistan
at the moment is that we do not have a comprehensive whole-of-country approach
to the resolution of the problems there. And we need to have the entirety of
agencies—military, civilian, government, non-government—all working together
cohesively to one common strategy with common goals and objectives.
Let me now move on to our strategic environment because I think it is important
to focus on that for the moment. As you would all be aware, we have recently
had a change of government, but one thing that is enduring is our strategic
environment. It is important to highlight in the first instance that the most
fundamental factors that shape our strategic environment concern the
relationships between the big powers in our wider region. It is very important
for us that the United States, China, Japan and India are able to coexist together
in our wider region. I think we can manage the rise of China. Indeed, we are a
very lucky nation to be leveraging off the rise of China at the moment. Australia
has had 16 years of straight growth and very high levels of growth in our
economy and that is due to our relationship with China.
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So China is an important partner to us at the moment. Whilst it grows, it
obviously becomes a much bigger and more substantial strategic entity. And as
it does that, we do not necessarily have to have strategic competition in the old
mould. What we need to do, and what other nations need to do, is manage our
relationship with the Chinese so that we can avoid miscalculation and move into
the future in a way that is a win-win for all those concerned. If we continue to
effectively manage our relationship with China, it will have a positive impact
on our prosperity as a nation. Thus, big-power relationships across our region
are vitally important.
I might contrast that with some of the issues out there in the Pacific at the
moment. If we have a look at what has been happening in the past 12 to 18
months, our region has been challenged by fragility in the smaller nations of
the Pacific. Indeed, the crisis in May 2007 in Timor-Leste was testament to this.
This fragility is something that we need to respond to and I think the challenges
there are substantial. We do not have an easy way of dealing with the challenge
of fragile nations out in the Pacific.
One of the challenges is to find a more effective way of dealing with the fragility
in the region. Again, I would say, straight away, whilst a military response is
quite handy in the first instance, at the end of the day, we need all agencies of
the government working together to meet that challenge. The other really big
challenge that we face in our neighbourhood and across the world at the moment
is the threat of terrorism. We see a very lethal terrorist threat, not only in the
Middle East and beyond, but in our own region. Interestingly, we have been
very successful against the terrorist threat in our immediate region—particularly
the threat that was resident in Indonesia. But it is almost impossible to
exterminate it completely. Terrorism will be something we have to deal with
into the future. Therefore, we have to find good strategies to deal with what
will be an enduring threat in the years ahead. The problem between Israel and
her neighbours is something that has to be resolved. Furthermore, we are in
Afghanistan at the moment because the country was a haven for terrorists before
the coalition became involved.
I might now move on to the operational tempo in the Australian Defence Force.
Right now, we have the highest level of operational tempo we have had, certainly,
for a generation. And it is probably the most challenging form of operational
tempo, in that it extends not just in one area, but in a number of different areas.
If you have a look at what we have done in the past two and a half years, we
have had about 20 000 individual deployments since July 2004. Compare that
with the 20 years from 1980 to 1999. During that time, we were involved in the
Gulf War, in the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia as well as in Somalia.
Furthermore, at the end of the 1990s, we were involved in the intervention
operation in East Timor. In all of those years, with all of those operations, we
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deployed only 17 000 individuals. So you can see already in the past two and a
half years that we have exceeded the tempo that typified the environment in
the 1980s and 1990s. This is highly significant, as the media tends to focus on
those people deployed to areas such as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands
and Iraq. Yet the level of deployment also puts a very heavy load on the defence
organisation here in Australia. It does not matter where you go in the defence
organisation at the moment, what you will find are very busy people, who are
working incredibly hard, in a very dedicated way, so as to ensure that all the
enabling support that is required is completed to ensure the success of those
operations overseas.
Let me just give you a couple of examples. Our intelligence agencies are probably
more stretched than they have ever been. Not only are they providing operational
support to areas in which troops have been deployed, they still carry out the
workload they would be undertaking in a more normal peacetime environment.
Furthermore, if you go to the three services, although the service chiefs are not
involved in operations, they and their people provide a vital ‘raise, train and
sustain’ function. Furthermore, the Chief of Army prepares a force to go off to
any of the operational deployments and spends six months preparing that force,
and that preparation culminates in a full-blown mission rehearsal exercise, which
involves not only all the traditional ways of doing business, it includes
exploitation of modern technology, mainly simulation, where you are able to
actually rehearse and practice everything that you are likely to face when you
go on operations.
One of the big threats we face at the moment is improvised explosive devices.
We can actually replicate all of that using simulation, so that our troops are very
well prepared for the challenge they will face when they go onto operations. I
think one of the reasons that we have been very successful on operations is
because of that incredible investment that we make in the preparation and
training of our people. One of the great things about our troops is their ability
to work very closely with whoever we ask them to work with. They get on as
well with the Afghans as they do with the Timorese. You can rely on them in
very demanding circumstances wherever we deploy them.
Leading the Australian Defence Force
Seven broad themes define the way I lead the Australian Defence Force. First, I
lead with a heavy emphasis on people. People are my highest priority. We have
wonderful equipment in the Australian Defence Force, but it’s the people who
deliver the results. I’ve just spoken extensively about our people in operations,
and if you invest in the right way in training your people, maintaining very
high military standards, they deliver incredibly good results. So people are my
highest priority, and I will work tirelessly for the welfare of the people of the
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Australian Defence Force, and I expect all of my subordinate commanders to do
likewise.
The second broad theme is leadership and values. I will not tolerate any form
of poor leadership. This includes any form of bullying, intimidation or coercion.
Leadership is about leading by example and treating people in the right way.
In terms of the way that we treat people, we should empower people to the
maximum extent possible. If you empower people, as I said earlier, you get very
good results. Moving on to values, we have a set of values that we emphasise.
We expect people to adhere to those values and, of course, the values also define
the way we do business in the defence organisation.
The biggest strategic challenge we face in the Australian Defence Force at the
moment is recruiting and retaining sufficient people to maintain our capability
now and into the future. Our third theme, then, is operations and operational
preparedness. If you talk to any chief executive officer around Australia at the
moment you will find that this is not a problem that is unique to the Australian
Defence Force. Our big problem is in the skilled areas. We are having absolutely
no difficulty at the moment recruiting infantry men, but when we come to trying
to recruit avionics technicians, electronics technicians, information systems
specialists and health specialists, we have a huge problem. And the problem is
probably greatest in the navy at the moment. We have 24 critical categories in
the navy, three of which are perilous. The problem is a little bit better in the
army, with 12 critical categories. The air force at present has no critical categories,
although in the past three months, with the shortage of pilots worldwide, we
have been starting to see very high separation rates with our pilots. And, indeed,
right now, we have a separation rate of just fewer than 40 per cent for pilots
who are not held by a return of service obligation. And, of course, they are our
most experienced pilots—the people who instruct and lead in the flying game.
Thus, we are taking steps to address that particular problem, which has come
almost out of nowhere. We knew it was going to come at some stage. It is amazing
what traction we have seen in recent times. And this reflects a shortage of pilots
right across Australia at the moment and, indeed, right across the world.
Fortunately, we have a 10-year return of service obligation on pilot courses, so
we are not in a critical state, but we certainly have to address the problem and
we are addressing that problem right now.
In the long term, I think we are going to be and will continue to be challenged
by getting sufficient people into the defence force in all three services. If you
have a look at the demographics, they are against us. And with a booming
economy, with unemployment running at or about 4 per cent, it is a huge
challenge to recruit sufficient people for the defence force. I am pleased to say
that our performance in 2006 improved quite dramatically. We obtained just
over 90 per cent enlistment, which was a marked improvement on the year
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before and the best result we have had for quite a few years. But we had to work
incredibly hard to achieve that result. An area that I think we have to improve
is in the retention area. In order to improve in this area we need to get our
separation rates down to where the air force is at the moment, which is down
below 10 per cent. Both navy and army have separation rates that are a little
higher than I’m comfortable with.
A couple of areas I would just like to highlight on the way through are the
military justice reforms. We are well advanced in the implementation of those
reforms and indeed we would almost have the program finished now but for
the fact that the election was called and some of the final pieces of the legislation
were caught up due to the fact that the Parliament ceased and we did not get
the final bit of legislation through. This will be readdressed with the new
government.
In terms of operations, just to give you some facts about what is happening right
now with our relief operation in Papua New Guinea, we have just fewer than
200 people in Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, at the moment, we have 4500
people deployed on operations. I think this reflects just what a high level of
operational tempo we have. Of course, that also includes the 450–500 or so people
who are involved in boarder security operations in northern Australia and of
course the people who are involved in the Northern Territory emergency task
force.
In terms of the fourth theme, strategic direction, I know many of you would be
interested in that. We look forward to being involved in the writing of a new
white paper. The last white paper process was conducted in 1999–2000 with
the white paper published in 2000. The new government has made it very clear
that in 2008 we will be embarking on another white paper process and it is very
important that we seize the opportunity to review all parts of our organisation
and of course conduct a thorough review of our strategic environment. That is
probably the most important part of the work—to review our strategic
environment and then, after we have reviewed this, look at the capabilities that
are required within the full structure of the defence force. We need to have a
look at all parts of the defence organisation, including the infrastructure, the
information systems—indeed, everything that gives us the capability to do what
government requires of us. And I relish the opportunity to be involved in that
really important process.
One of the things that I wanted to do when I first came to the job of Chief of the
Defence Force was to establish a good strategic framework so that we had clear
direction as to where we were going. This has produced a very highly classified
and very good document called the Defence Planning Guidance. Clearly, it will
have to be updated as part of the white paper process, but it really provides the
basis for a number of other strategic documents that guide the way we do
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business in the defence force. I am very pleased with where we are at with that
documentation at the moment.
The fifth theme is capability. We have been very heavily involved in the
investment in new capability in the past few years. I anticipate that out of the
white paper process we will do another capability review and out of that will
come another Defence Capability Plan. Again, I think that is going to be very
important because it is absolutely imperative that we continue to invest in new
capability to take us into the future. Whilst we are well placed at the moment,
there is still much work to be done and, of course, the capability that we acquire
needs to be the right capability for the strategic circumstances that are defined
in the white paper. Because we are a nation of just over 21 million people, it is
very important that we make the right decisions in that particular area. Over
the years, governments of both sides have been very effective in coming up
with the right force structure to give us the balance we need to face the strategic
challenges that Australia has seen.
The sixth theme is based on collaborative relationships. Relationships across
government are vitally important. I remember years ago we probably used to
work in our stove pipes. I think the stove, the departmental stove pipes, are
gone for good. It is absolutely imperative that we work across government in a
very effective way and I think some of the forums that have been established,
some of the committees that have been established, have seen us do much better
work. Probably the best of those in my view is the National Security Committee
in cabinet. I think that is a very effective way of running the national security
business of government. That particular committee brings together not only the
responsible minister, but the responsible officials in a very effective way of
dealing with complex national security issues from the crisis that has just broken
to the very important capability decisions that I have mentioned above.
Finally, the seventh theme is management, governance and accountability. Right
now we are occupied with the business of implementing the Proust Report.2
This is well under way. We have hit most of the high points, we are implementing
all of the recommendations other than the one to do away with the diarchy.3
Secretary Warner and I think the organisation works fine under our partnership,
under our joint leadership and the areas that we are focused on are obviously
improving advice to government, which is a high priority, improving our
information technology systems and also rationalising some of the structures
within the defence organisation. What we are doing is separating the policy part
of human resources in the defence personnel executives from service delivery.
We are moving service delivery functions out into the defence support group
and we think that will give us a much more effective way of developing human
resource policy.
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One of the areas that I think has worked well as part of the reforms is separating
the vice chief and the chief of joint operations functions. The vice chief will
work in a number of areas that are important to improving governance and also
improving the way we look after joint capability. We will have a three-star
officer, General David Hurley, who will be initially at Fairbairn, but later out
in our new headquarters in Bungendore and he will have total responsibility to
run our operations. We have found with this very high level of operational
tempo that it is imperative to have an officer who concentrates wholly and solely
on operations. And already we are seeing the benefit of the split that was
implemented about two or three months ago.
The final part of the Proust Report is improving our accountabilities. Because
we are a very large organisation, sometimes the accountabilities have become a
bit blurred. We will be looking at accountabilities and coming up with a much
better way of doing business to ensure that everybody knows exactly what their
accountabilities are, that they are not lost in this rather large and complex
organisation that we call the defence organisation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, you can be very, very proud of your defence organisation and
you can be particularly proud of those young people that we send off into harm’s
way to do the business the government has asked them to do. They always excel
in the operational environment, they have great generosity of spirit, they are
very courageous but they are also very compassionate and they represent
Australia in a very fine way.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 28 November 2007.
2  Proust, Elizabeth (2007), Report of the Defence Management Review 2007. Australian Government,
Department of Defence, Canberra. The Defence Management Review was established by the Minister
for Defence on 18 August 2006 to review and make recommendations in relation to ‘Defence decision
making, business processes, human resources, finance and information management processes and
systems’.
3 The Proust Report observed that ‘The most unusual part of the Defence model is the diarchy, under
which the Secretary and the CDF share responsibility and accountability for most of the functions in
Defence’ (p. 8:2.3). The report states that the Diarchy ‘describes the joint leadership of Defence by the
Secretary and CDF, both under the Minister for Defence. Within the diarchy, the Secretary and CDF
are responsible for “joint administration” of the ADF. The CDF commands the ADF and is the principal
military adviser to the Minister’ (p. 30:5.6). The review ‘formed the view that the diarchy, and the
reality of a two-headed organisation, leads to a diffusion of commitment to and compliance with
leadership visions and goals throughout the organisation. Moreover, achieving consistency in articulating
a vision and strategy will always be more difficult in a diarchy than in an organisation with one leader’
(p. 19:4.16). Although the review stated that ‘we believe that the diarchy is still an appropriate way to
run what is the most complex portfolio in Government’ (p. 41:5.10) it nevertheless made two
recommendations (Recommendations 17 and 18) aimed at giving ‘greater definition to the individual
and shared roles of the CDF and Secretary in the diarchy’ (R17, p. 49). Neither recommendation was
accepted in the Department of Defence response to the recommendations arising from the Defence
Management Review ( http://www.defence.gov.au/dmr/defence_response.pdf
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http:/true/truewww.defence.gov.au/truedmr/truedefence_response.pdf ), and it is these recommendations
Angus Houston is referring to here. (Editor’s note).
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13. Essential linkages—situating
political governance, transparency and
accountability in the broader reform
agenda1
Andrew Murray
I shall take the broader reform agenda as a given. It would be a strangely
uninformed Australian who wasn’t aware of the intense focus on infrastructure,
climate change, education, the extensive COAG agenda, and so on, all set in the
current maelstrom of financial, fiscal and economic troubles.
The economic, social and environmental reforms contemplated are very large.
The reform is intended to make Australia more productive, more efficient, more
competitive and a better society, and to better safeguard the future. These are
noble plans that embrace nearly every sector in Australia, but leave the political
sector largely untouched, as if only the political class at the apex does not need
to be more able, have a higher calibre, be more productive, more competitive
and professionally more suited for the future.
In times of trouble, it is important to stay true to the integrity and principles
that will make reform lasting and sustainable. Money is scarcer than in good
times. My thesis is that better political governance, more transparency and
greater accountability will materially assist in troubled times and will add to
the effectiveness of reform. They will assist the realistic measurement of reform
achievements.
This point should not be lost in an atmosphere of crisis. A succinct, slightly
crude business saying is apt: ‘Even when you are up to your arse in crocodiles
it is important to remember that your objective is to drain the swamp.’
These are times of reform opportunity. In times of trouble, the populace gives
governments and parliaments greater latitude to act. These are good times to
bed in major long-term reforms that would otherwise attract greater resistance,
especially from vested interests.
My brief was to promote debate about how public sector performance and
efficiency improvement could help meet the higher expectations of Australians.
Debate is good, but persuasion is my aim; if you are persuaded of the merits of
my arguments, I hope you have the determination to make change happen.
Australians are demanding much more of their governments. They want peace,
prosperity and a good life. They want respect internationally and growth
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domestically. They want jobs and opportunities. They want their governments
to be proactive, responsive, professional, far-seeing, productive and performance
driven. They want their needs met. The push for higher standards and better
performance is strong. The cry for economic, social and environmental reform
is loud. Governments have said they will respond with a broad reform agenda.
Expectations have been created. Success in meeting those expectations needs
achievable plans, an accepted time line, constant credible reporting and
measurable results—through key performance indicators, targets, benchmarks,
review and analysis.
The gap between expectation and performance has to be addressed.
The major theme of this essay is the essential linkage between the need to reform
political governance, the need to improve accountability regimes—financial and
informational—and the democratic and managerial case for transparency and
accountability resulting in more efficient, effective, responsive and sustainable
business, government and not-for-profit2  organisations delivering public
services.
It is almost 20 years since the Fitzgerald Inquiry reported. The ‘moonlight’ state
took a leap into the sunlight and there have been quantum improvements in
politics and public administration in Queensland since. In terms of my broad
argument, Queensland is living proof that there is a clear link between
transparency and openness, better governance and improved outcomes in terms
of economic performance, status, competitiveness and national influence. So the
system works and major accountability reform really does help; it’s scary and
at times painful, but the long-term benefits can be quickly realised.
The problem is it took a horrible period and a remarkable judicial inquiry3  to
get such real change. We don’t want that repeated to get more change. The
benefits can be forecast and foreseen; more transparency and accountability will
materially help Queensland and other Australian governments. The Australian
people want more transparency and accountability—that is why each election
campaign sees renewed promises, too often followed by later backsliding.
Essential linkages
I was educated in the doctrine of the political economy, a holistic approach to
the functioning of the State and society that respects specialisation (‘silos’ in
modern parlance), but believes the virtue of specialisation is to provide depth
and understanding to overarching integrated objectives and programs. Such an
approach requires linkage analysis; not just what will make the parts work better
as a whole, but what linkages are essential to make it work well.
There are intangible links such as ethics and culture, but usually the links
dictating consistent performance are tangible, bedrocked in statute, regulation,
codes, guidelines, procedures and the like. The continuity and maintenance of
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standards require such tangibles, but without the intangibles, standards will
decline. So the personal calibre, quality and character of political and public
service leaders in government matter greatly in holding ethics and culture
together, as well as in delivering performance.
In that context, a recent federal whole-of-government survey that said 45 per
cent of employees agreed their agency was well managed and 46 per cent agreed
that their agency’s leadership was of a high quality implied that more than 50
per cent did not4  —a worrying way to go therefore, on that front.
And the poor opinion the community has of politicians in general, with
exceptions for some individuals, creates a large gap between expectation and
performance.
Which leads me on to political governance; I have been anxious about the state
of political governance for years.5
Governance through law regulation and process makes power subject to
performance and accountability and leads to better outcomes and conduct, which
is why so much effort has been put into better governance in the bureaucratic6
union and corporate sectors, with great improvements resulting.
Political governance matters because political parties are fundamental to the
Australian democracy, society and economy. They wield enormous influence
over the lives of all Australians. They decide the policies that determine our
future, the programs our taxes fund, the ministers that government agencies
respond to and the representatives in parliaments they are accountable to.
Political parties must be accountable in the public interest because of the public
funding and resources they enjoy and because of their powerful public role.
Conflict of interest and self-interest have meant minimal statutory regulation of
political parties. It is limited and relatively perfunctory, in marked contrast with
the much better and stronger regulation for corporations or unions.
We have law and governance in the public interest for corporations and unions
because they make a real difference to their integrity and functioning. When I
last looked, there were 2262 pages of laws to regulate the conduct of companies,
1440 pages to regulate unions, but few rules regulating political parties.7
The successful functioning and integrity of an organisation rest on solid and
honest constitutional foundations. Corporations and workplace relations laws
provide models for organisational regulation. Political parties do not operate on
the same foundational constructs.
Political governance includes how a political party operates, how it is managed,
its corporate and other structures, the provisions of its constitution, how it




Increased regulation of political parties is not inconsistent with protecting the
essential freedoms of expression and protection from unjustified state
interference, influence or control.
Greater regulation offers political parties protection from internal malpractice
and corruption and the public better protection from its consequences. It will
reduce the opportunity for public and private funds being used for improper
purposes. The federal electoral committee has previously agreed with many of
these points, but nothing has been done.8
I haven’t time to go into other areas of political governance that could help
materially, such as constitutional and electoral law change and better
remuneration and career opportunities.
Improved political governance will over time lift the overall calibre of the political
class by requiring greater professionalism, better preselection, recruitment and
training, a sustainable career path for professional parliamentarians as well as
those who aspire to an executive ministerial career, and by reducing the
opportunity for patronage, sinecures and dynastic factionalism. Australia is
fortunate in having many very able politicians, but the overall quality and ability
of politicians and ministers—local, state, territory and federal—need to be lifted.
A trained professional, experienced political class that is subject to the rigours
of regulation, due process and organisational integrity will always perform better
than one that is not.
If you are still resistant to the idea of political governance ask why the best
talent is attracted to business, the professions or the public sector—all of which
have strong governance—but not (with exceptions) to politics, which has little.
Ask yourself if you are satisfied with the overall quality of political candidates,
representatives and ministers—or with the branch stacking in political parties,
their murky processes, the donations system and their standards.
Transparency
Transparency is usually bracketed with accountability, but it is not the same
thing. Transparency means easily discerned, seen, open. Accountability connotes
formal reporting and being ‘responsible for’ and ‘to’.
The democratic case for transparency is that the public’s ‘right to know’ is an
essential principle and protection in a democracy. It is a right, like voting, or a
fair trial. It aids efficiency.
Why is transparency often resisted? In essence, transparency means giving up
power and freedom of action in the political market. In another context, Joseph
Stiglitz recently alluded to this: ‘Those working in markets see information as
power and money, so they depend on a lack of transparency for success.’9
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The managerial case is that transparency means activities and processes are easily
seen, automatically providing an efficiency incentive and less opportunity for
corruption, waste, mismanagement, incompetence or any other potential sins of
public administration. Inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption can thrive
in the absence of transparency.
As the saying goes, sunlight is the best disinfectant.
Right at the heart of my thinking is this: more transparency, clearer accounting
and continuous disclosure will actually mean less need for scrutiny, because
close and detailed scrutiny will not be necessary—and therefore there will be
more focus on what is relevant.
Sunlight does not need torchlight.10
There are many good examples of improved transparency: legislation and forms
that are in plain English; web sites that are user friendly, informative, easy to
navigate and have analytical aids; public access to information that is provided
helpfully and promptly.
Then there are the impediments: freedom-of-information systems that are nothing
of the sort, whistleblower laws that are instruments of suppression, budget
papers that are deliberately obtuse and appropriations whose design permits
licence and impropriety.
Fundamental to transparency is the minimal use of secrecy by government.
Secrecy is necessary for genuine reasons of security and privacy, but too much
secrecy is unacceptable if Parliament is to fulfil its oversight function and if
government is to remain open and accountable to the people.11
When information is blocked, it must genuinely be in the public interest, not
in the political interest or in the private interest of those who would otherwise
be exposed for mismanagement, waste or impropriety.
Freedom of information is vital
Alan Rose, former president of the Australian Law Reform Commission, made
the point succinctly: ‘In a society in which citizens have little or very limited
access to governmental information, the balance of power is heavily weighted
in favour of the government. It is doubtful that an effective representative
democracy can exist in such circumstances.’
The New Zealand Court of Appeal once described New Zealand’s freedom of
information (FOI) legislation as of ‘such permeating importance’ that ‘it is entitled
to be ranked as a constitutional measure’. The 1996 Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa provides for a constitutional right of access to information held
by the State. British Columbia’s FOI regime requires the government to disclose,
among other things, ‘information which is clearly in the public interest’. This
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is a mandatory duty to disclose, which arises even where no particular individual
has specifically requested the information.
In contrast, Australia’s commitment to freedom of information has been
disappointing.
The provision of information is a public duty. The Freedom of Information Act
should be the final resort for obtaining information, not the only means of doing
so. Many agencies refuse to provide information without sound reason, forcing
recourse to the act.
I have had a bit to do with FOI issues over the years, including producing my
own bill in 2003.12  At that time, our FOI laws were in serious need of reform
and the Howard Government had no intention of delivering that reform.
Recently, Queensland led the way on FOI with the impressive Dr David Solomon
having 116 of his 141 recommendations supported by the Queensland
Government in full (and either partially or in principle supporting another 23
recommendations).13
Solomon14  attacks the costly, legalistic and adversarial FOI culture and attends
to such vital issues as having an independent FOI commissioner to oversee and
monitor the act; broadening the scope of information that can be accessed under
the act; creating a fairer, more reasonable fee structure; reducing the time limits
for the processing of FOI requests to 25 days; limiting the right of refusal to
essential public interest grounds; and so on.
The Queensland Government has issued two draft bills for simultaneous public
consultation—the Right to Information Bill 2009 and the Information Privacy
Bill 2009—for the very good reason that privacy is the flip side to public
disclosure, and one should not be considered in isolation of the principles and
practices of the other.
I won’t deal with it here, but elsewhere I have had much to say about the misuse
of privacy rules to prevent adults institutionalised as children from finding out
their past or their identity.15  FOI laws exist to help achieve open and accountable
government, to allow access to certain personal information held by government
departments and to provide a general right of access to government information.
Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said that ‘too much secrecy inhibits
people’s capacity to judge the government’s performance’, neatly encapsulating
the very reason later governments and bureaucracies were to conspire to limit
FOI, aided in some cases by executive-minded court decisions.16
In 1983, former Prime Minister Bob Hawke put the case bluntly: ‘Information
about Government operations is not, after all, some kind of “favour” to be
bestowed by a benevolent government or to be extorted from a reluctant
bureaucracy. It is, quite simply, a public right.’ It is a public right, it is in the
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public interest and the principle of popular sovereignty demands that people
have access to relevant information.
The power to access and independently scrutinise government information
makes for a genuinely deliberative and participatory democracy. FOI opens
government up to the people. It allows people to participate in policy,
accountability and decision-making processes. It opens government activities
to scrutiny, discussion, comment and review from the individual and from the
media on behalf of society.
In our massive government sector, it is hard for watchdogs such as
auditors-general or even management to keep abreast of everything. The military
will tell you that troops and equipment are insufficient without good ground
intelligence. That is what whistleblowers can provide.
Whistleblowers are people who by reason of their employment come across
information that reveals waste, mismanagement, corruption, dishonesty or
improper conduct in government or in private organisations. They play a vital
role in ensuring the accountability of government.
The expert Dr A. J. Brown of Griffith University Law School has said:
The willingness of public officials to voice concerns on matters of public
interest is increasingly recognised as fundamental to democratic
accountability and public integrity. At the same time, ‘whistle blowing’
is one of the most complex, conflict-ridden areas of public policy and
legislative practice.
When whistleblowers reveal waste, corruption, dishonesty or improper conduct
in an organisation, they deserve protection. If a person is bullied, defamed,
demoted or sacked because they made a genuine and warranted disclosure, there
must be processes that allow for investigation and restitution or damages.
Public administration and public accountability can only ever be as good as the
frameworks that support them. Openness, rigour and the need for constant
revision are required within public bodies to ensure they live up to the vision
for which they were created: serving the Australian people.
Remaining accountable for the wide array of services provided by government
and ensuring the Public Service remains productive and efficient needs good
people, supported by competitive entry standards and competitive wages and
conditions. Requiring employees to keep official secrets in the public interest
or requiring security clearances for certain tasks to ensure that people are
trustworthy are necessary.
You also need safeguards to ensure that proper procedures are followed and that
maladministration is uncovered. This underdevelopment of effective
whistleblowing procedures is bad for public administration, bad for the
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Australian people and bad for public officials who are twice betrayed—first by
the failures these officials see within the Public Service and second when they
are punished for reporting the problems they see.
While all the states and territories have reasonably comprehensive, if inadequate,
legislation for public officials making disclosures, Commonwealth public sector
whistleblowers are afforded little protection. There is no specific legislation and
the Public Service Act (s.16) provisions are very limited and problematic.
In federal law, secrecy prevails over the public interest. So a leak to the media
resulting in a review and major upgrade of Australia’s airport security resulted
in a conviction for the official accused of the leak.17  Such outcomes are perverse
and mean that the active disclosure of corruption and wrongdoing is inhibited.
The Rudd Government has accepted the view that genuine whistleblowers
perform a valuable and essential public service. They have asked a federal
parliamentary committee to come up with a better approach. This is another
accountability area in which I have my own bill.18 This bill was used as a
submission to the parliamentary inquiry.19
Whistleblower legislation must be carefully crafted to ensure that unworthy
causes cannot be pursued in the name of good public administration and that
there are sufficient safeguards to weed out the inappropriate use of complaints
procedures.
Any public interest disclosures regime should incorporate three principles: create
a framework to facilitate the disclosure of information in the public interest;
create a framework that ensures such disclosures are properly dealt with; and
provide practical protection—including relief from legal liability and workplace
victimisation—for people who disclose information in the public interest.
Whistleblower legislation must create an effective and transparent framework
through which genuine public interest disclosures are managed, from initial
reporting to appropriate people through the life of the investigation and
ultimately to the appropriate resolution of the issue.
It is important that the focus should be on the disclosure itself. This shift is
designed to place primacy on addressing the issue raised rather than the person
who raised it. This does not imply a lack of protection for those who raise the
issue—quite the reverse.
A unique element of my bill is that it supports the role of parliamentarians and
journalists in the whistleblowing process. After other options have been
exhausted, a disclosure may be made to a senator or member if under all the
circumstances it is reasonable for the official to do so and the disclosure has
already been made to a proper authority but to the knowledge of the official has
not been acted upon within six months; or the disclosure has been acted upon
by the proper authority but it was not adequate or appropriate; or the disclosure
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concerns especially serious conduct and exceptional circumstances exist to justify
the making of the disclosure.
After the disclosure to a parliamentarian, a public official may make a public
interest disclosure to a journalist if they do not make the disclosure for the
purposes of personal gain, whether economic or otherwise; and under all the
circumstances it is reasonable for the public official to make the disclosure; or
the disclosure has already been made to the senator or member but to the
knowledge of the public official the response was not adequate or appropriate;
or the disclosure concerns especially serious conduct and exceptional
circumstances exist to justify the public official making the disclosure.
A culture of secrecy is damaging to the integrity of public administration and
expenditure.20
Here are two examples of how apparently small transparency measures can bring
about big changes. The Senate was constantly frustrated by the lack of a
systematic filing and record-keeping system, abetting secrecy and hindering
accountability and FOI requests.
The Senate continuing order (the Harradine motion) of May 1996 required that
an indexed list of all files from each agency be tabled in the Senate annually.
The result was the entire government had to get its filing and record-keeping
system into a rational, accessible order, and those file titles were now on the
record. If my memory serves me correctly, defence reviewed its entire secret
classification and halved the number of matters formerly designated secret.
Hundreds of billions of dollars of contracts are let annually by Australian
governments. Strong, independently audited procurement and tender processes
are essential.
Because ‘commercial confidentiality’ clauses in government contracts were often
not genuine and were designed to avoid scrutiny, the June 2001 Senate
Continuing Order (known as the Murray motion) required ministers to table
letters annually confirming that their departments and agencies had posted on
their web sites a list of contracts entered into in the preceding 12 months (or
before, if not yet completed) worth $100 000 or more. They have to show, among
other things, the name of the contractor, the value and duration of the contract,
the subject matter, the commencement date, whether it contains confidentiality
provisions and, if so, why.
This key accountability measure ensures all Commonwealth contracts are public,
prevents the overuse of confidentiality claims and promotes more efficient,
competitive and open contract practices.
The Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee noted in 2007:
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Two notable achievements are the general decline in the use of
confidentiality provisions and the now commonplace inclusion of
standard disclosure provisions in government contracts [but] concerns
remain about the continued misuse of confidentiality provisions in
contracts and the reliability of the reported data in departmental and
agency lists.
Sunlight has helped, through the devices of reporting, transparency and regular
auditing.
All government agencies should conduct a thorough audit as to just how
transparent their processes and public interactions are. In my experience, this
is almost never done in any holistic way and never in a whole-of-government
sense.
Generally speaking, accountability is a matter of formal process or of legislation:
Senate Estimates being of the first kind and legislation requiring annual reports
by agencies being of the second kind.
Accountability systems need review like anything else. The Productivity
Commission and COAG red-tape reviews focus on the regulatory burden on the
private sector. I have proposed21  a similar approach to review the burden of
overlapping accountability reports and governance systems in the public sector.
Ministers and parliaments often address issues in one portfolio that are isolated
from effects across government. It is wise to periodically do some thorough
housekeeping to establish whether reports, systems or processes are outdated,
irrelevant or ineffective.
Governments and bureaucracies might relish the opportunity to rid themselves
of requirements whose primary purpose is to satisfy Parliament, and which they
regard as costly, time consuming or onerous, or as limiting their freedom of
action. Therefore it is unwise to let the government do this housekeeping,
although obviously they must and should make proposals for periodic reform.
It is the task of Parliament itself to periodically conduct a comprehensive review
of cross-government accountability devices and measures, to ensure they remain
necessary and relevant to the Parliament.
Accountability is very often dictated by statute, but its force derives from higher
law. This is what I had to say in the Murray report on budget transparency: ‘In
important ways budget transparency and financial accountability are part of
the rule of law, mechanisms which deliver integrity and a real underpinning to
our political economy, and which enable law to operate effectively and
affordably.’
The Commonwealth’s power to tax and spend is arguably its most important
power of all. It is fundamental to the Commonwealth’s ability to achieve its
policy priorities and objectives.
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A simple proposition informs my approach to budget transparency and financial
accountability. That proposition is that budget transparency and financial
accountability are not only ethically, morally and managerially sound concepts
with positive and beneficial consequences; they are not only the natural
accompaniment of parliamentary democracy; they are legal requirements that
flow from the higher law of the Australian Constitution, as supplemented by
statute.
Budgetary transparency is fundamental to Australia’s parliamentary democracy.
Without it, governments are able to deny the Parliament effective oversight of
government expenditure and effective and efficient administration can be
subverted. In any true liberal democracy, where the electors are sovereign,
transparency is an essential feature.22
As we come towards the end of this essay, are you asking why it is hard to get
change, when the benefits are evident? Apart from the obvious—that it is always
difficult to get change—what is it that causes resistance to reform, disclosure
and openness; what is it that people and institutions fear? I have no academic
studies to fall back on, but my personal and political experience tells me that
many people in positions of power in politics and the bureaucracy like power
and don’t like giving it up.
Second, being asked questions by parliamentarians or the media or the public
is an uncomfortable business, especially when such questions have a nasty edge
to them and assail your motives or integrity.
Third, many people in politics and the bureaucracy know that if something has
been concealed that will be widely criticised if known, it will make life difficult.
Just see the resistance to publishing health system misadventures.
It is worth acknowledging the human, cultural and other barriers to be overcome,
because they are formidable. But the consequence of openness is less discomfort,
less squirming. Openness requires a rethinking of processes and reporting; as a
result, a better product is created and integrity goes up a notch.
I am sympathetic to the dilemmas public servants face, given the personal and
public stakes involved when something embarrassing happens; and for ministers
also, especially in service delivery-intensive areas (health, education, transport,
emergency management—the bread and butter of state governments). And I’m
particularly cognisant of the difficulties an officer faces when dealing with
ministers and advisers who have no or little professional management training
or who are less than enthusiastic about openness.
Having police interviews video-recorded protects the policeman as much as the
accused, and leads to more faith in the process. Having hospitals report
misadventure and mistakes lessens the extent of those over time. Publishing
kids’ numeracy and literacy scores results in better schools and teaching. Federal
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politicians’ travel used to provide endless copy for journalists; now that it is
regularly published and open, it is much less so.
When matters are professionally dealt with and managed, media sensationalism
and public distrust become harder to sustain.
My opinion is that the only way to overcome the human and cultural barriers
to openness is through widespread advocacy, such as through an audience such
as this, strong campaigns such as the media campaign on FOI and political and
bureaucratic leadership founded on principle and integrity.
There is much more to be said, but can I end provocatively with respect to
Queensland.
Although I think it matters enormously, in this essay, I have not dealt with
aspects of political governance that mean reassessing the constitution, the
separation of powers, a republic, whether the federation should stay and, if it
should, in what form, and the powers states and the Commonwealth and the
House and Senate should each have. That means reassessing how power is
acquired and restrained, who has power over what, how money is raised and
spent, and by whom. It means examining the question of imbalances between
the people and their rulers, the issues of rights, liberties, obligations, protections,
representation and accountability.
You do need to think about what is missing in your battery of protections. If
you do not have an independent appointment-on-merit system, such as in the
United Kingdom under the ‘Nolan principles’,23  you are always at risk from
partisan interference in what would otherwise be independent agencies or
institutions. External, independent oversight bodies, staffed by people of skill,
ability and integrity, are essential to good government.
Nevertheless, if you do have an auditor-general, solicitor-general, ombudsman,
equal opportunity, human rights, privacy, FOI and public disclosure
commissioners, an independent judiciary, an independent police force and a
Crime and Misconduct Commission—and effective laws and adequate resources
to empower them and to ensure their integrity—then you are on your way to
the protections needed in a civil society against abuse of power, waste,
inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement.
Your Parliament matters because it represents the sovereign people. If Parliament
has less talent, integrity or judgment than it should, everyone loses. Law that
is the result of a parliamentary tyranny where a political party with half the
popular vote gets all the say is not as sustainable or durable as one where there
is plural cross-party input and support.
Do not tell me the ballot box cures all, if all it results in is changing one
parliamentary take-all majority for another. Your constitution, electoral system
and representative system matter in sorting this out.
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In Queensland, your unicameral system design is bad, because it raises the
Executive above all else and diminishes the checks and balances explicit in the
separation of powers. If Queensland wants to remain unicameral, it should go
either to proportional representation or to having your premier and deputy
premier directly elected and letting them appoint ministers outside of Parliament,
so making your unicameral house a non-executive one.
The alternative is a bicameral system. An upper house is necessary for the nobler
cause of the public good and public interest, by adding real value:
ideally—heightened accountability, a restraint on executive and legislative
excess, a repository of Parliamentary good governance and standards and fearless,
open and extensive consultation inquiry and review.
Appendix 13
Expanding on political governance
In the green paper, the Special Minister of State says:
[W]e rightly value core democratic values: fairness, transparency, political
integrity. Australians also want a healthy political system, with impartial
umpires and processes underpinning our electoral system, keeping our
campaigning fair and transparent and ensuring our systems are free from
corruption and improper influences.24
This is an argument for better political governance. Greater fairness, transparency
and political integrity require improved political governance.
Political governance includes how a political party operates, how it is managed,
its corporate and other structures, the provisions of its constitution, how it
resolves disputes and conflicts of interest, its ethical culture and its level of
transparency and accountability. As the green paper implicitly acknowledges,
electoral reform also requires attention to aspects of political governance such
as transparency and accountability.
All registered political parties should be obliged to meet minimum standards of
accountability and internal democracy. Given the public funding of elections,
the immense power of political parties (at least of some parties) and their vital
role in our government and our democracy, it is proper to insist that such
standards be met.
At present, there are two governance areas in politics that are regulated by
statute to a degree: the registration of political parties, and funding and
disclosure. The statutory registration of political parties is well managed by the
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), as a necessary part of election mechanics,
but the regulation of funding and disclosure is weak.
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Although they are private organisations in terms of their legal form, political
parties by their role, function, importance and access to public funding are of
great public concern. The courts are catching up to that understanding.25
Nevertheless, the common law has been of little assistance in providing necessary
safeguards. To date, the courts have been largely reluctant to apply common
law principles (such as on membership or preselections) to political party
constitutions, although they have determined that disputes within political
parties are justiciable.
The AEC dealt with a number of these issues in Recommendations 13–16 in the
AEC Funding and Disclosure Report Election 98. Recommendation 16 asks that
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (CEA) provide the AEC with the power to
set standard, minimum rules, which would apply to registered political parties
where the parties’ own constitution is silent or unclear. This is a significant
accountability recommendation.
The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters’ (JSCEM) 1998 report
recommended (no. 52) that political parties be required to lodge a constitution
with the AEC that must contain certain minimal elements. This recommendation
was a significant one, but it did not go far enough. In their report into the 2004
election, in Recommendation 19, to its credit, the JSCEM again recommended
that political parties be required to lodge a constitution with the AEC that must
contain certain minimal elements.
Political parties exercise public power and the terms on which they do so must
be open to public scrutiny. The fact that most party constitutions are secret
prevents proper public scrutiny of political parties. Party constitutions should
be publicly available documents updated at least once every electoral cycle.
(The JSCEM was once told by the AEC that a particular party constitution had
not been updated in its records for 16 years.)
To bring political parties under the type of accountability regime that befits
their role in our system of government, the following reforms are needed:
• The Commonwealth Electoral Act should be amended to require standard
items be set out in a political party’s constitution to gain registration, similar
to the requirements under corporations law for the constitution of companies.
• Party constitutions should specify the conditions and rules of party
membership; how office bearers are preselected and selected; how preselection
of candidates is conducted; the processes for the resolution of disputes and
conflicts of interest; the processes for changing the constitution; and processes
for administration and management.
• Party constitutions should also provide for the rights of members in specified
classes of membership to: take part in the conduct of party affairs, either
directly or through freely chosen representatives; to freely express choices
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about party matters, including the choice of candidates for elections; and to
exercise a vote of equal value with the vote of any other members in the
same class of membership.
• Party constitutions should be open to public scrutiny and updated on the
public register at least once every electoral cycle.
• The AEC should be empowered to oversee all important ballots within
political parties. At the very least, the law should permit them to do so at
the request of a registered political party.
• The AEC should also be empowered to investigate any allegations of a serious
breach of a party constitution and be able to apply an administrative penalty.
Changes to political governance such as these do not need COAG approval,
although its support would be welcome. Such reforms to Commonwealth law
would inevitably flow onto the conduct of state political participants, since
nearly all registered state participants are also registered federal parties.
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Part 4. Reflections on adaptive change

14. Higher education: it’s time…(to
change the policy framework)1
Ian Chubb AC
Let me begin with a comment about self-interest. Experience tells me that
self-interest is a vice often observed when somebody else says something with
which you disagree. If ever you have a flash of insight and detect self-interest
in your own comments, you know at least that it is pure because, as you know
with certainty, that’s how you are. I hope what I am about to say will be heard
to be beyond pure self-interest. Although I am paid by The Australian National
University to work in its interests, there are some issues that go to the state of
the higher education sector and not just the state of a single university and I
will address some of those.
But, when you get down to it, we are an odd sector. And up there on the scale
of oddness is our perverse attitude to performance. As one of my former
colleagues asked several years ago: are we the only country that penalises success?
He was commenting on the fact that research council grants cover nothing like
the full costs of the projects they support—so the more you have the more you
have to top up. Naturally, this diverts resources from other, say, prospective
activity and is quite antithetical to a strategic approach to research and research
development. It means that the best are penalised to enable more to be funded.
More recently, the same sort of thinking intruded into evaluating teaching
performance. The Australian National University, for example, lost roughly $1
million a couple of years ago because scores were adjusted as the students the
year before the allocation (not those actually surveyed as graduates) entered the
university with high average cut-off scores. It was assumed, I presume, that we
added less value to those graduates than did a university whose entry scores
were low. I will come back to this later.
But even if we are not the only nation to penalise success, we seem to be expert
at perverse incentives. It is time to get past this implicit ‘equalisation’ strategy
and to put in place sensibly enlightened policies that will reinvigorate and
advance the sector in a way that is coherent. They need to acknowledge that we
perform differently and that we should not hold back (some would say continue
to hold back) the best-performing universities in the hope that some of the others
will join them at some high level if we deflect resources, or spread them thinly,
for long enough. As I will discuss later, the gap does not appear to be closing.
Holding back is a recipe for levelling down. And that, I would argue, is in
nobody’s interest. Even so, it is an issue about which we cannot expect consensus
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in the sector; it will need real political courage if we are to maintain at least some
of our universities in the upper reaches of the world league.
While it is a vexed issue, it is raised, not in self-interest, but rather as part of an
urging that we come to terms with what we want to be and our place in the
world as a nation, as a community, as a sector.
This is as important now as it was when The Australian National University was
established as part of postwar reconstruction. The minister declared then that
the activity of the university should lead to it taking its rightful place among
the great universities of the world and that by it doing so Australia would have
taken one more step to align itself with the great and enlightened nations of the
world. This might be even more important now.
Clearly, the circumstances facing the world are different from 1946 but still
massively complex: the issues of climate change, the environment, terrorism,
pandemics and the migration of people are a few examples of problems that
don’t respect national boundaries. And solutions will be found only if the best
minds in the world work on them, are given the skills to work on them and are
able to work on them across cultures and boundaries. This is no time for reducing
the capacity of our best. This is no time simply to say that what used to be is
still good enough. It is not the time to assume that a country with a small
population can have its universities presume that they are essentially scale models
of some ideal teaching and research university. Nor is it the time to reduce the
opportunities for Australians to get access to university, if it is their wish and
they have the talent to succeed.
I take heart from comments made by the Deputy Prime Minister, Julia Gillard,2
when she said ‘we can’t compete with the worldwide higher education revolution
unless we improve the quality of our universities and keep some [more] of the
best minds here’. She went on to announce a doubling of undergraduate
scholarships and new mid-career fellowships and she linked education, training
and social inclusion. Good news.
But importantly, she acknowledges up front that there is a worldwide revolution;
that starting point is crucial to our future. I argue that it is, indeed, time—time
for a policy framework that is fresh, strategic and supportive. That would
certainly be revolutionary for us.
We have an opportunity. We have an opportunity to rethink, fundamentally,
public policy, because of a change of federal government following the lengthy
incumbency of its predecessor. While it is an opportunity we can’t afford to
miss, there are some preconditions necessary for turning the chance into a
revolution. Let me suggest five prerequisites.
First, the incoming government needs to be interested in substantive policy
reform. There are early indications of renewed interest in ideas and debate,
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which is refreshing. The COAG initiatives, the commitment to Indigenous
communities, the review of the National Innovation System and the 2020 Summit,
for example, indicate a new energy and a commitment to consultative policy
development. The real tests will come in choosing between competing ideas and
taking the hard decisions to put into effect necessary policies.
Second, the government needs to have adequate capacity for policy development.
It needs access to evidence, analysis and creative thinking to guide longer-term
policy formulation and evaluation. The policy capacity of the Australian Public
Service is stretched in responding to the demands of the new government, as a
result of its recent focus on ‘can-do’ program delivery and generational change.
In the circumstances, there is a role for people in the university community to
assist in offering policy analysis and advice.
Third, the government needs to invest the resources required for reform. There
seems likely to be fiscal capacity for targeted investment in future years, but
now, with inflationary pressures throughout the economy, and large election
spending commitments, we are asked to be patient. While giving the new
government room to set the house in order, we also need some signals of intent
to address pressing concerns. We would be wise to ensure that the case we make
for future investment is sound.
Given the current environment and condition of the sector, it is unrealistic to
expect government to increase public investment in higher education across the
board without regard to cost effectiveness and adding value. In other words, if
we want extra investment, we offer reform in return. It will take two to tango
to bring about microeconomic reform in higher education.
Fourth, the community needs to be ready for change. The signals of this are
ambiguous. On the one hand, the community is calling for more effective and
efficient service delivery, such as in health and education. On the other hand,
resistance can be expected to further structural reform that disconnects people
from their anchors in society. It is particularly essential that the institutions
involved are encouraged to embrace change constructively by the policies,
regulatory frameworks and financial incentives that are put in place, and by the
way they are put in place.
Fifth and, I think, foremost, reform needs to be guided by clear vision and values.
Blurred policy signals and incentives lead to dysfunctional systems. Yet a
prescriptive approach is inappropriate for a pluralistic society. Policy needs to
be alive to differences in community circumstances and institutional missions
while also having coherence of purpose. It becomes important for government
to be clear about its objectives and also for universities to articulate how well
they do what they do, and what they stand for. I believe we have not only an
opportunity but a responsibility to help build a balanced and sustainable policy
framework for the future. The government is asking us to contribute ideas, so
183
Higher education: it’s time…(to change the policy framework)
I will outline what I see as the key features of well-designed policy architecture
and the building blocks necessary to support it.
But before considering where we might go in the future, we need to understand
where we have come from. Australia’s policies for education and research have
been built around national and sub-national orientations, politics and ambitions.
But at the sharp end, national ambitions will not be realised if Australia fails to
sustain a cluster of globally networked research universities. At the same time,
we will fail as a nation to achieve the goal of an inclusive, well-functioning
society if we do not provide equitable access to quality education and training.
The course of educational policy development in Australia, particularly in the
past decade, has been segmented across the schooling, vocational education and
training and higher education sub-sectors, with fissures between public and
private provision. Once we enjoyed a capacity to consider policies and
developments across sectors. We were able to consider things such as trends in
demand and supply, the interactions of incentives for educational participation
and employment, the effect of changes in education costs on access and study
choices of students, the destinations of graduates and changes in employer
requirements and expectations. There were also structured arrangements for
intergovernmental consultation and cooperation, and provision for input from
business and the unions.
It is time to join the dots again, to take an arm’s-length view of needs across
sectors, a helicopter view of international developments and a contemporary
view of regulation for the increasingly competitive operating environment. And
now that there is recognition of those long-neglected bookends—early childhood
education and adult and continuing education—it is all the more necessary to
adopt a joined-up approach. But how to join the dots?
Although he was focusing particularly on the universities, Peter Karmel’s view
expressed back in 2000 is still apt today. He wrote then: ‘The government needs
objective advice unaffected by political/ideological and political/electoral
considerations and by the pressures of lobby groups. It cannot receive such
advice from a government department subject to ministerial direction and the
lobbying of individual institutions.’3
In addition to requiring sound and objective advice, the government also needs
to be putting in place policies that will stand above the fads and fashions of
political expediency. The higher education sector suffers from the legacy of
accumulated incremental policy shifts and drift. The result is a lack of policy
coherence, an introspective and narrow view of possibilities and a limit to
institutional futures. Both sides of politics have railed against ‘one-size-fits-all’
funding. Before the 2007 election, both sides conceded that the Dawkins’ model
of the unified national system had passed its use-by date. There is a consensus
that greater flexibility is necessary.
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But we know that flexibility is not easily achieved. Experience suggests that
even when measures are introduced to dilute funding incentives that induce
sameness, cultural norms remain powerful in a sector where institutional status
is confused with institutional purpose and performance.
This problem is not unique to Australia, as the American commentator Martin
Trow has noted:
[A] central problem for higher education policy in every modern society
is how to sustain the diversity of institutions, including many of which
are primarily teaching institutions without a significant research capacity,
against the pressure for institutional drift toward a common model of
the research university…the effort alone shapes the character of an
institution to be something other than what it is: a prescription for
frustration and discontent.4
Amid the confusion, we cannot expect consensus within the sector about future
directions for policy and financing, other than the kind of lowest common
denominator position calling for a spread of funding increments that has
resonated throughout the past quarter-century and has levelled the system
downward.
Before the election, Labor offered mission-based funding compacts. This was
intended as a way to manage the transition over several years from an outmoded
model of central control to a more market-driven approach, while also
safeguarding the essential public good of universities.
That approach might be regarded as a balance between the ‘grand plan’ and
‘muddling through’. On the one hand, it envisages the government clarifying
its objectives and policy principles and, on the other, universities identifying
how they can best play to their strengths in fulfilling their missions and
contributing to government objectives. It has appeal as a two-way process. We
can’t start again, as it were, with a clean slate and centrally prescribe some new
model, just as we can’t rely solely on the self-referenced aspirations of individual
institutions to cater adequately to varying needs.
The compact model recognises that universities have multiple roles in
contemporary society, and that different universities have different roles. The
concept of compacts, as outlined in Labor’s 2006 discussion paper, indicated the
potential for new funding streams for community service and innovative
activities, additional to funding for the traditional functions of teaching and
research.
Labor in government has signalled its intention to use compacts as a means for
effecting reform. The Innovation Minister, Senator Kim Carr, recently said:
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[C]ompacts will be instrumental in bringing about structural reform and
cultural change, and in concentrating people’s minds on our international
competitiveness. They will enable us to manage the transition from the
present centralised system to a more flexible environment in which each
university can respond to the needs of its students, its community, the
country and the global knowledge economy by exploiting its comparative
advantages by leading with its strongest suit.5
It is not yet clear how far the government will adopt the details of the compacts
approach outlined in 2006, what modifications will be made and where compacts
will fit in the broader policy framework. It is timely, though, to emphasise that
the notion of compacts is government policy; it is the detail that remains to be
sorted. This fact is apparently a shock to some in our sector.
The government’s decision to separate the portfolio of research from that of
education allows a more open consideration of tertiary education possibilities,
without the distractions involved in exaggerated claims of a ‘teaching–research
nexus’. Instead, we are being invited to explore the potential of strengthening
the nexus between university functions and innovation, in ways that will enlarge
the contributions that universities make to the community. Compact funding in
that context can help to improve knowledge exchange between universities and
enterprises, and government and community organisations.
The government has also linked compact funding to tightening the access of
universities to funding for research and research training on the basis of verified
research quality. Quoting from their white paper:
A university will be expected to cease admitting research degree
candidates to areas where adequate quality of research performance
cannot be validated. The university may shift funds for research training
to build its capability in those fields of research where it has rated well
or it may transfer the funds to undergraduate or postgraduate coursework
places, or to develop activities for community service or innovation.6
This approach has the potential to shore up Australia’s research capacity, by
focusing future investment in areas of best performance. The areas of strength
may initially be identified through the work of the Australian Research Council
(ARC) in developing a replacement for the flawed Research Quality Framework.
One approach would be for each university to self-rate its research against the
benchmarks it considers relevant for the type of research it undertakes. The
ARC/NHMRC (National Health and Medical Research Council) could then validate
that the benchmarks are appropriate and assess how well the research rates
against the benchmark, using a combination of appropriate metrics and peer
judgment.
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A major outcome of this approach would be a greater concentration of investment
in research and improved research training. Several universities will be able to
sustain comprehensiveness in research and research training, others will be more
selective and a few will be active in niche areas only.
The ‘hub and spokes’ element of compact funding, as outlined during the election
campaign, and, like compacts, part of the policy that the government took to
the last election (again a revelation to some in the sector), will complement this
reform, by widening opportunities for individual academics to be active in their
scholarly field irrespective of the research focus or capacity of their home
institution.
Already there are rumblings in some universities about this direction, but the
government must stand firm. All Australian universities should benefit through
the profile and access that the best performers enable. Australia cannot afford
any longer to dissipate resources and level down the performance peaks.
Australia’s capacity and performance slippage against the international leaders
reflect an underlying deficit of national investment in research, research training
and research infrastructure. I hope that a number of ministers soon get to see
the scale of investment in facilities and talent in the leading universities of China,
Europe and elsewhere. Then they will understand just how far we have fallen
behind and how precarious is our future. I would hope that they would see the
benefits to be gained by adopting an approach that funds the full costs of research
and by accepting that there needs to be some focus of funding notwithstanding
some political consequences.
Australia’s catch-up cannot be predicated on a thinly spread distribution of any
additional investment because of the scale and pace of our competitors. The hard
reality is that the rest of the world is not waiting for Australia, and if we play
catch-up politics internally, waiting a few more decades in some vain hope that
the Dawkins reforms will eventually give every university a place in the sun,
we could be watching the world from the sidelines.
We cannot continue to be timid about this imperative. Despite government
incentives encouraging research expansion in newer universities, the performance
gap between the top research universities and the rest has widened, not
narrowed, since 1992, on all available quantitative and, especially, qualitative
indicators. For example, the leading eight increased their share of total research
income from 66 per cent in 1992 to 68 per cent in 2004.
The bottom 12 increased their share from 5 per cent to 6 per cent, and the ATN
universities from 7 per cent to 8 per cent over the same period. Among those in
the middle, the performance trends have been variable. One fell from a 3.4 per
cent to a 1.5 per cent share, one fell from 1.7 per cent to 1.1 per cent, while
another rose from 0.3 per cent to 0.7 per cent.
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It is no wonder that some are very vocal advocates of funding on the basis of
potential rather than performance. Potential is a bottomless pit, whereas track
record is finite. It is indeed ironic that a sector that bases so much on track record
from the accomplishments of entering students to research grants and their
allocation to what staff have done to earn promotion should suddenly discover
that ‘potential’ is more important when it comes to funding. Sometimes, it might
be thought, self-interest is not always pure.
Around the world research is funded, including in emerging areas, on the basis
of track record. Research grants are not awarded and researchers are not
employed on the basis of promise alone. Their promise is inferred from what
they have done.
So for research, research training, research infrastructure and improved
connections of universities to the innovation system, the compacts approach
should drive much-needed reform. I would like to see this process moving in
the direction of customised block grants to universities from the research councils
reflecting true operating costs with accountability for quality of outcomes as
the means by which we judge the quality of our work and adjust the block.
In the short term, compacts could provide opportunities for university
repositioning, new incentives for mission differentiation and funding-envelope
flexibility. Diversification is itself a means rather than an end. The key purpose
is to modernise the structure of provision to accommodate more cost effectively
an enlarged body of students with varying characteristics. The main point is,
in the words of Peter Karmel, to achieve ‘the twin objectives of widespread
access to higher education and of nurturing the most intellectually able’.7
Access should be widened in ways that recognise differences in student readiness,
ability and motivations. Particular effort is needed to enable those with poor
readiness to progress—not to make it easy to succeed by lowering standards,
but to ensure they acquire the skills necessary to achieve good employment
outcomes. This means support: with study and the relevant skills and support
mechanisms. It also means minimising distractions: if we are to improve access
to post-school education, and completion of courses, we need to think creatively
about how to ensure that all students are able to meet basic living costs while
studying.
Unlike course fees, day-to-day living costs cannot be deferred through HECS.
Living costs present as an upfront deterrent to access and recent studies have
shown that ever more full-time university students are having to work longer
hours in part-time and casual jobs just to make ends meet.
The student income support system has not been the subject of a proper
government-driven review since 1992; there is an urgent need for reform. In
higher education, we are more likely to see diversity flourish when we address
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policy across the whole spectrum of post-school education and training.
Conceiving of a holistic system for tertiary learning has implications not only
for institutional structures, but for student access, financing mechanisms and
student income support.
In this wider context, we need to revisit the rationale for the education
component of compacts as conceived in Labor’s 2006 outline, and to move to a
less bureaucratic discussion. There are many questions to be addressed and
serious work needs to be commenced shortly to underpin future policy
considerations. Matters requiring attention include: student-driven models and
the allocation of funding; the balance between private and public costs; the
continuity of scholarship in areas that are not sustained by student demand
alone, as well as the balance between graduate output and labour market
requirements; and the principles and operations of a more appropriate regulatory
framework for a competitive services sector.
In recent years, the OECD has been undertaking a series of thematic reviews of
tertiary education, with 13 countries participating in a program of visits by
international assessors. Australia did not volunteer for a visiting panel and missed
out on the benefits of international perspectives and comparative assessment. I
am sure an international panel would have been struck by the disconnections
within the tertiary education system and the disconnections between it and the
labour market. It is time to take a wider view. There is a further matter that
must be addressed, and that is the actual cost of teaching at acceptable standards.
A better understanding of actual costs will be needed for a more deregulated
system. Truer signals about quality will be needed to inform student choice and
safeguard educational standards.
We have danced around the question of standards for far too long. There is a
dizziness affecting our thinking and a reluctance to confront reality. We persist
with a notion of parity of esteem of degrees even though we know there are
sizeable differences in the entry scores of students, in the capabilities of academic
staff, in campus environments and cultures and in amenities for learning and
research. Through the Learning and Teaching Performance Fund, these
differences are smoothed out in order to detect a notional institutional value
add, on the assumption that the exit standards of graduates are equal.
We know that there are differences in graduate destinations that reflect
differences in student preparation, such as in engineering and information
technology (IT). For instance, employers look to one university for computer
systems designers and to another for computer programmers and to another for
computer operators. That is what happens in the real world, and it is a good
thing, and we should reveal rather than disguise the fact. Yet we have not
achieved acceptance, either in rhetoric or practice, of the concept of fitness for
purpose.
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In Australian higher education, we have a process of quality auditing that assesses
processes but does not necessarily assure acceptable standards. It could even,
by dint of the process, validate mediocrity, especially when the criteria are
referenced only to national norms. I understand the Minister for Finance and
his ‘razor gang’ are looking for savings options. I can nominate some for him.
Evaluating standards is inherently difficult, and that is probably why most of
the higher education quality assurance industry treats quality of process as a
proxy for quality of outcomes. Standards-referenced evaluation requires a focus
on how well students learn and how institutions assess this, rather than a
preoccupation with how well the paperwork is prepared and the records kept.
It is time to establish a minimum acceptable standard for a degree and to develop
benchmarks for differences in performance standards achieved by graduates.
There are various options available, such as comparisons of student work assessed
at different grades across institutions in comparable areas of study, as well as
examinations of the kind used in other countries, such as the Graduate Record
Examination in the United States. We have responsibilities to our graduates to
safeguard the reputation of Australian qualifications in the international market.
It is time to grasp the nettle and get around what, I remind you, Trow described
as ‘a central problem for higher education—the pressure for institutional drift
toward a common model of the research university’.
Our Australian way of handling the ‘central problem’ has been largely to ignore
it as we penalise success in order to spread the already thin largesse.
It is time to discuss the whole issue of standards and accept that there are
differences, real differences, within the sector and that those differences lead to
consequences. It is time to consider the relationships between our universities
in order to provide better opportunities for staff and students.
It is time to focus on the purpose and performance of universities. It is time to
seize this rare opportunity for rethinking, renewal and reinvigoration.
All in all, it is time.
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15. Achieving a ‘conservation
economy’ in indigenous communities:
a Canadian model for greening and
growing local economies1
Ian Gill
Like Australia, Canada is a big place. It has the longest undefended border in
the world, with the United States. While most Australians live in a thin band
around the coast, most Canadians live along a thin line called the forty-ninth
parallel that stretches along the US border from coast to coast—or, as Canada’s
motto has it, ‘A mari usque ad mare’ (‘From sea to sea’).
In Canada, as here, there is a deep divide between urban and rural populations—a
division that is about much more than just geography. John Ralston-Saul, one
of our pre-eminent social commentators, believes that the growing gap between
urban and rural populations is one of the most profound social issues in
twenty-first-century Canada, and I agree.
Ours is a modern, pluralistic, democratic state. Ours is also a heavily
resource-dependent economy; Canadians are ‘hewers of wood and drawers of
water’ in the classic phrase, but we are also miners and smelters and car makers
and farmers and drillers, and we don’t always do all that as sustainably or
sensitively as you might expect from a country such as Canada.
Like Australians, Canadians have stood alongside Britain and the United States
through some of their most noble, and their most ignoble, adventures abroad.
We didn’t go to Iraq. You did. We are in Afghanistan, fighting, yet we are better
known as peacekeepers. And let’s face it, living alongside the United States, we
have no illusions about being a regional military superpower.
By far our largest trading partner is the United States, and Canadians mostly
like Americans—but these days don’t much care for America. I suspect that if
Canadians and Australians and, I guess, the citizens of Berlin were allowed to
vote in the US election, it would be Obama in a walk.
Speaking of elections, we have a federal one of those under way right now,
featuring Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, trying to convert his minority
government into a majority one. Harper shares the distinction with George W.
Bush of being possibly the only politician in the free world to have openly
expressed admiration for your former Prime Minister, John Howard. And look
where that got John Howard.
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Harper is up against Stephane Dion, a highly cerebral man whose most popular
contribution to public life has been to name his dog Kyoto. Canada signed the
Kyoto Accord, by the way—by which I mean the real one, not an agreement
with Stephane Dion’s dog—but then we decided we wouldn’t abide by it. I see
that Australia has finally done the same thing: signed Kyoto. The jury is out on
whether you’ll have the courage to honour your commitments, or choose Canada
as your role model.
Stephane Dion, by the way, is leader of the Liberal Party of Canada. In Australia,
that would actually place him at the head of a very watered down Labor Party.
Stephen Harper heads the Conservative Party, which truly is what it says it is.
We have a more classically social democratic party, the New Democrats, who
are a genuine force for good in Canada, possibly because they never come close
to forming a government at the federal level. This election will also see a more
prominent role for the Green Party, but it too is in no danger of making any
significant electoral inroads.
Because the Queen is still our head of state, we have a governor-general—and,
like yours, ours is a woman. Canada has also, briefly, had a woman prime
minister. But our prime ministers, and our politics generally, go pretty much
unnoticed in the world. Pierre Trudeau was really the only Canadian politician
ever to make much of a splash abroad.
Still, some other Canadians have made it onto the world stage: think Joni
Mitchell, Neil Young, Donald Sutherland, Margaret Atwood—but please don’t
blame ordinary Canadians for Celine Dion. Some Canadians, like Australians,
have made it onto the world stage only to be asked to leave: you gave the world
Alan Bond, we countered with Conrad Black.
Canada has a public health system that is said to be the envy of the world. Like
Australia’s, there is a good chance you will survive Canada’s health system if
you don’t die waiting for a hospital bed.
Like Australia, ours is a sporting nation, although we spend more time on ice
than in water. Judging by the results of the Beijing Olympics, bronze is the new
gold when it comes to our athletes. When we do get a rare gold medal, they play
an anthem that Canadians actually seem to like, Oh Canada. It’s no Waltzing
Matilda, but it’s a big step up on Advance Australia Fair.
Our colonial, frontier history is poetically captured by Robert Service, the closest
thing we have to a Banjo Patterson. You have ‘movement at the station’ and we
have ‘strange things done in the midnight sun’.
There are many more similarities and differences—some profound, some
superficial—that I could list here. Suffice to say, ours is one lucky country. I
seem to recall reading once that Australia is one lucky country, too.
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The reality is, the majority of Canadians believe they live in one of the best
places on Earth. I think a lot of Australians think they do, too. Ours are among
the richest nations on Earth. We have money in our pockets and when we aren’t
grumbling about the weather or taxes—including that Canadian invention, the
GST—well, we’re a pretty happy bunch.
But let’s talk for a minute about the money in our pockets. I have some right
here: an Australian $50 note. The Australian $50 note has on it a drawing of
David Unaipon, an Aboriginal inventor from Point McLeay Mission, down near
the Murray mouth in South Australia.
Meanwhile, the Canadian $20 note has on it depictions of the artwork of Bill
Reid, a Haida First Nations artist credited with producing some of the most
complex three-dimensional objects the world has ever seen.
Think about it. Is there not some irony in the fact that in both our lucky
countries, hundreds of thousands of times a day, our citizens unconsciously
transact their business and their pleasure with currency bearing the images of
people who have almost no currency in the modern economies of which we are
all so proud? Or think of it another way. In Canada, we spend about $9 billion
a year on First Nations at the federal level. That’s 450 million $20 notes a year
spent mostly on substandard social services that produce almost no positive
outcomes for native people.
Canada, remember, is consistently ranked at or near the top of the UN index
that ranks the livability of countries around the world. If the same indices by
which Canada is deemed to be so successful are applied just to aboriginal Canada,
the country would rank sixty-third in the world. That’s a pretty big gap, by
anyone’s reckoning.
I won’t burden you with the detailed numbers, but I can assure you that in
Canada, as in Australia, aboriginal people live in substandard housing more
befitting a Third World country; their rates of incarceration are higher than
non-Native Canadians; their graduation rates lower. Lower average income,
lower average life expectancy, higher suicide rates—the same terrible statistical
rollcall.
If you look at the Canadian landscape—by which I mean the actual, physical
condition of the country’s lands and waters—in between all those postcards of
the Rockies and the prairies and the Mounties are valleys and villages flooded
for cheap power to run aluminium and lead smelters and to irrigate crops. There
are areas of clear-felled forests so large that they are visible from outer space.
There are rivers where two million fish used to return every year, now reduced
to 2000 returning salmon. There are polluted lakes and streams and, lately, whole
forests ravaged by beetles that used to die out in cold winters but no longer do.
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Like Australia, Canada had a gold rush—literally for gold, but for other minerals
too, and for forests and for fish and for furs—and in that resource rush the
aboriginal people were pushed aside at best, and targeted for extinguishment
at worst. Like Australia, we had residential schools and a Stolen Generation. Like
Australia, our Prime Minister recently said sorry. Like Australia, there is much
talk of reconciliation—but little consensus on what that actually means.
At the same time that we talk of reconciliation, we of course cannot bring
ourselves to sign the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—for
fear, we are told, that it might compromise our legal position. As for our legal
position, you had Mabo, we had Calder. You had Wik, we had Sparrow. You
had Yorta Yorta, we had Delgamuukw. And now, we have Haida—a case that
so squarely argues for Haida title and rights that our federal government argues
back that the Haida essentially don’t exist. This, we are told, is necessary to
safeguard our legal position. Some reconciliation.
But I’m glad to report it’s not all bad news for indigenous Canadians.
In 2004, the Haida Nation won a landmark case in our Supreme Court that has
put a burden on governments—and vicariously although not directly on
industry—to consult and accommodate First Nations in the event of development
on their lands, whether or not they have proven title. I repeat, to consult and
accommodate. This does not give First Nations veto power, but it does put them
at the negotiating table with senior governments in a way that actually gives
meaning to the notion of negotiation. It is, in my view, one of the fundamental
building blocks of a conservation economy.
Let me define the conservation economy, at least as we see it at Ecotrust Canada.
A conservation economy:
• provides meaningful work and good livelihoods
• supports vibrant communities and the recognition of aboriginal rights and
title
• conserves and restores the environment.
The starting assumption of Ecotrust has always been that there is opportunity
where conservation and the economy meet. The old paradigm is that you either
have jobs or the environment—but you cannot have both. Our work instead
takes place at the intersection of the two. I know this sounds all very nice in
principle. What it means in practice is this.
As I mentioned, because of favourable court cases in Canada and because, in
British Columbia, treaties were not signed and settled during the period of first
contact, we now have a series of imperatives that demand that aboriginal people
be dealt into decision making at every turn.
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Spencer Beebe, the founder of Ecotrust, likes to say that ‘societies do what
societies think’. Well, part of our approach is to help communities think about
their future, think about what to do or not do, based on a comprehensive
understanding of their traditions and their current conditions.
We think of this as ‘information democracy’. In the past, all the decisions about
resource extraction and economic development were made in capital cities like
this one, Canberra, or in cities with capital, such as London and New York…like
Sydney, Melbourne, Perth…like Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver.
None of the decisions was made by the communities themselves, or even with
their knowledge or consent. On the British Columbia coast, I can take you to
First Nations villages where, literally, the first inkling that native people had
that someone was logging their traditional lands was when they saw a massive
barge laden with old-growth logs being towed past their communities—headed
south to distant mills and markets.
At Ecotrust, our notion of information democracy is that decision making has
to vest in affected communities. So we work with communities on use and
occupancy mapping—on land-use and marine-use planning—in order that today,
having been invited to the decision-making table 150 years after the fact, they
can come equipped with culturally relevant and technically and scientifically
defensible maps and plans of their own.
It is my contention that not a single new resource decision should be made—in
Canada or in Australia—without affected communities first being able to
articulate their traditional use and occupancy of their territory, or country, as
you call it here. That knowledge should be the basis upon which communities
can then articulate which economic opportunities they wish to pursue—or forgo.
I think it is a fundamental human right to be informed, to be armed with
knowledge that is your own.
So, as I said, information democracy is a core building block of a conservation
economy.
But in a conservation economy, there also has to be an economy. I remember in
a strategy session one of our board members taking us to task because, to him,
it sounded like a conservation economy was just a set of principles—local this,
sustainable that, value-added something or other else. He asked, not unkindly,
‘Are there any products in a conservation economy?’
Well, yes there are.
Inevitably, when communities articulate a vision, it involves some kind of
development. At Ecotrust, we have been fortunate to work for more than a
decade now with Shorebank, one the world’s leading development finance
institutions. Shorebank introduced us to community development finance—and
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it is courtesy of Shorebank that we operate the only revolving loan fund for
business development housed in an environmental non-profit in Canada.
We have done a modest amount of lending: about $10 million so far. We finance
small and medium enterprise development. We finance mostly sustainable
forestry, fisheries, tourism and renewable-energy projects. Our loans average
about $125 000 at origination—not exactly micro-lending, but what we call
‘whites-of-your-eyes’ lending. Local, responsive and leveraged, our $3.8 million
active portfolio in 2007 leveraged a further $13.7 million in capital to our clients.
Of that, about 30 per cent went to aboriginal enterprises. We have slowly,
patiently helped to create or sustain hundreds of jobs on our coast.
Somewhat emboldened by these results, we are currently looking to raise market
capital for renewable energy and sustainable forestry funds because we want
to work on bigger deals, at a larger scale, with our First Nations partners. But
before I get to that, let me give you a concrete example of how Ecotrust has
worked with a First Nations client.
Let me tell you about a company called Iisaak Forest Resources.
Some of you might have heard of Clayoquot Sound. It is an extraordinarily
beautiful place on the west coast of Vancouver Island, a place that became
notorious in the 1980s and 1990s when the industrial logging juggernaut that
was consuming the forests of Vancouver Island at an insatiable rate was stopped
in its tracks.
In the summer of 1993—after years of skirmishes in the woods and interminable
negotiations leading nowhere—more than 16 000 Canadians rallied on the logging
roads of Clayoquot Sound in what became the largest single act of civil
disobedience in Canadian history. More than 850 people were arrested for
stopping the logging in Clayoquot. Your current Environment Minister, Peter
Garrett, led his band, Midnight Oil, in a protest concert at the Black Hole, a
notorious clear-cut that became an emblem of the worst excesses of the Canadian
logging industry.
The blockades came on the heels of a conservation plan that left two-thirds of
the sound open to logging. The government of the day promised this would take
place sustainably, but no-one believed the government had a clue what that
meant. In the wake of such a furious backlash, the government appointed a
‘blue-chip’ science panel to report back on what sustainable forestry might
actually look like. At this point, local First Nations stepped in and called a halt.
In effect, they challenged the credentials of a band of white scientists—no matter
how well qualified on paper—to properly understand what sustainable forestry
could be, without fully understanding the position of First Nations people who
had lived in the forest for thousands of years. In the end, the science panel was
co-chaired by Hereditary Chief Umeek of the Ahousaht First Nation. In the end,
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the science panel produced a report that radically altered the regulatory and
social landscape for logging on the coast of British Columbia.
When the science panel reported in 1995, the companies didn’t like the significant
new restrictions on logging practices, but the government went ahead and
approved the panel’s recommendations. Sure enough, there was a dramatic
reduction in the annual cut and, soon after, the two big companies in the region
were looking for a way out. One of them, MacMillan Bloedel—which later sold
out to Weyerhaeuser—closed down operations in Clayoquot, but committed to
a joint venture with the local First Nations in the form of a new company, Iisaak
Forest Resources. The word ‘iisaak’ is Nuu-chah-nulth for ‘respect’ and, in 2000,
First Nations in Clayoquot were majority owners of a company that set out to
produce just that: wood with respect.
Ecotrust Canada helped finance that first year of operations. In itself, that might
be thought of as an unusual act for a conservation organisation: to finance a
joint-venture logging company in Clayoquot Sound in which timber giant
Weyerhaeuser was a partner. But, to our view, this is what everyone had been
arguing for: a dramatic reduction in the cut, more local control, more First
Nations control, more local benefits and preferably a product certified by an
international body, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). So for us, financing
this example of a triple-bottom-line company was a no brainer. We also helped
it get FSC certification. And we aided the company in many other ways, including
finding markets for its good wood and spreading the word.
In 2005, Iisaak bought out Weyerhaeuser’s minority interest and the First Nations
became sole owners of the company. In 2006, seeking new management after
some poor years and substantial financial losses, Iisaak asked Ecotrust Canada
to help find new managers. Instead, with a partner that had experience in
ecosystem-based forest management, we decided to offer ourselves up as
managers.
Why did we do this? Because environmentalists have a tendency to support
things such as Iisaak in principle, but seldom offer much by way of tangible
assistance where it counts: in the day-to-day operational reality of a business.
And while environmentalists sing a good song about helping aboriginal people
get access to resources as a way out of poverty, they get a bit weak-kneed when
they actually do it.
So we stepped up with a plan, won a competitive bidding process to manage
the company, and we did so for 18 months—a contract that ended a couple of
months ago. At the end of our management turnaround contract, here’s how
things stood:
• 47 per cent of employment was First Nations
• 67 per cent of employment was local
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• Forest Stewardship Certification (which had been lost) was reinstated
• we achieved a financial turnaround and left Iisaak with $1.5 million in the
bank
• emerging markets were found for FSC-certified wood
• 18 months of advance engineering was in place (that is, plans for business
going forward).
I have to say that assisting First Nations to cut old-growth forests in one of the
iconic conservation areas in the world hasn’t endeared us to everyone. As one
of my staff put it in a report to our board, ‘Our effort here inspired many, puzzled
some, enraged a few, and left no-one indifferent.’ So too, probably, will our
upcoming work to raise venture capital to assist First Nations to invest in
micro-hydro projects, and to acquire and manage private forest lands. But to
me, conversation for far too long has been about access—and not about assets.
Everyone wants access to indigenous lands—to exploit them, to ‘save’ them,
whatever—but in very few cases do we see good-faith attempts to actually build
an asset base in indigenous communities. At Ecotrust Canada, we think that is
critical to the long-term success of the communities where we work.
This gets us to some of the challenges. I’ve read a bit about the deterioration in
Australia of the so-called black–green alliance. Canadians are far too polite to
ever colour code people. No-one up home would ever talk about a red–green
alliance and anyway, in Canada, Red Green is the name of a TV comedy character,
so they wouldn’t know what you were talking about. But as in Australia, in
Canada, there has long been an assumption that the indigenous agenda is at once
and at least in part a green agenda. In truth, that has been the case for the past
30 years or so: about the same time that Greenpeace was founded in Vancouver,
aboriginal communities were engaging in their own conservation efforts, linked
to their emergent rights and title agenda. But today, as First Nations come into
ownership and control—as they come to determine more and more of the access
to lands and natural resources—those old allegiances will come under strain. In
fact, they already have—as in the case of Iisaak Forest Resources, as I’ve already
mentioned, but in many other instances as well.
In Canada, as in Australia, I predict a significant shift in the agenda towards
new allegiances based less on conservation and more on economic
imperatives—and a transfer of assets to communities that for the most part have
none. That doesn’t mean the end of conservation. But we should not assume
that indigenous economic development choices will always be the good ones.
Then again, they won’t always be bad ones: well informed and well led,
indigenous communities will make many good economic development decisions,
and they could invoke their aboriginal right to say no to development. For all
we know, they might say that more often than they say yes. The fact is, a new
era is upon us, and I think the conservation community has a significant role to
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play in helping indigenous communities make good choices about conservation
and development. Nature is resilient where it is bio-diverse. I would argue that
communities are resilient where they are culturally strong and economically
diverse.
One issue that does crop up in our work and which continues to limit confidence
in First Nations—especially among investors—is that of governance. It’s not as
if non-native people have somehow perfected how to govern our political or
economic affairs—the newspapers let us know that on a daily basis.
Nonetheless, just about everyone bemoans the problems of governance that
afflict indigenous communities. We’ve seen our fair share of poor governance
up our way. I understand that’s a big issue here, too.
Some of you might have heard of the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development. It’s a research project that has been running for more
than 20 years now under the expert eye of Stephen Cornell, who argues that
access to resources is not necessarily an essential ingredient for economic success
in indigenous communities. He argues, and offers powerful evidence, that
culturally relevant governance—regardless of access to resources—is absolutely
essential to success in Indian country. He argues that there are significant parallels
between the US experience and that of communities in Canada, Australia and
New Zealand.
Cornell argues that self-determination in indigenous communities is key to their
ability to progress. He says that for central governments, good governance means
governance on their terms, so as to facilitate service delivery in a way that appeals
to ministers and bureaucrats and, I would add, reporters. Central governments
are terrified of self-determination, because where indigenous peoples control
natural resources, there is a threat to the ability of the State to utilise those
resources or get them to market, which undermines the State’s ability to control
what happens within its borders.
No wonder that Cornell says, ‘Reluctant to address indigenous self-determination,
states instead address indigenous poverty.’
Sound familiar?
Self-determination is critical. Good governance is critical. But I must say that
on a visit last week to a remote community in Northern Australia, I saw
something pretty discouraging. I saw a community that was getting a huge
amount of money through a benefits agreement with an industrial concern,
which had set up a corporation to manage that money. I saw nothing culturally
relevant in any of this. In fact, I was told by their earnest non-Indigenous adviser
that the corporation was run according to the rules of the Corporations Act in
Australia. Minutes are taken, live on PowerPoint, before the Indigenous people’s
very eyes. However, this same adviser had just finished telling me that every
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adult person in the community was illiterate and innumerate. So whose agenda
does this serve? Is this what the framers of the Corporations Act had in mind? I
have in mind something less corporate. Perhaps something more
cooperative—modelled along the lines of the cooperative economic experience
of the Emilia Romagna region of Italy. Is there not a governance model based on
principles of the gift exchange, on reciprocity, that is more relevant to Indigenous
communities than trying to find a cultural way to build a corporation, or a
corporate way to rebuild a culture? I don’t know the answer to this, but I believe
it is a question that deserves an answer.
In two trips—last week in the Kimberley and Kakadu, and three years ago to
Kimberley and Cape York—I’ve seen some discouraging things in your
Indigenous communities, and I’ve seen great potential. There are tremendous
reserves of resilience based, I believe, on retained culture and on conserved
country. While I haven’t seen that much to inspire me in respect to new economic
models, I think you have many of the conditions that I believe are essential to
building a conservation economy.
Both of these trips to the north have been sponsored by the Australian
Conservation Foundation and its partners (including Land and Water Australia),
who see value in our approach in Canada. There is a proposal afoot to start an
Ecotrust Australia, and it might just be up and running in six months or so. I
hope it is, and I hope it is a remarkable success.
I don’t for a minute imagine that Ecotrust’s approach, adapted for Australian
circumstances, will solve all the woes of your Indigenous communities or
somehow magically convert an economy built on gross resource extraction and
consumption into a conservation economy—at least not right away.
But surely what is happening to your climate (the drought)—and indeed to the
Earth’s climate—suggests that the need for alternative development models is
urgent. And I think there is a way to pay for them, too. As you embark on
emissions trading here, and as markets in carbon offsets and other ecosystem
services continue their meteoric growth, I think we need a system not just of
carbon capture, but ‘capital capture’. Given that new capital markets are opening
up precisely because of an awakening to the perils of climate change (among
other environmental threats), surely we can find ways to spend that capital on
solutions. To invest in new technologies, for sure—but also in new development
models, and most urgently in indigenous communities.
My fellow Canadian Naomi Klein has written a remarkable book called The Shock
Doctrine: The rise of disaster capital. Its focus is mainly on American global
hegemony, both military and economic, over the past 50 years. But I think the
post-contact, colonial experience has been one long, continuous spasm of ‘disaster
capital’, and nowhere have its effects been more evident than in aboriginal
country around the world.
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We’ve seen a remarkable decline in cultural capital, and community capital, in
the past 200 years. We have to start—now—building what Jane Jacobs has so
wisely referred to as ‘reliably prosperous’ communities. These are the
communities that we envision are the constituent parts of a conservation
economy. I know that such a thing—a conservation economy—might seem
somewhat wistful or quixotic. But it’s the only one I want to live in—and it
seems a much safer place to be than in an economy that is melting down around
us as I speak.
Re-engineer the whole economy? Why not? The Berlin Wall came down. Who
would have predicted that? Nelson Mandela got out of prison. The Soviet Union
broke up. Suharto was swept from power. Or somewhat more tangibly to us
mere mortals, consider that people no longer smoke in airplanes—or just about
anywhere else for that matter. Thirty years ago, who would have predicted
radical social change like any of the above? So why not a new economy? Why
not reliable prosperity? Why not a triple bottom line? Why not economically,
ecologically, culturally and socially successful indigenous communities?
My friend and an Ecotrust Canada board member, Eric Young, writes about how
the world gets changed in a book called Getting to Maybe. ‘If history shows us
anything,’ Young says, ‘it is that the obdurate world does yield.
Change—surprising and sometimes radical change—does happen. The world
does turn on its head every once in a while. And what seemed almost impossible
looking forward seems almost inevitable looking back.’ So it is—or so I believe
it will be—with the conservation economy.
ENDNOTES
1 This essay was originally presented as an ANZSOG Public Lecture on 17 September 2008.
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16. From crystal sets to the double
helix in one journalist’s lifetime1
Peter Thompson
When I was a child in the 1950s, my mother told me that she and other children
at her school at Randwick rushed outdoors to see the fly-over of Charles Kingsford
Smith on one of his epic voyages to Mascot aerodrome. My father was born in
the same decade that the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk. This bygone era
of technology so dated my view of my parents that they might as well have lived
in the time of fossils rather than in the world that I knew.
Now, I find myself caught in my own time warp. The change that
communications technology has wrought has made my childhood experiences
a remnant of a long-eclipsed era. I have spent my working life immersed in the
technology of what used to be called ‘mass media’ but which somehow lost the
‘mass’ bit along the way. I realise now that I too am a fossil. Of the crystal set
era!
I first marvelled at the gadgetry of my techno-age when I watched boys attach
their crystal set radios to the wire fences of the school tennis courts. These
ingenious little devices could tune into AM radio using only the power of the
station’s own transmitter.
The first inkling of my future as a journalist came when I accompanied my
dashing Uncle Ray to his work as editor of the yellowish Sunday Mirror at the
News Limited offices on the corner of Holt and Kippax Streets in Sydney. Could
work be this exciting? Long screeds of copy were run back and forth by copy
boys, each time bearing new coloured pencil notations and markings. They were
handed to the typesetter, after which the apron-wearing compositor would lay
out metal blocks of the text and images ready for the presses. I took home a
block bearing my name and my destiny was half decided. At home, I laid out
the first and last edition of The International, circulation: one copy. Later on, I
was to find it easier to talk for a living rather than write.
In the school library, as a twelve year old, I read John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in
Courage to learn more about the hero president who had been killed the year
before. These dramas of former statesmen stirred my own fantasies about
pursuing a noble career as a politician. And it must be said I took down copies
of parliamentary Hansard. How impossibly important to have your every spoken
word recorded for posterity! Now, the two consistent pathways in my life began
to merge: a passion for journalism (and communication) and an abiding interest
in politics.
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In the Sydney of my childhood in the 1950s and 1960s, Cinesound Review and
its competitor, Movietone News, were entering their twilight years as the
showcases of documentary newsreels that would accompany the ‘shorts’ before
the feature film at the ‘pictures’.
An all-newsreel cinema operated in the basement of the grandly ornate State
Theatre, in Market Street, Sydney. I went there hand in hand with my parents.
It was easy for me to imagine wartime crowds queuing up to get their fill of the
latest sanitised documentary footage of conflicts raging in Europe and the near
Pacific. Drama and atmosphere were added to the images by the exaggeratedly
declaratory voice-overs and martial music. Much of the film work was masterfully
shot by brave young cameramen such as Damien Parer, who trudged the Kokoda
Track alongside the diggers. The introduction of television into Australia in
1956 slowly killed off the newsreel and ushered in a new communications age.
The television, the communications satellite (first launched in 1963) and the
jumbo jet became symbols of a new era of ‘speed’ and ‘access’ that tore down
the barriers that separated people by psychological and physical distance, mind
and body. You could go anywhere in the world in a day; talk to anyone, any
place, at any time; or sit numbed by a continuous stream of news, pseudo-news
and entertainment on the box (and later on computers and mobile phones and
a combination of the two). This transformation in ‘connectivity’ would help
transform cultural norms and was a taproot of globalisation. Over just a few
decades, one world had morphed into another. The world at war already seemed
far back.
Imagine 1939–45 wartime Canberra and its physical isolation. The Prime Minister,
John Curtin, sat in the bush capital, with telegrams still acting as a primary form
of communication. A journey to his home town of Perth meant an arduous
journey by transcontinental train or by coastal shipping for most travellers. A
small coterie of print journalists tapped out the news from the press gallery to
their head offices around the country.
Imagine wartime Washington. President Roosevelt had expanded his personal
office in the White House to cope with the growing demands of the job. When
he became president at the height of the Great Depression, one correspondence
secretary was sufficient to handle the flow of mail into and out of his office.
Roosevelt had mastered the new medium, radio, and in stentorian tones had
delivered his renowned ‘fireside chats’, which sounded much more like lectures
than chats. He made 30 of these broadcasts between 1933 and 1944.
Imagine wartime London. Winston Churchill made his great speeches in the
House of Commons but an actor, Norman Shelley, then mimicked Churchill to
repeat the same speeches for broadcast on the BBC. As the great American
journalist Edward R. Murrow observed, Churchill mobilised the English language
and sent it into battle. Television, with its demands for intimate speech rather
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than platform oratory, would soon bring down the curtain on the age of rhetoric
of which Churchill and Martin Luther King Junior were the last exemplars.
Back in 1939, the ABC broadcast Neville Chamberlain’s declaration of war live
via BBC short wave and, soon after, Robert Menzies made a live announcement
that ‘Australia is also at war’. A ‘Department of Information’, of which Sir Keith
Murdoch was briefly Director-General, censored all news reports.2
Voice was the breakthrough medium of the Second World War, presented with
formality by posh-accented radio announcers (as broadcasters were then called).
The head of the ABC, Charles Moses, for a long time held the view that
announcers should remain nameless.3
Radio began in Australia in 1923 and the ABC came into existence on 1 July
1932 with a vision of helping to unite the continent’s far-flung population. In
those heady days of the ‘wireless’, families gathered around the radio console
at night to listen to the mix of soap operas (so named because of their soap
company advertisers on commercial stations), talks, music and news. Richard
Boyer, appointed chairman of the ABC by the Chifley Government and after
whom the Boyer Lectures were named, called radio more revolutionary than the
internal combustion engine (an ambitious claim; at least it produced less
greenhouse gas).4
During the war, the ABC still relied for news content on negotiated agreements
with wire services and newspapers, although a number of ABC reporters, such
as Chester Wilmot and John Hinde, became voices of the Australian war effort.
An independent ABC news service was finally introduced on 1 July 1947, a year
after the broadcast of Parliament began—an experiment that the politicians of
the day were sure would raise the prestige of their debates.
The television era
It’s now more than five decades since Bruce Gyngell stood in front of the camera
at TCN 9 Sydney and uttered the words, ‘Good evening ladies and gentlemen.
Welcome to television.’ When television was introduced into Australia in 1956
to coincide with the staging of the Melbourne Olympics, crowds gathered around
shop windows to watch coverage of the games and marvel at the new medium.
If a television set was beyond the pocket of the family budget then rental was
a popular option. TV’s socialising influence would soon far outreach radio’s
impact. Television spread with enormous speed throughout Australia. By 1960,
70 per cent of homes in Sydney and Melbourne had a TV set, rising to 90 per
cent in established markets by mid-decade. The combination of ‘live’ variety
shows, American movies, soapies, comedy, BBC dramas, sit-coms, sport and
news proved irresistible to the growing consumer society.
The Menzies Government held in its hands the gift of granting licences to
virtually print money. Those licences went to existing media owners after a
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royal commission and public hearings by the Australian Broadcasting Control
Board. Fairfax got ATN 7 in Sydney; the Herald and Weekly Times got HSV 7 in
Melbourne; a consortium of the soon to be defunct Argus, Syme, Hoyts and
Greater Union got GTV 9 in Melbourne; and Frank Packer’s Consolidated Press
established TCN 9 in Sydney. By 1965, television advertising accounted for 24
per cent of total advertising spent. It climbed to more than 35 per cent after
1980.5
ABC—from promise to paucity
The ABC was granted a piece of the action with its own television network. The
Australian model was starkly different to the United Kingdom’s. The BBC
commenced experimental TV broadcasts in 1932 and it took off its training
wheels in 1946 when TV recommenced after being suspended during the war.
The BBC had a monopoly on television for 20 years and then faced only limited
commercial competition (Independent Television or ITV). BBC2 commenced
broadcasting in 1964 with a brief to produce more specialist programs after the
Pilkington Inquiry had roundly criticised the poor quality of ITV programs.
By contrast, the ABC never enjoyed a head start over its rivals although the
postwar Chifley Government had proposed a public television service rather
than a dual public/commercial system. In Australia, the weighting of licences
in favour of commercial versus ABC was 2:1 then 3:1 after the launch of the
third commercial network by 0/10 in 1964–65. In the United Kingdom, the
playing field was tilted in the other direction. The BBC’s monopoly on radio
broadcasting extended far longer, lasting until the 1970s. The British population
didn’t appear to suffer long-term harm from its diet of BBC. Indeed, the Beeb’s
long lead time in establishing its culture of broadcasting goes a long way to
explain why its cultural content is arguably Britain’s most important export.
The vision of the BBC’s founder, Lord Reith, of building a platform of cultural
excellence was more than half a world away from the ABC’s founding purpose
of helping unite a disparate and far-flung population spread over a continent.
Caution about innovation and looking after the interests of existing players has
been the hallmark of governments’ approach to new communication technology.
Proprietors and politicians alike have a mutual love of exercising power and
coexist in a relationship of considerable nervous tension towards each other.
The politician doesn’t want to alienate the interests of the media owner for fear
of being turned on by the press. On the other hand, the media proprietor steps
warily around the politician for fear of loss to their commercial interests in the
carve-up and regulation of public assets, like access to the airwaves. This
softly-softly approach delayed colour television in Australia, it permanently
shelved the introduction of a fourth commercial network and it long postponed
the introduction of pay TV.
208
Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy
My first appearances on television, mustering all the authority of a
nineteen-year-old Walter Cronkite, were in black and white. Colour television
was finally switched on in 1975, more than a decade after its introduction in the
United States and eight years after Britain. The network owners wanted the
competitive advantages of colour but sought time to gear up for the change.
Sadly, the legacy of 50 years of Australian television is a notable
underachievement in creative output. This is not to say that our talent pool has
been lacking. Far from it. There have been many flashes of outstanding drama
and miniseries such as Brides of Christ and Changi. There has been genuinely
brilliant natural history and wildlife documentary making, especially in the
hands of David and Liz Parer. Cop shows turned out by Crawford Productions
such as Homicide (500 episodes), Matlock Police and Division 4 had their heyday.
Closer to the bone were shows such as Blue Murder, Phoenix and Wildside. Soapies
such as Bellbird, The Sullivans, A Country Practice (a 12-year run), Neighbours
and Home and Away have done well for domestic audiences and in some cases
as exports. Variety had Mavis Bramston, Graeme Kennedy and Hey, Hey It’s
Saturday. Children’s television has enjoyed the consistently strong backbone of
Play School. Comedies such as Frontline and Kath and Kim have tickled audiences.
And the reality television era made its dubious debut with Sylvania Waters in
1992. And, who could deny the value of the invention of one-day cricket as a
television product?
Yet, all in all, audiences have been fed a 50-year diet of mostly American junk
TV. Local content rules brought about the production of cheap product such as
game shows, sport and low-end variety and did not so much raise the bar of
quality as produce a lowest common denominator response to meet the minimum
required hours. Alas, the failure of Australia’s television industry to achieve
much of its cultural potential has been a missed opportunity in the nation’s social
development.
The creative arts are the mirror and conscience of a nation. It is through our
stories that we come to know ourselves and what we stand for. Perhaps it was
a manifestation of our notorious cultural cringe in the foundation years of
television that such an opportunity to develop our cultural industries was
stillborn.
The founding of the National Institute of Dramatic Art in 1959 and the Film and
Television School (‘Radio’ has been added to its title) in 1973 were important
steps in the direction of developing a talent base on which to build a robust
performing arts/media industry. The renaissance of the Australian film industry
in the 1970s and 1980s created brave hopes that it might nurture and sustain
the excellent credentials of filmmakers, but it turned out to be more like a
short-lived gold rush to pour money into the 10BA tax scheme. It was a policy
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tragedy: a combination of good intentions to support an industry and a tax rort
that was bound to draw adverse attention to itself.
A serious blow to the ABC was the scrapping of the television and radio licensing
fee by the Whitlam Government and substituting direct funding from the federal
budget. It was a popular move at the time and supporters of the ABC were
blindsided by the temporary largesse of the government. The licence fee was a
nuisance for consumers to pay and for government to collect. But the licence
had the virtue of making funds for the ABC quite an explicit commitment.
Funding has been on a gradual downhill slide ever since and the blood flow
wasn’t staunched by David Hill’s ‘eight cents a day’ campaign. Now, the BBC,
still paid for by licence fees, enjoys nine times the income of the ABC.
A flickering bright moment in the history of television came with the introduction
of SBS by the Fraser Government. Its TV service was launched in October 1980
to serve Australia’s ethnically diverse communities. It has been one of the more
visible examples of our multicultural society at work. More than half of its
broadcasts are in languages other than English. Always under-resourced, SBS
has in recent years been playing with the devil by introducing commercials in
the hope that government will still feed it basic funding.
The decline in the output of Australian drama by the ABC has been alarming.
In 2001, the ABC produced 102 hours a year but this had fallen away to 21 hours
in 2004 and it continued its decline in 2005 when it produced barely a dozen
hours a year of new TV drama. This decline has been echoed in the independent
television sector, where in 2004–05 the number of productions was just 33, the
second lowest in 15 years. 6
This feeble contribution to the nation’s culture was the legacy of a federal funding
squeeze on the one hand and the extension of new services such as online, ABC
2, NewsRadio and digital radio networks on the other. The Howard Government
continued to pare back ABC funding, following the lead of the Keating
Government, which had conspicuously ignored the ABC in its boost to arts
funding under the ‘Creative Nation’ program of 1994.
Radio
FM technology brought a high-fidelity breakthrough to radio. First patented in
1933, FM became widespread in the United States in the 1950s. FM radio was
one technology where the ABC did get a break on the field. ABC FM, now Classic
FM, began broadcasts in January 1976 to Adelaide, Melbourne, Canberra and
Sydney. A year earlier, the ABC had launched its 24-hour-a-day youth station,
2JJ (later Triple J).
The launch of FM led to a migration of music formats to the new band and a
consolidation of talk radio on AM. In the case of the ABC, the reorganisation led
to the birth of Radio National, which replaced ‘Radio 2’ in 1985. Over the next
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decade, the service was extended to more than 300 transmitters throughout
Australia. Radio National developed a fiercely loyal audience and fulfilled ABC
obligations to provide specialist programs that were culturally diverse and
educational. Australia is lucky to have such a culturally rich resource.
The commercial launch of FM came in 1980 with the inauguration of 3EON (now
Triple M) in Melbourne. The existing AM proprietors were understandably
frightened of the competitive threat posed by FM and poured lobbying efforts
into protecting their interests. The new licences were auctioned for big sums.
The potential of pay television to wrest market share from the free-to-air
networks rattled vested interests too. Cable television was introduced to the
United States in the late 1940s. Yet again Australia lagged behind, holding up
the introduction of pay TV until 1995. It’s now in about 25 per cent (1.27 million)
of Australian homes, a low penetration rate compared with countries such as
Canada, where there is 70 per cent connection. Pay’s early years were marked
by the madness of a duplicate roll out of cable across suburban Australia by
Telstra and Optus as the telcos competed to take big equity positions in the
converging world of telecommunications and media. The slow take-up and big
investments squeezed both players until ultimately the Telstra-backed Foxtel
won the competitive game. Its digital service, introduced in 2004, now offers
100 channels. Fearing a backlash from viewers/voters who stood to lose free-to-air
access to major sporting events, the government drew up a long list of events
that would be protected from ‘siphoning’ to pay TV.
The long battle waged by the old media proprietors to protect themselves against
the onslaught of new media has prompted a reordering of investment priorities.
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation has poured capital into upstart digital
services such as MySpace while James Packer has turned his attention to gaming.
Of the big players, Fairfax is the only one that still looks like a traditional media
company, though it has made some costly investments in the digital world.
Decline of newspapers
In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 2005, Murdoch
reminded the audience that while four out of five Americans read a newspaper
every day in the mid 1960s, only half that many did today. The figures for
younger readers are far bleaker:
One writer, Philip Meyer, has even suggested in his book The Vanishing
Newspaper that looking at today’s declining newspaper readership—and
continuing that line, the last reader recycles the last printed paper in
2040—April, 2040, to be exact. There are a number of reasons for our
inertia in the face of this advance. First, newspapers as a medium for
centuries enjoyed a virtual information monopoly—roughly from the
birth of the printing press to the rise of radio. We never had a reason to
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second-guess what we were doing. Second, even after the advent of
television, a slow but steady decline in readership was masked by
population growth that kept circulations reasonably intact. Third, even
after absolute circulations started to decline in the 1990s, profitability
did not.7
In Australia, the first newspaper to go after the advent of television was the
Melbourne Argus, founded in 1846. In the classic mogul style of smothering
competition, the Herald and Weekly Times bought the Argus and the parcel of
shares it owned in GTV 9 (the Herald and Weekly Times already controlled HSV
7) and soon onsold the shares and closed the paper in 1957.
The arrival of the bright new national titles, The Australian in 1964 and the
Australian Financial Review (weekly 1951, twice weekly 1961, daily 1963),
marked an important stage in the development of more specialised political,
industrial relations and business reporting in Australia. Also, for the first time,
newspapers were starting to reach over state borders and take a national
perspective on public affairs.
Almost inevitably, television’s octopus grip on leisure hours made life
unsustainable for afternoon papers. They still limped on for quite some time.
The Sydney Sun was closed in 1988. Even Canberra had an afternoon paper,
Canberra News, a Fairfax publication from 1969 to 1974. Perth’s Daily News
ceased in 1990. Brisbane’s Sun closed in December 1991 (it had been a morning
paper from 1982 to 1988). The closure of the Adelaide News in 1992 brought
down the curtain on the last afternoon paper in the country.
Valiant efforts were made to save the nation’s most successful afternoon paper,
the Melbourne Herald. It had been published in the evening since 1869 and,
with Keith Murdoch as editor-in-chief after his return from being a war
correspondent at Gallipoli, it became the largest circulation newspaper in the
country. It reached a peak of 500 000 in 1964.8  Energetic editor Eric Beecher
pushed the Herald upmarket in its final years but the venerable masthead went
down. A limp attempt was made to create multi-edition ‘24-hour’ newspapers
with the closure of the Melbourne Herald and Sydney’s last afternoon paper,
the Daily Mirror, but this was really a smokescreen for morphing the titles into
their morning stablemates, the Melbourne Sun and the Sydney Daily Telegraph.
Internet
The sunset year for the Melbourne Herald, 1990, marked a key moment in the
dawning of the Internet age. Tim Berners-Lee created a hypertext system for
use among scientists. Two years later, the offspring of this technology, the World
Wide Web, was born. The idea of networking had first been outlined in a series
of memos written by J. C. R. Licklider at MIT in 1962. He imagined a ‘galactic
network’ of linked computers that could instantly access data and programs
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from other computers.9 With the Internet, like many advances in science and
technology, effort was poured into developing the ideas as part of the US response
to the Russian lead in the space race and as part of efforts to improve
command-and-control systems of nuclear missiles. What’s been called the first
‘hot’ application of the technology was sending emails in 1972. Another
breakthrough idea that shaped the Internet we enjoy today was Bob Kahn’s
notion of an ‘open architecture’ Internet protocol, which meant there was no
international controlling body that operated the system.
The giddying potential of the Internet for information exchange fuelled the
dot-com bubble on Wall Street that burst in 2001. Amid the hysteria, many back
office staff of internet companies became overnight paper millionaires after stock
market floats. The absence of sustainable business models that could generate
revenues to match the burning of cash was something of a problem.
Despite the excessive exuberance on the part of crazed investors who could see
only dollar signs in their eyes, the Internet did go some way to rewriting the
rules of commerce. From banking to ordering and distribution services, to
knowledge industries and media, the Internet was revolutionary. Names such
as eBay, Google, Amazon and YouTube grew from minnows to whales in the
digital pond.
The Internet and digital revolutions posed two dilemmas for traditional media
companies. How could they beat the anywhere, anytime accessibility of the Net
and digital space? And, how could they staunch the flow of advertising dollars
to the new media?
In Australia, companies such as Fairfax were especially vulnerable. They had
built revenue models heavily dependent on classified advertising. Even though
the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age were easily outsold in their markets by
rival newspapers, they held sway over the classifieds. It would no longer be so
easy. Competitors emerged with internet classifieds in the key areas of housing,
cars and jobs. At Fairfax, incoming CEO Fred Hilmer was set the task of taking
$40 million a year in costs out of the business to meet dwindling revenues. A
wave of journalists or, as Fred called them, ‘content providers’, went. Then, as
part of the company’s positioning in the dot-com business, Fairfax paid $625
million in 2006 for New Zealand’s net classified site, TradeMe.
Internet technology was decoupling the nexus between the news business and
advertising. News was expensive to gather, with the bigger newspapers and the
ABC each employing hundreds of journalists. Its high cost base demanded sizeable
revenues to sustain. If advertisers had a dwindling need to use old media
‘channels’ then it followed that their business models were at risk.
Step into the ABC’s compact online news operation in Brisbane and glimpse the
future. A journalist writes a story and instantly edits the text, walks a few metres
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into a studio that’s little more than a telephone booth in size, dabs on a little
make-up if their vanity demands it, switches the camera on, records the story,
steps outside to edit it, then presses ‘send’ and it’s all but ready for viewing by
a global audience. No waiting for the seven o’clock news anymore. In 2006, the
ABC web site averaged 22 million page views a week.10
Newspapers are catching on. Their web sites are rapidly becoming interactive,
boundary-less news operations, featuring written text, audio and video clips as
well as blog sites and mini-polling stations that invite people to express attitudes
about news of the day. Visits to these sites are growing rapidly. In the year to
June 2006, smh.com.au grew 30 per cent, theage.com.au was up 32 per cent and
news.com.au visits rose 31 per cent. The awkward issue for the accountant
seeking to balance the books at traditional media organisations is that audiences
see little need to pay for any of these basic services.
Some theorists of the new communication technology claim that the Internet
has profoundly shifted power relationships in the media towards consumers.
They equate ‘connectivity’ with ‘control’ and envisage an unstoppable
democratisation of the Net. In this model, everyone becomes a journalist. There
are famous examples of where previously anonymous individuals have gained
worldwide attention through blogging. Remember the diary ‘Where is Raed?’
by the blogger using the name ‘Salam Pax’ that chronicled day-to-day existence
in Iraq after the invasion of 2003? Of course, if you do know about his story,
chances are you learned about it through traditional media.
China makes an interesting case study in government efforts to retain censorship
controls. The Net is widespread in China. Next to Tsinghua University, Beijing’s
version of MIT, the multicoloured Google logo stands on top of a technology
park building adjacent to the campus. As their price of admission to the lucrative
Chinese market, Google and Yahoo have done deals with the central government
restricting access to certain topic areas. You won’t find reference to Falun Gong
in a Chinese search engine. Access to sites on the Tiananmen Square uprising of
1989 is limited. The big net companies have been just as willing to bend to
China’s whims as Rupert Murdoch did when his publishing house dropped the
book East and West by Hong Kong’s last governor, Chris Patten. The risk to his
Star TV satellite rights was too great.
New genres of journalism
Inevitably, the emerging technologies have brought with them new forms of
journalism. The ABC introduced 4 Corners in 1961 based on the BBC’s Panorama.
Early programs that questioned venerable institutions such as the RSL soon
upset the establishment but the genie was out of the bottle. 4 Corners programs
would often take many weeks to research and this particular culture of long-form
journalism made challenging demands on reporters and producers. Chris Masters,
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the doyen of the art, joined in 1983. Two of his programs had profound political
repercussions. His very first report, ‘The big league’, led to a prosecution of the
chief stipendiary magistrate in New South Wales and a commission of inquiry
during which the Premier, Neville Wran, stood aside from office. ‘The moonlight
state’ shone the torch on police and political corruption in Queensland, led to
the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry and was a factor in a change of government
after decades of National Party rule.
Pilots for a possible nightly program on the ABC began in the mid 1960s. The
unfortunately named Week created nightmares for the promotion department
when announcements were made to the effect, ‘Next week on Week’. This Day
Tonight began broadcasting in 1967 and rapidly had its impact on the nation’s
political culture. For the first time, politicians were subjecting themselves to
tough cross-examination from a new breed of self-assured journalists. There
were many celebrated incidents in the program’s early days, such as federal
police storming a studio in pursuit of a draft dodger conducting a live interview.
He was spirited out the rear door.
The arrival of nightly current affairs programs put politicians into lounge rooms
in a way that had not occurred before. Inevitably, it enhanced the fortunes of
political actors who were quick on their feet, looked good on television and
could sell a political message in quick grabs.
The coaxial cable, laid between Sydney and Melbourne in the mid 1960s, made
possible simultaneous network broadcasts between the two major cities. Prior
to the cable, television film was flown in the TAA and Ansett ANA fleet of
Electra turbo-props and would need to leave one city early in the afternoon to
make the evening news in the other.
Before the introduction of microwave technology, Tasmania remained dependent
on air shipping of film. For example, Gough Whitlam’s short-lived weekly news
conferences were held in Canberra on Tuesdays and made the TV news in
Tasmania on Wednesdays.
Commercial television was not far behind the ABC in introducing nightly current
affairs. Mike Willesee, the talented presenter of 4 Corners, created a start-up
show for the Nine Network, A Current Affair, that brought a tabloid feel to its
content in order to generate audiences. Politicians such as Whitlam, Fraser,
Hawke and Keating would make appearances on ACA in days gone by, but A
Current Affair and its imitator on Seven, Today Tonight, have exited the field of
politics altogether in favour of a line-up of stories dominated by diets, celebrities
and rip-offs.
60 Minutes brought a new style to journalism. Its founding philosophy,
unchanged to this day, was to personalise stories so that an issue could be
explored through the experience of one person. This produced a time-honoured
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maxim that journalists needed to ‘forget the flood and find Noah’. A clever
formula of creating celebrities out of its team of reporters and its populist story
selection built and sustained an unrivalled Sunday night audience for the show.
Where necessary, 60 Minutes gets out the chequebook and buys access to
sensational stories such as the sky-high dalliance of actor Ralph Fiennes and the
airline stewardess.
An amendment to the law allowing broadcasting of telephone calls in the mid
1960s, so long as they were accompanied by a beep or pip, changed the direction
of radio. Talk radio was born. Some of the top personalities of radio turned their
talents to the new genre. Ormsby Wilkins, Claudia Wright and Norman Banks
at 3AW in Melbourne built strong audiences by tackling topical issues, as did
John Laws in Sydney. John Pearce discovered that calling an irritating caller a
‘nitwit’ or other insult created controversy that attracted rather than repelled
most listeners.
In the later 1960s, a number of serious journalists entered the commercial radio
world as presenters and set a high standard of discussion and debate. Brian
White pioneered a news-talk formula at 2GB and Anne Deveson brought a then
rare female voice to her Newsmakers. At 2UE, Steve Liebmann broke similar
ground. Their work was an inspiration to me and I somehow convinced the
management of provincial 7LA in Launceston to allow me to try a similar format
by calling guests to discuss the day’s events.
In 1967, the ABC introduced AM, followed by PM in 1969. Their arrival marked
a coming of age for radio journalism in Australia and they soon set the standard
for reporting and analysis on the medium. A listener to the programs today
would be quite shocked to hear the scratchy sound quality of ‘circuits’ that
carried reporters’ voices in those early days. The content has changed too. In
the 1970s and 1980s, AM would regularly carry stories of high drama in the
House of Commons and BBC reporters were often heard from places where no
ABC journalist had reached. AM was short and snappy with items not often
exceeding two minutes. Reporters were given a razor blade and editing block
on their first day on the job and learnt the art of fine cutting audio tape. Office
floors were festooned with miles of discarded tape. Today, everything is edited
digitally.
Skilful politicians such as John Howard have exploited the opportunity offered
by talk radio to the full. In a keynote address to the centre-right parties’
International Democratic Union in Washington in June 2002, Howard shared
his thoughts about the power of the medium:
The Australian experience with the media is instructive. Like all
democratic nations I guess, Australia is no different in the sense that
there is a greater preponderance of people in the media of a…how should
I put it mildly and gently and diplomatically…of a gentle centre left
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disposition. Talk back radio is tremendously important in Australia.
Enormously important. It has played a greater role in shaping and
determining the outcome of elections over the last few years than perhaps
has been the case with other sections of the media. I was having a
discussion with Ian Duncan Smith [then UK Conservative Party Leader]
earlier and I said to him that radio in Australia I found to be the iron
lung of Opposition. We would always get a run. There is so much of it.
And you couldn’t devour enough of it. And whether that is the same in
all of your countries, you individually will know.
John Howard was certainly a welcome guest on Radio National Breakfast during
my eight years at the helm. Covering politics was central to our program brief
and our audience’s expectations. In the final two years of my tenure, 2003–04,
I worked with the talented producer Jacquie Harvey, who was a veteran of
commercial current affairs programs (3AW and Mark Day in Melbourne) and of
ABC programs such as Lateline during Kerry O’Brien’s period as host. We
wrestled with a dilemma to which there was no easy answer. While we remained
fully committed to covering politics, we worried that audiences were bored by
the utter predictability of politicians’ spin where virtually everything was said
for its effect rather than enlightenment.
So, instead of covering politics mostly by talking to politicians, we experimented
with a different approach. First, we overturned a convention that all breakfast
segments must be short in duration and introduced long debates on the salient
issues of the day, often of 20 minutes or more. Though politicians were not
disqualified as guests, we much preferred talking to people at least one step
removed from the frontline. Following John Maynard Keynes’ aphorism that
‘even the most practical man of affairs is usually in the thrall of the ideas of some
long dead economist’, we searched out people at the source of ideas that were
shaping political actions. Often we would seek policy wonks or leading global
thinkers on issues.
Audience response was overwhelmingly positive. For the first time, Radio
National Breakfast achieved its peak share of the market after 7.30am, just when
we ran these debates. What explains its apparent success? It certainly convinced
me that there is a substantial audience hungry for a high-calibre discussion of
public affairs that goes beyond the banalities of much political discourse. Go to
writers’ or ideas festivals around the country and you get the same sense. People
want to engage with ideas.
Sadly, at the other end of the spectrum, there’s money in muck. From the early
days of the ‘top 40’, Australian commercial radio was always derivative of trends
set in the US market. Radio programmers would make the pilgrimage across the
Pacific to air-check new formats and DJs. In time, the emergence of a nasty brand
of ‘shock jock’ radio in the United States was imitated here. To be charitable,
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you might call the offerings populist. It’s closer to the truth to say that they are
often bullying, vindictive towards vulnerable groups and individuals and just
plain ugly. Technical gizmos ensure that the shock jock can override the voice
of any incoming dissident caller and, of course, they can choose to terminate
the conversation at any time.
Talk radio has been lorded over by demigods with inflated egos and a tiresome
sense of self-importance but it has also operated as something of a release valve
for public pressure. It has become a sort of permanent ‘vox pop’, the modern-day
equivalent of neighbours yakking over the back fence.
In 1999, the lucrative commercial arrangements that greased the incomes of radio
millionaires such as Alan Jones and John Laws were exposed in the notorious
‘cash for comment’ affair. It worked like this. If a sponsor wanted favourable
comment on their business, they paid up. In return, they received not
advertisements but favourable editorial mentions. Banks, for instance, which
had been under sustained consumer pressure for years for closing branches and
offering terrible service, suddenly became the subject of friendly editorial
comment. Telstra was another case in point. One moment it did no end of harm.
In the next, Telstra was praised as a good corporate citizen after all. Too bad if
these inconsistencies were confusing to listeners. There was big money at stake.
Expensive lawyers for all the main players argued out the issue before the
Broadcasting Authority and it was decided the arrangements could stay so long
as the presenters made occasional mention of their friendly sponsors’ names.
The talk phenomenon plays best when presenters work themselves into a lather
of righteous indignation. Taking a populist ‘moral’ position on a highly charged
emotional issue is a ratings winner. This ‘opinion-led’ journalism on radio soon
began to infect newspapers. Pick up a smartly edited tabloid paper and you’ll
find no absence of moral guidance about how to interpret the leading story of
the day and you won’t have to go to the opinion page to find it.
A sample of weekday front-page headlines of the Daily Telegraph amply
demonstrates the point. In the space of just over a week in January–February
2007, on Tuesday: ‘Save our state. Cut property taxes now—or ruin the next
generation of young homebuyers.’ On Thursday: ‘Drug barons: sick Aussies
ripped off as pharmaceutical companies create sham medicine shortages.’ On
Friday: ‘Two years of total chaos. Exclusive: what Labor didn’t tell you about
its water desalination plant.’ And, on the following Tuesday, ‘All torque. What
has 904 wheels, 226 fuel tanks, 1356 cylinders and exposes our MPs as climate
change hypocrites?’ And, on Thursday: ‘Road to ruin. Tunnel’s final disgrace:
$60m lost from public servants’ superannuation fund.’ Are you feeling happier
about the world after reading that litany? The headlines all work to provoke a
high emotional response in a low-trust environment about the perceived sins of
big government and big business.
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It is still early days for journalism on the Net. In the United States, the Drudge
Report, originated by Matt Drudge about 1994, achieved notoriety by being first
with the scandalous Monica Lewinsky story that by a long chain of events led
to the impeachment of President Clinton. In Australia, Stephen Mayne, a former
(unsuccessful) political minder to Jeff Kennett, began Crikey.com, a site that is
a mix of gossip and titbits.
In the United States, there has been a migration of some serious journalists to
the Net, including John Harris, national politics editor of The Washington Post,
who has joined a subscription web site, The Politico, which is building a reporting
staff of 30 journalists.11  Sites such as Salon.com offer serious commentary and
analysis and are a bright alternative to the mainstream press.
Efficiency is the great advantage of accessing news on the Net. It is available
anywhere, anytime. There’s no need to wait tiresomely for the next radio or
television news bulletin and then find that it doesn’t cover the item you are
interested in. And good sites make for quick and easy navigation to the stories
of interest. Radio and television, which had the great advantage of immediacy
over newspapers, are now the slow coaches.
Double helix
What can we say about how ‘the media age’ shapes politics? In turn, how does
politics shape the media world?
A metaphor from biology seems appropriate. In 1953, just as the nascent
television industry in Australia was gearing up for its launch, two scientists,
James D. Watson and Francis Crick, offered the world the image of the ‘double
helix’ to describe how DNA was constructed. Watson was supposedly on an
LSD trip when he saw the vision.
In many respects, the ‘double helix’ fits the media/government relationship,
where both strands twist together to form its DNA. Like the image of the double
helix, both spirals engage in a dance around each other, centred on the same
axis. Neither strand manages to fully dominate the other.
One strand contains ‘money’ elements of the relationship, the other the ‘black
box’ of content. The ‘money’ thread holds the ‘legislative’ codes that have
unlocked the enormous market power of the technological revolution that is
modern media. Government paced the introduction of key technologies (where
it could) and bestowed favours on media proprietors through regulating the
playing field. It is the politicians who enact the laws. So, appearances give the
impression that the government is the dominant force in shaping the structural
thread but the reality is somewhat different. No government idly transgresses
on the commercial interests of the handful of owners. Indeed, a media proprietor
expects his calls to the Prime Minister to be returned. As former NSW Premier
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Bob Carr remarked, the only thing that separates Jamie Packer from the other
dozen billionaires in Australia is that he has media interests.12
The ‘black box’ thread of the DNA contains the ‘editorial’ codes of data and
information that make up the daily news agenda. It’s the journalists who write
the headlines, present the news, interview the politicians and pen much of the
commentary. So, appearances give the impression that this role makes journalists
the dominating force in the content thread. Again, the reality is somewhat
different. Journalists and politicians live in a tightly woven relationship of
co-dependence. Both sides are busy ‘framing’ the news to put their own
interpretation on events. Neither side wants to yield to the other’s version. A
prime minister expects his or her calls to an editor to be returned. The editor
will call, but if they are worth their salt, will not necessarily buckle.
The helix shape, of course, corresponds to a ‘screw’ and perhaps that is the more
fitting image, as both sides of the relationship seek to screw down the other,
fastening, keeping in check, protecting their source of power as they play the
great game of politics and media.
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